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Abstract   
The right to strike is a fundamental human right recognized in international law and the South  
African Constitution. In South Africa, employees have a constitutional right to strike. Section 
23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, provides all workers with 
labour rights including the right to strike. The right to strike is given effect to in chapter IV of 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the LRA). The LRA provides 
for the requirements and limitations which employees, in exercising their right to strike, 
ought to comply with in order to ensure that their strike is protected. In terms of the LRA a 
strike is protected if it complies with the provisions of the LRA.  
  
The purpose of this study is to explore the manner in which the right to strike has been 
exercised recently in South Africa, with specific focus on the mining sector. It will be shown 
that recent strikes in the mining sector have been unprotected and characterised by an element 
of violence. This will be done to establish whether the limitations thereof, intended to combat 
unprotected strikes, serve the purpose of curbing the unprotected strikes. As a means of 
assessing how the regulation of strike action could be improved, this study will, inter alia, 
compare the law which regulated the right to strike in terms of the previous Labour Relations 
Act No. 28 of 1956 and in terms of the current Labour Relations Act No. 66 of 1995 which 
replaced the former.   
  
The study will then suggest a more effective legal means by which to curb unprotected strikes 
like those seen recently in the mining industry. This would involve adjustments, additions, 
and the tightening of strike laws. Some of these changes would involve reintroducing 
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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background and Statement of Purpose  
Industrial action is accepted as an integral part of collective bargaining and essential to the 
rights of workers. Industrial action can take many different forms, including a strike1, a lock-
out2, a picket3, a product boycott4 and protest action5. Strike action itself can take different 
                                                 
 
1  A strike is defined in s 213 of South Africa’s Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“the Act”) as meaning: 
“the partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction of work, by persons 
who are or have been employed by the same employer or by different employers, for the purpose of 
remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual interest between 
employer and employee, and every reference to “work” in this definition includes overtime work, 
whether it is voluntary or compulsory. 
2  A lock-out is defined in section 213 of the Act as meaning: “the exclusion by an employer of 
employees from the employer’s workplace for the purpose of compelling the employees to accept a 
demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between employer and employee, whether or not the 
employer breaches those employees” contracts of employment in the course of or for the purpose of 
that exclusion. 
3  Picketing is not defined in the Act. However, Barker & Holtzhausen Labour Glossary 113 describe 
picketing as “action by employees or other persons to publicize the existence of a labour dispute by 
patrolling or standing outside or near the location where the dispute is taking place, usually with 
placards indicating the nature of the dispute. The aim of the picketing might simply be to communicate 
the grievance to the public or it might be to persuade other employees in that workplace not to work 
and to take their side in the dispute, to deter scab labour, to persuade or pressurise customers not to 
enter the workplace, to disrupt deliveries or to drum up public support”.    
4  The term “product boycott” generally refers to the boycott of a certain product of an employer by 
customers or the public in support of workers who are in dispute with their employer. They do not buy 
the product or have anything to do with it until the dispute has been resolved.    
5  The term “protest action” is defined in section 213 of the Act as meaning: “the partial or complete 
concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction of work, for the purpose of promoting or 
defending the socio-economic interests of workers, but not for a purpose referred to in the definition of 
strike”.    
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forms such as an overtime ban6, a work-to-rule7, a rotating strike8, a go-slow9, an intermittent 
strike10, a secondary strike and a sympathy strike. Labour relations in South Africa are 
regulated, inter alia, by the provisions of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, which replaces 
the Labour Relations Act. 28 of 1956. The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereinafter 
referred to as the LRA) is itself subject to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,11 
(hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), which is the supreme law of the land, and it was 
enacted to give effect to s 23 of the Constitution. In terms of s 23 of the Constitution 
everyone has the right to fair labour practices.12 The section further provides that ‘every 
worker has the right to form and join a trade union; to participate in the activities and 
programmes of a trade union; and to strike’.13 The right to strike is one of the fundamental 
rights enshrined in the Constitution.14 The right to strike is necessary to give effect to the right 
to engage in collective bargaining as it corrects the inherent inequality of power in the 
employment relationship.15 Further s 64 of the LRA provides that every employee has the 
right to strike and every employer has recourse to lock-out in certain circumstances and if 
certain requirements are met.  
 
                                                 
 
6  Barker & Holtzhausen Labour Glossary 113: An overtime ban refers to a case where employees 
collectively refuse to work overtime in order to put pressure on the employer to agree to their demands 
or to address their grievances.  
7  The term “work-to-rule” refers to a case where workers collectively decide to do only what they are 
legally obliged to do in regard to their work and nothing more. Cameron et al The New Labour 
Relations Act describe the term “work-to-rule” in the following terms: “A work-to-rule occurs when 
employees act concertedly in following the terms of their contracts to the letter. If the concerted action 
is carried out in furtherance of an industrial demand, which is usually the case, and it in fact entail an 
“obstruction of work”, then perhaps it should be regarded as a strike.” 
8  Barker & Holtzhausen Labour Glossary 142 defines a rotation strike as a “strike that occurs in one or 
certain sections of an organisation at any given time, whether it moves to another or other sections 
9  Barker & Holtzhausen Labour Glossary 114:  The term “go-slow” refers to a case where workers   
               collectively work slowly in order to put pressure on their employer to agree to their demands. 
10            Barker & Holtzhausen Labour Glossary 142 define an intermittent as meaning “a repeat strike, each  
               lasting for a short time, e.g. a few hours each day or during each shift. Also known as an irritation   
               strike”. 
11 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. (1996 Constitution).  
12 Section 23 (1) of the 1996 Constitution.  
13 Section 23 (2) (a) (b) and (c) of the 1996 Constitution.  
14 Ibid.  
15 P Davies & M Freedland Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law 3 ed (1983) 292: “[I]f workers could not, 
in the last resort, collectively refuse to work, they could not bargain collectively. There can be no 
equilibrium in industrial relations without a freedom to strike.”    
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In many countries the right to strike is provided for in statutory law.16 In some it is even 
entrenched in their constitutions,17 as is the case in South Africa.18 However, like all rights, 
the right to strike may be reasonably limited in the interest of other values and goals. Section 
36 of the Constitution provides the requirements to be met in order for a limitation to be 
justified. In South Africa, there are both substantive and procedural limitations on the right to 
strike, which are set out in the LRA.19 The South African mining industry, which is the main 
focus of this thesis, has been overwhelmed by several instances of industrial action, some of 
which have been unprocedural. The propensity for workers in South Africa to undertake 
unprocedural industrial action has assumed a worrisome level in recent years and most 
especially in the mining industry. According to data collected and analysed in 2013 by the 
Department of Labour, there was an overall rise in the number of strikes as compared to 
2012.20 The Department recorded 114 industrial action incidents in 2013, an increase from 99 
recorded strikes in 2012. This in my view necessitates the assessment of current labour 
legislation in so far as its limitations of strike are concerned, so as to establish and incorporate 
constitutional systems within the LRA to combat the illegal and unprotected strikes that have 
transpired, including those in the mining industry.   
It is the purpose of this research therefore, to show that the propensity for workers in South 
Africa to undertake unprocedural industrial action has assumed an unacceptable point in and 
that it has become a trend for workers to disregard the requirements of the labour legislation, 
and to breach provisions of the existing collective agreements which restrict their right to 
strike. This research also intends to examine the current strike actions by workers, in the 
mining industry, in relation to the collective bargaining process recognised by labour 
legislation and to establish whether the limitations intended to combat violent and 
unprocedural strike action are effective., Furthermore, this study seeks to investigate whether 
the bargaining process serves its purpose. It is well established that although the right to 
                                                 
 
16 Some of those countries are South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
Denmark, Sweden, Spain, Finland and the Netherlands.  
17 1996 Constitution. 
18 Section 23 (1) (c) of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.   
19 Section 64 and 65 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the “LRA”).  
20 Annual Industrial Action Report, Department of Labour, Strikes Statistics (2013), page 4.  
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strike is protected in international and domestic law, it is not absolute. In discussing this 
issue, reference will be made to the International Labour Organisation principles and the 
statutory provisions of some countries dealing with limitations on the right to strike. The 
purpose in referring to such statutory provisions is to show what provisions such statutes 
contain, and how can these be of assistance when considering how to regulate the right to 
strike in South Africa more effectively. The research further points out that because of the 
prevalent unprocedural strikes that we have seen, mainly in the mining industry, there is a 
need to better regulate the right to strike. The study will suggest how this can be done without 
impairing the employees constitutional right to strike.  
1.2 Rationale for the Study  
The propensity for employees in South Africa to undertake unprocedural industrial action 
suggests that the right to engage in strike action needs to be reassessed and better regulated. 
This issue is very important because many of these unprocedural strikes have been seen to be 
successful. This creates the perception that unprocedural, violent strike action is effective. We 
have witnessed this in the mining industry and subsequent strikes by farm workers in the 
Western Cape. An illegal strike for instance at Lonmin Mine, which caught global attention, 
was successful despite its element of unlawfulness. The employees achieved their demand for 
a wage increase. Subsequent to this strike the neighbouring mines, such as the Anglo Gold 
Mine, also embarked on an illegal strike in support of a demand for a wage increase. Through 
this strike they also achieved a commitment from management to increase their wages.  
These instances of unprocedural industrial action by workers portend grave danger for a 
peaceful and harmonious industrial relations practice in the country. They have the potential 
to set a precedent that could fundamentally redefine the modus operandi of strike actions in 
South Africa, in the near future. If these instances of unprocedural industrial actions are not 
addressed, employees from other employment sectors could adopt the same method of 
industrial action to address their grievances.   
As a means of assessing how the regulation of strike action could be improved, this study 
will, inter alia, examine the law which regulated the right to strike in terms of the previous 
Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 and in terms of the current Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995, which replaced the former. It is also the intention of this study to examine the current 
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strike actions by employees, particularly in the mining industry, to assess if they are 
conducted as required by the collective bargaining process recognised by the current LRA. It 
will also be suggested that the consequences of embarking on unprotected strike action, 
including having interdicts issued against the illegal strikers, do not seem to have curbed the 
trend of increasing numbers of unprotected strikes. In the end it will be suggested that the 
right to strike needs to be better regulated so as to curb the prevalence of unprocedural 
strikes, with specific reference to the mining industry.  
1.3 Research Problems and Objectives   
This research will investigate emerging evidence that suggests a radical departure by 
employees from the procedure and limitations regulating strike action in terms of the LRA. In 
dealing with this problem the research will focus on the mining industry, which best 
illustrates the prevalence of the problem of unprotected strike action.  
Great care will be taken in this research to ensure that the foundation of the research lies is 
the current legal framework and how it lacks effectiveness when dealing with the growing 
trend towards unprocedural labour related strikes in South Africa, particularly in the mining 
sector. I will also examine what actions can be taken to remedy the situation.  
Trade unions have an obligation in terms of the collective bargaining processes21 to take 
responsibility for  their members when they exercise the right to strike. This includes both a 
duty towards advancing their collective interests and a responsibility to do so within the 
ambit of the law. However, trade union leaders have failed in this second duty to encourage 
their members to undertake peaceful legal activity. In dealing with this problem, I will make 
suggestions as to what appear to be the prevalent factors contributing to this problem and I 
will suggest how the right to strike can be better regulated.  
Research Questions 





1.3.1 What are the parameters of protected strike action? 
1.3.2 What are the consequences of embarking on unprotected and/or violent strike action? 
1.3.3 Why is there a trend towards violent, unprotected strike action? 
1.3.4 How can this trend be curbed? 
 
1.4 Literature Review  
A great deal of literature has been written on the subject regarding the need to better regulate 
the right to strike in the mining industry. Most labour law texts however, give only a cursory 
overview on the subject. They do not provide a detailed examination of the topic, which this 
research intends to provide.  
The right to strike enjoys a high degree of protection in South African law. In National Union 
of Metalworkers of SA and Others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd and another22, the Constitutional 
court declared it to be ‘of importance for the dignity of workers who in our constitutional 
order may not be treated as coerced employees’ and found that ‘it is through industrial action 
that workers are able to assert bargaining power in industrial relations’.23  According to Prof 
Darcy Du Toit and trade union leader Roger Ronnie24 the LRA sets out to promote the right to 
strike as an essential element of collective bargaining.25 Du Toit and Ronnie suggest that in a 
number of aspects, however, ranging from violence erupting in the course of strike action to 
the practical exclusion of large sections of the workforce from exercising the right to strike, it 
has become apparent that the current model is in need of adjustment26. Du Toit and Ronnie 
further suggest that the violence which has characterised a number of strikes in recent years, 
                                                 
 
22  National Union of Metalworkers of SA and Others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd and another 2003 (24) ILJ 
305 (CC) 13. 
23 Ibid 74.  
24 D Du Toit & R Ronnie, “The Necessary Evolution of Strike Law”, (2012) Acta Juridica, 195.  
25 Ibid 195. 
26 Ibid 195. 
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mostly in the mining sector, has cast doubt on the effectiveness of the LRA in this vital area27. 
Du Toit and Ronnie28argue that violence on the picket-line is a wake-up call not simply to 
introduce stricter controls, but to re-examine our system of dispute resolution, including 
strike law, more generally with a view of ‘eliminating dysfunctional barriers’ to the right to 
strike rather than introducing new ones29. Du Toit and Ronnie30 provide that the recent strikes 
in the public sector have become unruly which is the problem that this thesis has also 
identified in the mining sector. They further indicate that the current restrictions on the right 
to strike within the LRA are not effective in dealing with the illegal industrial actions which 
have enjoyed prevalence lately. They suggest that this necessitates a re-examination of the 
right to strike in South Africa as well as the framework giving effect to the right. However, 
Du Toit and Ronnie, in their assessment, do not really indicate how the re-examination can 
best be done in dealing with the issue of unruly strikes. This thesis will confirm their general 
findings, but it will go a step further by suggesting how to improve the manner in which the 
right to strike is regulated, as well as suggesting new provisions to amend the LRA by 
drawing from the experience of certain foreign countries, which could reduce the prevalence 
of unprotected strikes. Tembeka Ngcukaitobi, in his assessment of the situation in the 
Platinum Hills of Marikana,31 opines that “the role of the state is to create a legal framework 
within which parties can address their labour concerns’32. However, he reminds us that ‘any 
type of legal regulation implies an acceptance of the underlying social order’33. He further 
provides that ‘our present LRA framework remains ineffective in the face of inadequate public 
service delivery, ambiguous business social responsibility, changing union dynamics and the collapse 
of collective bargaining institutions. Unprotected strikes occur at an increasing rate. The prevalence of 
violence in industrial action caused by this instability means that there remains a limited role that the 
law can play. The solution then becomes one of a political nature’.34  It seems that the authors 
mentioned above agree concerning the problem of unprotected strikes, however, I do not 
                                                 
 
27 Ibid 195. 
28 Ibid 196. 
29 Ibid 196. 
30 Ibid 196. 
31 T Ngcukaitobi “Strike Law, Structural Violence and Inequality in the Platinum Hills of Marikana” 
(2013) 34 ILJ 836, 836.  
32 Ibid 836. 
33 Ibid 836. 
34 Ibid 836. 
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share the same suggestions towards solving the problem. Tembeka Ngcukaitobi suggests that 
the LRA is ineffective in dealing with the issue and believes that the solution is that of 
political nature.35 I seek to differ with this because in my opinion, contravention of law cannot 
be corrected by a political solution. Ineffectiveness of the legislation demands an assessment 
of that particular legislation and identification of what measures or provisions can be 
introduced or removed to bar and/or to curb the ineffectiveness, which is what this thesis will 
be driving towards. According to Maserumule, the LRA, rather than positively implementing 
the constitutional right to strike, serves to limit it. He asserts that the courts, similarly, have 
failed to protect the right and have instead been preoccupied with giving effect to the 
limitation of that right36. Ben-Israel37, argues that  “while a general prohibition of strikes 
constitutes a considerable restriction on the opportunities open to trade  unions for the 
furthering and defending of the interests of their members, the situation is different when the 
law imposes procedural restrictions or a temporary ban on strikes. Pertaining to the 
procedural restrictions, one can mention, for example, the obligation to observe a certain 
quorum …for example the decision of whether to vote would be determined by the number of 
votes casted either for or against the strike action. Such restrictions on the right to strike are 
acceptable as long as they do not place substantial limitations on the means of action open to 
trade unions organisations”. Having identified the problem of a radical departure by 
employees from the procedure and limitations governing strike action, this thesis will 
suggest., amongst other things, that there is a need to be introduce a secret ballot requirement 
before embarking on an industrial action.  
Ben-Israel38 suggests the introduction of secret ballot in dealing with the situation of violent 
and unprotected strikes. However, in my opinion, the introduction of secret ballot alone 
cannot solve the problem of unprotected strikes: it is but is one solution among others that 
needs to be introduced. Gavin Hartford39, refers to the strike at Lonmin’s Marikana platinum 
                                                 
 
35 Ibid.   
36 P Maserumule “A perspective on developments in strike law” (2001) 22 ILJ 45,46.  
37 B-Israel International Labour Standards: The Case of Freedom of Strike, (1988) 118.  
38 Ibid 118.  





mine in 2012, which culminated in the death of 44 people, as South Africa’s “mirror and 
lodestar” of how negotiations over wages and labour relation issues had degenerated over 
time. He argued that socio-economic inequality was the root of the many unprotected strikes 
in South Africa, with employees facing rural poverty, amongst many other challenges40. The 
unprotected strike in Marikana, according to Thenjiwe Meyiwa and her co-authors, is 
‘perceived as a protest against the unequal distribution of mining benefits, characterised by 
the poor social conditions of mining communities, and the perceived collusion between state, 
labour and capital that has long undermined workers’ rights and promoted corruption’.41 I am 
of the view that Hartford is correct by holding that socio-economic inequality has been the 
root of many unprotected strikes in South Africa over the last few years because socio 
economic inequality is also one of the factors in the mining industry that causes employees to 
lose patience with the employer. Amongst other solutions, the issue of socio-economic 
inequality could be solved by enforcing the Mining Charter, which has never been 
implemented. However, it is my opinion that despite socio-economic issues, there is still a 
need to better regulate the right to strike in terms of the law.  
Hartford further notes that mineworkers’ reliance on unions to negotiate wage increases had 
also turned into a bitter-sweet situation for them, as unions had shifted their focus from 
promoting workers’ interests to establishing a majority within the sector and becoming the 
ruling union. “Union democracy has been lost over the years, as union leaders’ accountability 
to employers has substituted their accountability to union members. Union leaders have 
become more prone to focusing on the benefits of being shop stewards than on finding ways 
to deal with issues affecting workers socially and economically,” he explained.42 Hartford 
advised that South Africans need to go back to the basics of negotiation to alleviate wage-
related strikes, and to do this he suggests that it is important for employers to re-establish 
                                                 
 
40  Z Mavuso, Mining Industry issues calls for Policy Amendment. 
www.miningweekly.com/article/labour-conference-highlights-mining-industry-issue-calls-for-policy-
amendment-2014-08-09.  
41 T Meyiwa, M Nkondo and others, State of the Nation 2014: South Africa 1994-2014: A twenty-year 
review, 2014,473.  
42 G Hartford, Addressing the Twenty-Seventh Annual Labour Law Conference, held at the Sandton. 




social and individual relationships with their workers, so that they become aware of the issues 
that workers face on a daily basis. Further, establishing workplace dialogue and forums 
would assist employers in becoming aware of worker’s concerns, thereby preventing strikes, 
as problems can be dealt with beforehand.43 Hartford suggests that collective bargaining 
negotiations have departed from the LRA framework and other collective agreements giving 
effect to the LRA. He points out that they have turned into violent strikes and further refers to 
the Marikana tragedy.44 Hartford suggests that another cause of violent strikes is ‘union 
democracy’ where union leaders, as a result  of the power they have gained within that 
particular industry, abandon the worker’s interests which should be at the top of their agenda 
in order to achieve the wellbeing of their workers. As a result of this, workers start losing 
hope in their leaders and opt for violent strikes in solving their grievances.45  Hartford’s 
suggestions aimed at alleviating violent strikes are more of a social orientated solution rather 
than a legal solution because he is mainly suggesting that the employers must establish social 
and individual relationships with workers so they can be aware of the issues affecting 
workers on the ground.  
John Brand,46 stated that South Africa has one of the highest incidences of industrial action in 
the world, with the strikes also being among the most violent. In 2012, the country lost 17-
million work hours, with 16 million of these in the mining sector, 99 strikes took place, 45 of 
which were unprotected or violent. He said there was need to re-evaluate the legal status of 
the right to strike in South Africa47.  The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (hereinafter referred to as the CCMA)48 has suggested interest arbitration as an 
alternative to collective bargaining, which the commission’s director, Nerine Kahn, said was 
                                                 
 
43 G Hartford, Analysis: Mining’s Unholy Trinity and Current Impasse, 7. 
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-10-11-analysis-minings-unholytrinity-and-current-
impasse/#.VqsM5NL2bmQ.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Z Mavuso, Review of strike-prone South Africa’s dispute resolution approach urged, 
http://www.miningweekly.com/article/labour-conference-highlights-mining-industry-issues-calls-for-
policy-amendment-2014-08-29.  Specific reference made to J Brand, “How The Law Can Better 
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not proving beneficial in any industry or sector in South Africa.49 Kahn explained that 
“Interest arbitration is a mediated process between parties in which an arbitrator or arbitration 
panel makes a binding ruling in a dispute on the grounds that a settlement would be in the 
wider public interest”50.  Organised labour’s reaction to the suggestion of “interest 
arbitration” has not been favourable. In this regard it was reported that the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (hereinafter referred to as Cosatu) had started to brief its lawyers on 
finding ways to block attempts by government to prescribe interest arbitration over industrial 
action in certain circumstances. Cosatu argued that interest arbitration was a direct threat to 
the constitutional right of workers to strike. This research will argue that as much as there is a 
need to re-evaluate the right to strike in our country, the necessary introduction of new 
provisions or deletion of ineffective measures to regulate industrial action must be 
implemented without impairing the worker’s constitutional right to strike.  
John Brand provides that “there is a need to balance the right to strike with other fundamental 
rights, such as those pertaining to trade, property, movement, healthcare, food, water and 
social security,”51 which are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights.52 He suggests that the 
Constitutional Court must consider international and foreign law in re-evaluating the right to 
strike in South Africa.53 This is also legislated both in the Constitution and in the LRA. Brand 
highlighted that legislation on the right to strike in the US, New Zealand, Australia and 
Canada included limitations pertaining to the obligation to engage in good-faith bargaining 
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prior to embarking on industrial action and a right to recourse to the courts in the event of 
unprotected strike actions, while Canadian and Australian legislation also included secret 
ballot requirements.54  Brand argues that the legislation had worked well for these countries 
and could be considered in South Africa. He further mentioned that establishing an 
independent institution to educate social partners about their rights and obligations in terms 
of the Bill of Rights, training them in mutual gain, good-faith negotiation and risk analysis, 
and providing them with reliable and relevant financial and economic information about 
collective bargaining could be beneficial to South African workers’ right to strike. He noted 
that “While the rationale behind collective bargaining is to maintain industrial peace, the 
protection given to the fundamental right to strike is based on the functional importance of 
strikes to collective bargaining in a free market economy”.55 Brand suggested that a 
Specialised Industrial Action Protection Unit could be established in the South African Police 
Service to protect people from criminal conduct during industrial action and that employers 
must not be allowed to hire replacement workers during protected industrial action.56 Further, 
trade unions, trade union officials and office bearers must be required to respect the right of 
non-strikers to work.57 Brand also suggests that the Labour Court be given a mandate to grant 
appropriate and proportional relief to any party whose rights had been violated during 
industrial action, for any breach of law, and that this might include, in extreme cases, 
suspending the protection of industrial action for limited periods. He further argues that the 
Labour Court must also be given the power to suspend the right to engage in protected strike 
action in the event of an acute national emergency.58 This research will concur with John 
Brand’s suggestions pertaining to the alleviation of violent strikes.  
The right to strike is regulated by the LRA.59 Darcy Du Toit,60 referring to the case of NUMSA 
v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd61 argues that the focus of attention must not be on the constitutional 
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mandate to engage in industrial action but on the statutory framework regulating that right, in 
order to determine whether it gives proper effect to that mandate. Some have argued that the 
statutory framework does not give proper effect to the constitutional mandate. Koboro J 
Selala62 argues that the current constitutional and statutory framework on collective labour 
dispute resolution in South Africa calls for urgent attention. The question which he attempts 
to answer is whether there is a future for meaningful collective bargaining in South Africa in 
light of the recurrent industrial unrest.63 He provides that the limitation of the right to strike 
contained in s 65(1) of the LRA64 is inadequate if regard is had to the significant impact of 
industrial action on the socio-economic interests of the parties involved.65 He suggests that if 
South Africa is to prevent a repeat of the likes of the Marikana strike, urgent attention should 
be paid to the specific provisions of the LRA which deal with the right to strike.66 He further 
suggests that a specific provision should be introduced into the LRA to extend the powers of 
the Labour Court to include the jurisdiction to adjudicate on fairness of industrial demands.67 
Selela’s suggestion is, in my view, a direct contravention of the employees right to bargain 
freely and without the interference of a third party or any sphere of government. The question 
of whether the industrial demands are fair lies with the parties involved. The solution of 
extending the Labour Court’s jurisdiction. in so far as dealing with the determination of 
fairness of industrial demands, will not assist in alleviating the recurrent industrial unrest, and 
instead it will cause confusion between the courts powers and the right to engage in collective 
bargaining.  
1.5 Research Methodology  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
61 Note 22 above,13. 
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This research will rely on desktop research and the sources of information to be consulted 
will include the labour legislation, the Constitution, relevant legal texts, cases, journal 
articles, and international instruments such as the International Labour Organisation 
conventions. A comparative analysis of the interpretation of the right to strike in other 
jurisdictions such as Botswana, New Zealand, USA, Australia and Canada will be conducted. 
No empirical research will be conducted on the subject.   
  
1.6 Research Outline  
The research spans seven chapters including this one. Chapter 2 will explore the purpose of 
collective bargaining with specific reference to industrial action in detail. An assessment of 
collective bargaining and its effectiveness will be conducted both under the old labour 
legislation as well as under the current labour legislation. Consideration will be given on the 
advantages and disadvantages of the introduction of the new labour legislation in relation to 
as collective bargaining, with specific reference to industrial action.   
Chapter 3 will focus on the justification and effectiveness of the procedural restrictions in 
respect of industrial action, such as the requirement of a notice prior to embarking in 
industrial action. An assessment will be conducted to determine whether this requirement 
assists in curbing the propensity of strikes in the labour industry. Historical developments 
leading to the inclusion of the requirement of prior notice of industrial action in the LRA, will 
be discussed.  
Chapter 4 will explore the characteristics of recent unprocedural strike actions in South 
Africa. Reference will be made to various incidents wherein unprocedural strike actions 
played out in, amongst others, the Marikana Massacre, the Amplats, Gold Mine strike and 
Farm Workers strike. Furthermore, it will be shown that it is mainly because of strike actions 
such as these that a re-evaluation of our collective bargaining laws is necessary.  
Chapter 5 will discuss the role of the Labour Court in relation to strike actions as 
contemplated by the LRA. An assessment of how the courts have interpreted the right to 
strike will be considered. This will be achieved through an analysis of judicial decisions 
dealing with violent strikes. A further assessment will also be conducted on the co-operation 
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between the trade union leadership and the courts, if any, where orders by the courts requiring 
compliance from the unions have been made. This will talk to the trend of interdicts granted 
by the courts and how these orders have been perceived by the striking workers.    
In Chapter 6 the International Law Organisation Principles on the right to strike will be 
discussed. Selected foreign countries will form the basis of a comparison of the limitations on 
the right to strike. Reference will be made to the statutory provisions of these countries 
dealing with limitations on their right to strike. The idea in referring to such statutory 
provisions is not to state what the legal position is in such countries, but to show what 
provisions such statutes contain, and which of those can be of assistance when incorporated 
in our Labour legislation so as to better regulate the right to strike in our country. The foreign 
states that I will use in my comparative assessment are Botswana, Namibia, New Zealand, 
USA, Australia and Canada and the UK, to mention a few.   
In Chapter 7, concluding remarks and recommendations for the re-evaluation of the right to 
strike will be made. Furthermore, it will be recommended that a secret ballot would be of 
assistance in our country. It will also be shown that the introduction of a secret ballot alone 
will, however, not address the unprotected and violent strike problem. I will show that 
incorporating the statutory provisions of the foreign states that contain limitation provisions, 
as identified in Chapter 6, South Africa can adopt similar provisions that could curb the 
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CHAPTER 2: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  
2.1: Introduction  
Collective Bargaining is the process by which employers and organised groups of employees 
seek to reconcile their conflicting goals through mutual accommodation.68 The process of 
collective bargaining involves the making of demands, and compromises in order to reach 
agreement on the issue in dispute.69  Collective bargaining is a process of constructive 
engagement between employees (usually led by a trade union) and the employer for the 
purpose of settling disputes between them. In Metal & Allied Union v Hart Ltd,70  a 
distinction was made between ‘consultation’ and ‘bargaining’ with the intention to 
distinguish between the two terms. It was held that: 
 
 “to consult means to take counsel or seek information or advice from someone and does not 
 imply any kind of agreement, whereas to bargain means to haggle or wrangle so as to arrive at 
 some agreement on terms of give and take.”71  
 
It was also held that ‘the term ’negotiate’ is akin to bargaining and means to confer with a view to 
compromise and agreement’.72 Prior to 1979, the applicable legislation was the Labour 
Relations Act of 1956. It was facilitative rather than prescriptive73. This means that it 
contained no rigid or narrow provisions. Rigid or narrow provisions are provisions that are 
inflexible or constricted. It contained alternatives to situations that were not favourable in 
certain circumstances or for purposes of race relations in the workplace, rather than providing 
largely restrictive provisions with no exceptions. For example, before 1979 trade unions that 
recruited and accepted black workers as members of their unions were excluded from 
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statutory forums such as the bargaining forums for employers and their associations. 
However, these unions negotiated directly with employers and concluded what became 
known as ‘recognition agreements’. In terms of such agreements a trade union and an 
employer regulated their mutual interests much in the same way as an industrial council does 
through its constitution. ‘A recognition agreement established and formalised the relationship 
between the employer and a union like a collective agreement would do. These agreements 
typically contained provisions in which the employer would recognise a union’s bargaining 
entitlement for a particular bargaining unit, and which would regulate how collective 
bargaining should take place.’74 The 1956 Act was premised on the view that the workplace 
belongs to and is governed by the employer (subject to a requirement that workers should be 
treated fairly),75 whereas the current LRA introduces a wholly different paradigm76. It regards 
the worker as an ‘industrial citizen’ who is entitled to enjoy rights and freedoms in the 
workplace77. The changes to the law regulating collective bargaining confirmed the power of 
the court to pronounce upon bargaining rights78. As an example, the Industrial Court, amongst 
other things, was not empowered to restrain  the commission of unfair labour practices as it 
had no jurisdiction over unfair labour practices.79 The Labour Courts ,now under the LRA, 
have exclusive jurisdiction to grant an interdict or order to restrain80 where the employer or 
employees exercise their bargaining rights in a manner that is not recognised by applicable 
labour legislation. These bargaining rights may be rights exercised by either party as 
available to them in terms of collective bargaining, for example the right to embark on 
industrial action by the employees or the right to lock-out by the employer.  The LRA 
currently provides for collective bargaining in three statutory forums: Bargaining Councils,81 
Public Service in Coordinating Bargaining Council82 and Statutory Councils.83 The LRA 
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recognises collective bargaining in terms of non-statutory arrangements by way of collective 
agreements. These collective agreements must, however, comply with the statutory 
obligations of the LRA.  Within collective bargaining and as an integral part thereof, there is 
what is known as industrial action. Industrial action is an integral part of collective bargaining 
because it is fundamental to the bargaining process as it puts the employer and the employee 
in a state of  equilibrium.84 This means that the employer and employee have equal bargaining 
rights in the workplace as provided for by the LRA. The strike action enables the employees 
to put economic pressure on the employer by withholding their labour. Equally on the other 
hand economic pressure is placed on the employees by the principle of “no work no pay” 
which applies during strike action whether it is protected or not.85   
 
2.2 Purpose of Industrial Action as part of Collective Bargaining  
Collective bargaining has been defined as ‘a voluntary process for reconciling the conflicting 
interests and aspirations of management and labour through the joint regulation of terms and 
conditions of employment.’86  There are two main purposes of collective bargaining:  
Firstly, collective bargaining aims to regulate terms and conditions of employment; and 
secondly has the purpose of being an avenue for the resolution of disputes.87 The LRA 
legislates and enforces these two purposes of collective bargaining through providing a 
framework for collective bargaining and promoting collective bargaining.88 The LRA grants 
trade unions a fixed list of rights such as the access to employer’s premises and the right of 
employees to join and participate in trade union activities.89 But beyond these the legislature 
has left it to the parties to decide how their bargaining relationships are to be structured. In 
other words, the LRA seeks to secure only the means of collective bargaining, without 
prescribing, or empowering the courts to prescribe, how these means should be exercised. 
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These goals were reiterated in the case of National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa 
and Others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd and Another90 where it was held by the Constitutional 
Court that the LRA sought to provide a framework whereby both employers and employees 
and their organisations could partake in collective bargaining and the formulation of 
industrial policy and that it sought to promote orderly collective bargaining.91  The processes 
of collective bargaining endorsed by both the 1956 Act and the LRA will be considered 
below to show that both these pieces of legislation shared the same purpose of collective 
bargaining, despite the new reforms and innovations initiated by the LRA, which will also be 
briefly discussed in this chapter.   
When the process of collective bargaining does not yield the desired outcome (for instance 
where the employer says ‘no’ to the employees’ demands), the trade unions often opt for 
industrial action and in most cases this will take the form of strike. To constitute industrial 
action in the form of a strike, the refusal to work must be ‘for the purpose of remedying a 
grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual interest between employer 
and employee’.92 Either a grievance or a dispute must therefore exist before workers can be 
deemed to be on strike, and strikers must intend their action to remedy or resolve that 
grievance or dispute.  In opting for industrial action in the form of a strike, employees would 
normally engage other employees in the workplace and demonstrate their demands or 
grievances by getting together in one point and downing the tools. In most cases employees 
would even disrupt the running of the business and this would normally be associated with 
violence in certain circumstances. 
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2.3: Industrial Action as part of Collective Bargaining under the Labour Relations Act of 
1956  
Industrial action as part of collective bargaining under the 1956 Act will be discussed in this 
section. It will establish how the previous Act regulated industrial action with the aim of 
comparing it with the current regulation under the LRA.    
There is no doubt that for collective bargaining to be successful the parties involved need to 
be cooperative and reach a common ground favourable to both parties. As Grogan states: 
 A collective bargaining system can work only where the participating parties are looking  
 towards a particular incentive which they intend to agree upon. Collective bargaining in other 
 words is successful where the participating parties have a mutual interest which will inform 
 the intended agreement. The capacity of the parties to underpin their negotiating stances with 
 potential resort to industrial action constitutes the mutual incentive.93  
The research in this chapter will, in light of the above, establish the purpose of collective 
bargaining and its effectiveness. The purpose and effectiveness thereof is discussed both 
under the 1956 Act and the LRA. Strike action is the most important weapon within the 
collective bargaining framework because it compels the employer to consider even the 
powerless employees’ grievances and/or demands. When the employees embark on a strike 
action, the employer is placed under economic pressure by virtue of employees withholding 
their labour. Therefore, the employer is forced to consider their grievances. This is a weapon 
that even unrepresented employees in the workplace could use in order to attract the attention 
of the employer to consider their grievances. 
The Labour Relations Act No. 28 of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1956 Act”) was 
introduced to regulate collective bargaining in the workplace. The provisions dealing with 
industrial action as part of collective bargaining will be discussed herein and the intention is 
to establish how the provisions regulated industrial action under the 1956 Act.   
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The 1956 Act provided striking workers with immunity from prosecution94 and immunity 
from delictual or contractual liability when embarking on industrial action.95 However, strike 
action was not forbidden by s 65. This research will argue and partly concur with Barney 
Jordan’s conclusion and recommendations, that even though the right to strike in the mining 
sector has mostly turned violent, the intervention of the state and its organs cannot really 
solve the problem as the problem is statutory in nature and calls for revision of the current 
LRA provisions on industrial action.96 The 1956 Act provided for substantive limitations, 
such as s 65 proscribing the freedom to strike which did not apply to all employees and which 
criminalised those responsible for striking before using the statutory dispute resolution 
procedures. Giving effect to the aforementioned, the substantive limitations of s 65 of the 
1956 Act provided that:  
no employee or other person shall instigate a strike or incite any employee to take part in or to 
continue a strike or take part in a strike or in the continuation of a strike, and no employer or 
other person shall instigate a lock-out or incite any employer or other person to take part in or 
to continue a lock-out or take part in a lock-out or in the continuation of a lock-out- during the 
period of the currency of any agreement, award or determination which in terms of this Act is 
binding on the employees or employers who are or would be concerned in the strike or lock-
out and any provision of which deals with the matter giving occasion for the strike or lock-
out97 ... or during the period of one year reckoned from the date of publication of a notice 
under section 14 (2) of the Wages Act, 1957 (Act No 5 of 1957), in respect of a determination 
made under that Act, which is binding upon the employees or employers who are or would be 
concerned in the strike or lock-out, and any provision of which deals with the matter giving 
occasion for the strike or lock-out.98   
In quoting this section, the intention is to show that in terms of s 65 of the 1956 Act, as stated 
above, no one was entitled to embark on a strike whilst an agreement or award which was 
binding on the employees or the employer was in subsistence. An agreement or award 
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binding the parties was a limitation and any employee or employer who was involved in a 
strike or furtherance or continuation thereof, would not be covered by immunity from 
prosecution or delictual action provided by the section.  
Further s 65 (2) (b) of the 1956 Act stipulated that: 
no trade union or employers’ organisation and no office bearer, official or member of such 
union or organisation shall call or take part in any strike or lock-out by members of the union 
or organization, unless the majority of the members of the union or organization in good 
standing in the area and in the particular undertaking, industry, trade or occupation in which 
the strike or lock-out is called or the taking part in the strike or lock-out takes place, have 
voted by ballot in favour of such action after a report has been made to the Director 
General.99  
In terms of this section no strike would take place without having been preceded by voting 
through a secret ballot. All members in good-standing would partake and the decision of 
whether the strike should take place would be determined by the result of votes cast.  
Section 65 (2) (b) of the 1956 Act was seen as further limitation and the deciding factor in 
respect of whether the industrial action in the workplace would qualify as protected. 
Employees could not embark on a strike if no voting was conducted by way of a secret ballot, 
before the strike action was commenced. The possibility of a strike would be determined 
solely by this process and if only the minority of the employees voted in favour of the strike, 
the intended strike would be prohibited.  
It is clear in terms of this provision that a ballot was a prerequisite for a strike. This was 
emphasised in SACWU v Sentrachem101 where it was stated that in the ordinary course it 
would make no sense to provide for the taking of a ballot in respect of the area in which the 
strike has actually occurred as a matter of fact. If this would be permissible it would be an 
indication of the fact that a strike which is illegal by virtue of being premature, may be 
legalised by a subsequent ballot of those participating in it. This case applied to s 65 in that a 
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strike in the workplace should be preceded by the ballot which is the determining factor as 
mentioned above. A strike therefore, cannot be permissible if it was not preceded by a ballot 
as that strike would not have been determined through the perquisite of ballot as provided by 
s 65. A ballot that would take place after the occurrence of the strike would be illegal as it 
occurred without being permitted through the outcome of the ballot. The subsequent ballot 
would be legitimising the illegal strike which lacked the ballot prerequisite.   
In Rainbow Chicken Farms (Pty) Ltd v FAWU100 the court ruled that the strike was prohibited, 
since the issue in dispute was regulated by a collective agreement that provided for arbitration 
as a private dispute settlement process, and this route was still open as it had not yet been 
pursued prior to embarking on industrial action. The union overlooked the agreement in 
place, upon which they were bound. Besides this transgression the strike ballot was not 
properly conducted prior to embarking on an industrial action. It was judicially confirmed 
that a pre-strike ballot had to be proper, and it was also one of the points of procedural 
compliance necessary in order to make the strike legal.101 The employer had locus standi to 
enforce compliance and was provided with an order interdicting the strikes on the basis that 
the ballot procedures were defective. The employees in this case had not complied with the 
agreement upon which they were bound. They failed to conduct a proper pre-strike ballot 
process. It is as a result of this case among others that caused the ballot provision to be left 
out in the LRA.  The strike in terms of the 1956 Act was defined widely to cover virtually all 
forms of collective, concerted worker pressure on the employer with the purpose of enforcing 
a demand connected with the employment relationship.102 The function of a strike was 
essentially explained as an attempt to break a deadlock situation in negotiations over such 
matters as collective agreements.103 However, disproportional harmful strikes would normally 
attract the court’s intervention. Disproportional strikes are strikes which are characterised by 
violence and which end up being harmful to the participants and other innocent parties. These 
were strikes which did not comply with the 1956 Act and did not take into account the 
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substantive limitations provided by s 65 as discussed above. These strikes resulted in violence 
and were harmful to the employer. They would therefore, be illegal, as they would contain 
violence resulting in harming the employers running of business.104 Employees would be 
dismissed for having participated in such strike actions. The elements which characterised the 
existence of a strike, are derived from a breakdown of the definition ‘strike’, which consisted 
of (i) a cessation of work, (ii) through collective action of employees with a common 
purpose, (iii) accompanied by a demand to induce or compel the employer or a secondary 
employer to agree with or accept the proposals of striking employees.105 The courts began to 
consider inter alia the fairness of the dismissal of striking employees. The principle that 
employees who had been dismissed for participation in a protected strike could be re-instated, 
was accepted in an early matter, MAWU v Stobar Reinforcing (Pty) Ltd106 in which dismissals 
relating to go-slow were considered.107 It is significant  that the court was able to intervene to 
remedy infringements of the rules of collective bargaining. It is significant that both strikes 
and lockouts were brought into the scope of the definition, until the 1991 amendments 
excluded strikes and lock-outs. The court’s jurisdiction over unfair labour practices evidently 
filled the vacuum that existed in strike law, where it was, for instance, silent on matters such 
as unlawful but otherwise legitimate and fair strike action.108 The court could be able to 
develop the fairness concept, to the extent that conduct which would otherwise be entirely 
lawful, could still be unfair.109 The introduction of the unfair labour practice jurisdiction gave 
rise to a situation where the lawfulness or legality of a party’s actions was not conclusive of 
the matter since the disputing party was able to secure relief on the basis that such conduct 
was unfair.110 It has also been held that participation in an unlawful strike did not preclude the 
dispute giving rise to that strike being categorized as resulting from an alleged unfair labour 
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practice on the part of the employer, enabling the court to retain its jurisdiction to hear the 
application.111   
2.3.1: The legal strike under the 1956 Act  
The substantive requirements for protected strike action under the 1956 Act required that 
where industrial action occurred in conformity with the provisions of the Act, three sets of 
legal consequences would follow:  
  Firstly, such action would not attract any criminal liability;112 secondly, both the  
  action itself as well as associated conduct would not be actionable at common law 
  because of the immunity introduced by s 79 (1); and thirdly, the legality of an  
  act would be relevant in assessing its legitimacy for the purposes of the unfair labour 
  practice jurisdiction.113   
The legal dispute procedure or process following a deadlock at the workplace over a rights or 
interest dispute114 was to proceed to conciliation at a Department of Labour Conciliation 
Board, applicable bargaining council, or another forum in terms of a binding collective 
agreement.115 If the dispute remained unresolved, or upon the cessation of s 45 arbitration 
proceedings,116 the employees could embark on strike action. It remained an option for a party 
to invoke a separate procedure) for urgent interim relief on 48 hours’ notice to the opposing 
party, in terms of s 17 (11) (Aa). This provision gave the court power to urgently grant an 
interdict or any other order in the case of any action prohibited in terms of s 65, or other 
interim relief, in terms of s 17 (11) read with s 43 or 46 of the 1956 Act. If a dispute remained 
unresolved employees could embark on a strike provided all the substantive and procedural 
requirements had been complied with. If the requirements were not met, the other party had a 
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remedy which it could invoke in terms of s 17 (11) of the 1956 Act. In terms of this remedy 
any strike action which was not in compliance with the legal requirements could be urgently 
interdicted.   
Other applicable provisions pertaining to lawful strikes were the “golden formula” or triad of 
protections.117 These provisions were contained in s 65;s 79 which conferred a general 
immunity; the court’s protection of strikers from dismissal  by virtue of its unfair labour 
practice jurisdiction;118 and participation in strikes substantially in compliance with section 
65.119  Section 65 required that the union give notice of strike in terms of s 65 (1) (d) (i) and 
(ii). A strike ballot would then be conducted in terms of s 65 (2) (b), which held that members 
of the trade union who were of good standing would vote. A strike would then commence, 
which would only be lawful, if there had been a majority vote by secret ballot of union 
members in good standing. The reason for the strike had to be the same as the reason for the 
dispute arising in the first place.120 It was an offence to call or take part in a strike if the 
parties belonged to an industrial council whose constitution provided for arbitration of an 
unresolved dispute.121 In respect of illegal strikes, a further procedure developed in judge-
made law, requiring an employer to issue an ultimatum,122 and then to conduct pre-dismissal 
hearings before taking the final decision to dismiss.123 The 1956 Act did not contain any 
express provisions governing the dismissal of legal strikers124 and such cases were dealt with 
under the unfair labour practice jurisdiction of the Industrial Court.   
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2.3.2 The illegal strike under the 1956 Act  
A strike not in compliance with s 65 of the 1956 Act was illegal in status, meaning that it was 
a strike not recognised in terms of the Act as it contravened the prerequisites of industrial 
action as provided for by s 65.   
The court distinguished between legal and illegal strikes in SA Chemical Workers Union v  
Sentrachem Ltd125. Some of the illegal strikes were termed ‘wildcat strikes’.126 A ‘wildcat 
strike’ would be any strike which the trade union has lost control of and which has become  
associated with violence and intimidation which ends up taking the form of criminal 
behaviour.127 An illegal wildcat strike occurred when workers broke ranks with the union in 
NUMSA, Wewe and 36 Others v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd128 and they were subsequently 
dismissed. A wild cat strike conducted independently of the union constituted a form of 
illegal and interdictable strike under the 1956 Act. This meant that any strike that was 
conducted outside the parameters of a registered union within the workplace was not 
recognised and therefore, illegal. On the other hand, it goes without saying that a legal strike 
would be one which takes place in the name of the registered union and within its ranks. 
Furthermore, that strike would have to comply with the prerequisites of industrial action as 
stipulated by section 65. Grogan129 stated that the legality of industrial action should not be 
determined by  reference to contractual obligations and possible prejudice to individuals, 
only, but also to public policy considerations and the intention of the legislature. This 
statement holds true of the new dispensation introduced to strike law in 1995. The legality of 
industrial action under the new constitutional dispensation cannot be solely dependent on the 
on collective agreements or any other contractual agreements in place which bind the parties. 
The Constitution and other legislation such as the Regulation of Gatherings Act No. 205 of 
1993 (hereinafter referred to as the RGA) which gives effect to the right to strike, cannot be 
overlooked in determining the legality of a strike. This legislation, without necessarily stating 
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the prerequisites, gives guidelines on how a legal strike should be conducted. Of particular 
importance is that the preamble of the RGA requires that when people gather with the 
intention to march or demonstrate they must do so peacefully and in a manner that will not 
infringe other people’s rights. The law therefore should serve as secondary force regulating 
the conduct of parties, while collective bargaining should be the primary and desired means 
of resolving workplace disputes. It therefore follows that strikes which are functional to 
collective bargaining deserve protection since it encourages trade unions to comply with the 
procedures or principles promoted by the Act.130   
2.4 Industrial Action as part of Collective Bargaining under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995  
The state of collective bargaining in our country has reached a very robust level and this can 
be witnessed by the prevalent strikes that have taken place in the mining sector recently with 
specific reference to the Marikana and Gold Fields strikes. The unions have in some cases 
resorted to industrial action in almost all sectors of employment in South Africa.   
The preamble and s1 of the LRA states that its purpose inter alia, is to give effect to s 23 of 
the Constitution 131 Section 23 of the Constitution includes reference to the right to fair labour 
practices and at s 23 (2) (c), the right to strike. Section 3 of the LRA states that ‘any person 
applying this Act must interpret its provisions to give effect to its primary objectives, in compliance 
with the Constitution, and in compliance with the public international law obligations of the 
Republic’. Section 23 of the Constitution states that ‘every employee has a right to fair labour 
practice’. Further it affords the employees with the right to strike. The LRA through s 3 as 
indicated above, is required to give effect to s 23 of the Constitution. It is therefore, clear that 
industrial action as part of collective bargaining, is derived from and has its rationale in the 
Constitution.   
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Chapter IV of the LRA regulates industrial action and builds upon the pre-existing strike law, 
which is transformed so as to bring it in line with the Constitution, and relevant ILO 
standards.132 To mention a few, the ILO Standards regarding the right to strike, as provided by 
the Committee of Experts and by the Committee on Freedom of Association, are that “the 
right to strike is a fundamental right, provided that the right is exercised in a peaceful 
manner’ and that ‘a general prohibition of strikes can only be justified in the event of an acute 
economic, national emergency and for a limited time.”133 The ILO Standards will however, be 
discussed in chapter 6 below.  
2.4.1 Reforms and innovations  
The LRA recognises the right of employees to engage in industrial action. The right to strike 
is an essential part of industrial action and is a fundamental right which is entrenched in the 
Constitution.   
 It is important to make mention that out of all the key legislative changes brought by the 
LRA in relation to the regulation of industrial action; the definition of strike has not been 
altered from the definition contained in the 1956 Act. The legislative changes will be 
indicated below. They will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.   
Key legislative changes that distinguish the LRA from the 1956 Act in respect of strike law 
include the following: 
Firstly, the introduction of advisory arbitration award as a pre-strike requirement in respect of 
a dispute concerning a refusal to bargain has been inserted.134 In terms of the advisory 
arbitration insertion, the party intending to embark on industrial action as a pre-strike 
requirement, is required to refer the issue in dispute for conciliation to a bargaining council 
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having jurisdiction or, if there is no such bargaining council, to the CCMA.135 The employees 
may not strike until the council or the commissioner has issued an arbitration award which 
the parties ought to comply with, or until the council or commissioner has certified that the 
parties have been unable to resolve the dispute,136 or if 30 days have passed since the date of 
referral,137 whichever occurs first. This is meant to assist the parties to try and find a way of 
achieving resolution of their disputes It can also be seen as means to prevent a dispute from 
resulting in a strike whereas the issue that the aggrieved party is striking for could have been 
resolved by finding common ground between the parties. Secondly, strikers now enjoy 
indemnity from criminal prosecution in respect of protected strike action.138 When the union 
embarks on a protected strike the members are automatically indemnified from criminal 
prosecution. The indemnity will, however, be removed when the strike turns violent.139 The 
research in Chapter 4 will discuss in detail violent strike action which lacks indemnity from 
criminal prosecution. Participation in or conduct in furtherance of a strike or lock-out under 
certain circumstances, will deprive strikers of protection. This will be in situations where the 
participation or conduct in furtherance of a strike is not in compliance with the limitations 
that ought to be complied with prior to embarking on a strike action. Thirdly, innovations 
include the removal of the ballot as a factor affecting the legality of a strike or lock-out;140  
the recognition and regulation of picketing, strikes and protest action; and the introduction of 
“minimum” services.141 The unfair labour practice jurisdiction of the court in respect of 
strikes and lock-outs was abolished. Under the 1956 Act the Labour Court had a jurisdiction 
on unfair labour practice matters to determine what was meant by unfair labour practice and 
whether a particular strike or lock-out fell within the ambit of unfair labour practice. This is 
no longer the position under the LRA. The LRA now provides a clear definition of unfair 
labour practice and categorizes what falls under unfair labour practice.  Section 64 to 77 in 
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Chapter IV of the LRA contains provisions regulating the right to strike and recourse to lock-
out, and prescribes the procedures142 to be complied with prior to exercising the right to strike 
or recourse to lock-out.143 Section 68 and 76 respectively, govern compliant strikes or lock-
outs, and the legal consequences of strike or lock-out not in compliance with the LRA.    
2.4.2. Protected strikes in terms of the LRA  
Protected strikes are those which comply with the provisions of s 64, 65 and 67 in Chapter IV 
of the LRA. These sections impose procedural requirements and substantive limitations on 
strike action. For a strike to be proper and in compliance with the definition of ‘strike’ in 
terms of the LRA, the following elements must be present:144  There must be a work 
stoppage;145 by a number of employees;146 for the purpose of remedying a grievance or 
resolving a dispute;147 and the issue in dispute must be a matter of mutual interest between 
employer and employee.148 The procedural requirements must be complied with before the 
strike will be protected. The procedural requirements include that the dispute must be referred 
for conciliation, that proper notice of the commencement of a strike or lock-out be given ,149 
and when the disputes relates to a refusal to bargain, that an advisory arbitration order be 
issued  prior to the commencement of the strike action.150 In terms of s 64 (1) (a), the issue in 
dispute is referred either to a bargaining council or to the CCMA for conciliation. Failing 
settlement, a certificate of outcome is issued, or a period of 30 days from the date of referral 
of the dispute must elapse. It is only then that the employees can embark on a strike action 
provided they have issued the 48-hour written notice to the employer. At least 48 hours 
written notice of commencement of strike action must be given to the other party in terms of s 
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64 (1) (b).151 Striking is permissible only after notice is given and as discussed above, and 
notice of proposed strike should be given to the employer.152 If the employer is a member of 
an employer’s organisation that is a party to the dispute, the employer is required to give 
notice to the organisation.153. If the issue in dispute relates to a collective agreement to be 
concluded in a bargaining council, Section 64 (1) (b) (i) stipulates that such notice must be 
given to that council Advisory arbitration is required if the issue in dispute concerns a refusal 
to bargain.154 Section 64 (2) requires that a commissioner must make an advisory award 
before notice of the proposed industrial action is given in terms of s 64 (1) (b).155 In the event 
of an employer failing to comply with a “status quo” notice in terms of s 64 (3) (e), the 
employees may dispense with statutory procedures and immediately go out on strike,156 or 
they or their trade union can apply for an interdict in the Labour Court to enforce 
compliance.157 This also means that the referral must have been sent directly to the employer.  
When comparing the substantive limitations created by both the 1956 Act and LRA, it is clear 
that the substantive limitations in s 65 of the LRA are similar to those of s 65 of the 1956 Act, 
despite the absence of the ballot requirement. The substantive limitations on strike action will 
be discussed in Chapter 3 below. 158 
2.4.3 Unprotected strikes under the LRA  
The LRA provides incentives such as protection for compliant strike action,159 in an effort to 
reduce the strikes. It does not prescribe criminal sanctions for unprotected strikes or protest 
action that does not comply with its provisions, save for instances such as contempt of court 
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proceedings.160 The consequences of non-conforming or unprotected strike action include the 
following:  
Firstly, the employer can make an application to the Labour Court to interdict and restrain 
unlawful conduct.161 This is a practical and important remedy available to the employer to get 
a court order which requires the employees to stop their strike action. Secondly, the employer 
may make a claim for compensation in respect of loss attributable to the strike, lock-out or 
related conduct.162 This claim can be instituted by an employer where his property has been 
damaged as a result of unprotected strike action by the union in the workplace; Thirdly, the 
employer can institute disciplinary action against unprotected strikers, since engaging in an 
unprotected strike is a form of misconduct. This is where an employee would be subjected to 
a disciplinary process to determine whether he or she is indeed guilty of misconduct and 
whether a dismissal would be justifiable in the circumstances.163Fourthly the employer can 
lock-out striking employees. This is where employees are denied access to the workplace.  
In Rustenburg Platinum v Mouthpiece Workers Union164 criteria for awarding and quantifying 
compensation were applied, and it was held that claims for losses must be based on loss from 
the strike itself, not for losses incurred by strikers conduct in furtherance of the strike.165 In 
County Fair Foods v FAWU166 the employer applied for an interdict to stop a strike by the 
union on the basis that it was unprotected, since they had failed to follow the procedure in a 
collective agreement. It was held that the union could elect to follow the collective agreement 
procedure or the statutory procedure in section 64 (1). It could be argued that this violates the 
doctrine of pacta sunt servande167. The Labour Court found that the union’s strike was illegal 
on the basis that they ignored the collective agreement to which they were a party and were 
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therefore obliged to honour. The court further found that the union did not comply with the 
statutory procedure provided by the LRA in terms of section 64 (1).168 Striking employees are 
protected against dismissal in terms of s 67 (4) if they comply with the s 64 requirements and 
other provisions in Chapter IV.169 Employees dismissed for participating in a protected strike 
will succeed in a claim for an automatically unfair dismissal.170 The unprotected striker may 
be disciplined on the basis of misconduct, and is also exposed to civil claims by the 
employers. However, unprotected strikers are also entitled to the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed in terms of s 185 of the LRA and to be fair the employer must comply with the 
ordinary requirements of fairness as well as the special considerations applicable to 
unprotected strike action as a form of misconduct. The principle reaffirmed in TGWU v Coin 
Security Group (Pty) Ltd171 is that participation in an unprotected strike is not sufficient to 
automatically justify the dismissal of strikers.  
2.5 Conclusion   
As far as the right to strike is concerned and through the comparison undertaken in this 
chapter, the most significant aspect of the LRA’s protection of strike activity is that it is 
wider than that provided for under the 1956 Act,172  in the sense that the definition of a strike 
covers all forms of concerted activity aimed at remedying or resolving employment-related 
grievance and disputes, including a refusal to work voluntary overtime.173  The purpose of 
industrial action as part of collective bargaining has also been discussed to show that the 
purpose is that of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of 
mutual interest between employer and employee.174 It has also been discussed that the right to 
strike is an important part of collective bargaining and that it is an effective and powerful 
bargaining tool for employees.175  The differences between protected and unprotected strikes 
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both under the 1956 Act and the LRA as well as the legal consequences in relation thereto 
have also been canvassed in this chapter.  In light of the case law that has been discussed, it 
transpires that the issue of illegal strikes and some which were termed as wildcat strikes, have 
always been evident in the workplace. There is also no evidence of any provision in the 1956 
Act that could have better regulated the right to strike or to have tried curbing the occurrences 
of violent strikes in the workplace. The only provision which would be advisable to retain 
from the 1956 Act, in trying to find a solution to end the propensity of violent strikes in the 
workplace, is that which provided for a ballot requirement prior to embarking on a strike. 
This provision, however, cannot successfully curb the problem alone; other provisions from 
the foreign states’ legislation, which will be discussed in chapter 6, would also need to be 
incorporated into our legislation. Chapter 6 will discuss these foreign provisions in detail.    
In the next chapter, justification and effectiveness of the procedural restrictions in respect of 
industrial action, such as the requirement of a notice prior to embarking in industrial action, 
will be discussed to see whether the requirement assists in curbing the unprotected strikes in 
the mining industry.   
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CHAPTER 3: THE PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE RESTRICTIONS  
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter will explore the procedural and substantive restrictions provided in terms of the 
LRA, prior to embarking on industrial action. To acquire the protection accorded by the 
LRA, all employees contemplating strike or protest action must follow the prescribed 
statutory procedure, unless different procedures are prescribed by any applicable collective 
agreement.176 The statutory pre-strike procedure is set out in section 64 of the LRA. 
Substantive limitations per s 65 of the LRA will also be briefly discussed. One of the crucial 
procedural restrictions is the requirement that prior notice be given before a strike or lock-out 
is embarked on.177 Special reference will be made to the ‘notice requirement’ with the 
intention of assessing whether this requirement has been effective in curbing the prevalent 
violent strike actions that have recently unfolded in the labour industry and especially in the 
mining industry. We have witnessed not only their high level of violence but strikes which 
have also culminated in a number of deaths of employees throughout the process.  Historical 
developments leading to the inclusion of the requirement of prior notice of industrial action in 
the LRA, will be discussed. This discussion will be made in order to establish the 
circumstances in the workplace relating to industrial action, which as a result thereof, led to 
the introduction of the notice requirement by the Industrial Court. Industrial Court decisions 
will also be discussed in detail to establish the role and influence of courts in leading to the 
inclusion of the notice requirement. Historically the inclusion of prior notice was introduced 
through Industrial Court decisions and this chapter will therefore focus on the restriction 
provided by the LRA as well as on a discussion and analysis of these decisions.  
Despite the influence the decisions of the Industrial Courts have had relating to the 
introduction of notice, two pieces of legislation were passed in 1993 providing for the 
inclusion of the notice requirement, requiring that a notice should be issued to the employer 
before a strike action is embarked on. These were the Education Labour Relations Act of 
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1993178 (hereinafter referred to as “the ELRA”) and the Public Service Labour Relations Act 
of 1993179 (hereinafter referred to as “the PSLRA”).   
3.2 The Substantive Limitations of the Right to Strike  
The LRA provides for circumstances in which employees may not engage in strike actions.180 
This section denies protection to employees who strike in circumstances which are 
specifically prohibited by the section.. The circumstances will be discussed in detail. 
Employees who strike despite being bound by a collective agreement prohibiting them from 
striking over the disputed issue, or which requires that the dispute be arbitrated, will be 
engaging in an unprotected strike.181  In University v Botha Vista182, the court held that the 
employees could not strike because they were bound by the collective agreement that 
prevented the issue in dispute from being the subject of the strike. The court reasoned that 
these employees were bound to this agreement despite having resigned from the union.183 The 
reason for the court’s decision was that even though they had resigned from the union they 
were still employees in the work place and therefore the agreement was still applicable. The 
court relied on s 23 (1) (c) and 23 (2) of the LRA to reach its decision.  In South African 
National Security Employers’ Association v TGWU & others,184  the employer sought albeit 
unsuccessfully, to obtain an interdict against a strike in support of wage demands to be 
implemented after the expiry of a current agreement. The court held that in terms of s 65(3) 
(a) (i) the parties were bound by the terms of a collective agreement for the period that it is 
operative.185 This simply meant that workers were free to strike about the terms of the next 
agreement, even though the current agreement was still in force. In this case employees had 
embarked on a strike for terms and conditions of an agreement that would operate after the 
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expiry of the agreement during which period they had embarked on a strike. The court 
refused the application for an interdict on the basis of section 65 (3) (a) (i) of the LRA.  
Where employees strike in respect of an issue that can be referred for arbitration or to the 
Labour Court, that strike cannot be protected in terms of section 65.186 According to Grogan 
this is certainly the most extensive limitation on the right to strike created by the LRA.187  
Under the 1956 Act, employees had the right to strike over disputes of rights or interests, 
however, under the LRA the right to strike over disputes of rights has been mostly prohibited 
thereby drawing a strict division between disputes that must be resolved by arbitration or 
adjudicated and those that can be resolved by industrial action, unless the parties have agreed 
that disputes of interest must be resolved by arbitration. This prohibition is consistent with 
the interim Constitution,188 in terms of which the LRA had been drafted, which had confined 
the right to strike to ‘the purposes of collective bargaining’.189 In relation to non-bargaining 
issues, the LRA provided only for ‘protest action’ in limited circumstances and subject to a 
stricter procedure.190 The limitation on the right to strike was removed in s 23 (2) (c) of the 
final Constitution. It is however, pointed out by Cheadle191 that the ‘change in wording 
between the two constitutional texts is consistent with the approach taken by the ILO. The 
right to strike extends beyond its role in collective bargaining, to the right to strike over the 
social and economic policies that have a direct impact on the interests of workers’. The right 
to strike can be a method by employees to demand their socio-economic rights. This is 
especially relevant in the mining industry where living conditions of employees are not 
compliant with what the Mining Charter demands.  
Section 65 (1) (c) however, has remained unchanged. This may be seen as a limitation on the 
right to strike that is not envisaged by the final Constitution.192 Cheadle argues that the 
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reasons for excluding the right to strike in the case of disputes of rights are well-known and 
he justifies this limitation with reference to the statutory objective of ‘labour peace’ and 
further argues that there is no need for industrial action where a legal remedy is provided.193  
Section 65 also disallows a strike in circumstances where employees are bound, for instance, 
by an arbitration award, ministerial determination or Basic Conditions of Employment Act194 
(hereinafter referred to as the “BCEA”) determination which regulates the disputed issue.195 
There are two related reasons according to Grogan196 for denying protection to workers who 
strike over issues that have been determined by an arbitration award: ‘first, the dispute has 
been authoritatively finalised; second, the fact that dispute has been determined means that 
there is no longer a dispute over that issue’197. This limitation is to a certain extent related to s 
65 (1) (c) discussed above. The relation is that industrial action is prohibited in circumstances 
where the dispute can be referred for arbitration or where the dispute has been determined by 
an arbitration award or is regulated by the BCEA.  Where employees are engaged in essential 
or maintenance services, they are prohibited from embarking on a strike.198 Essential services 
are the Parliamentary Service, the South African Police Service and a service ‘the 
interruption of which endangers the life, personal safety or health of the whole or any part of 
the population’.199Workers are protected under the LRA only if they down tools for one of the 
purposes mentioned in the definition of a strike.200 It is the intention of this research to 
indicate that even after the development of such limitations in the LRA, violent strikes have 
been prevalent and that limitations of this nature, such as the notice requirement and in as far 
as what the notice contains, has not assisted in curbing the violent strikes that we have seen 
recently in the labour industry and more particularly in the mining sector.  
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3.3 Overview on General Procedural Restrictions  
The LRA has put in place measures which employees contemplating industrial action must 
comply with in order for that industrial action to be legally recognised and protected. These 
measures can be interpreted as restrictions on the right to embark on industrial action.  
The first procedural step is to refer the issue in dispute for conciliation to a bargaining council 
having jurisdiction or, if there is none, to the CCMA.201 The employees may not strike until 
the council or the commissioner has certified that the parties have been unable to resolve the 
dispute,202 or if 30 days have passed since the date of referral203 whichever occurs first. The 
council or the CCMA has 30 days to try to resolve the dispute, unless the parties agree to 
204extend this period.205 The issue referred for conciliation must be same over   which the 
employees ultimately strike.206 Thus, if the dispute referred for conciliation is over the 
employer’s refusal to comply with demand A, the employees cannot strike over the 
employer’s refusal to comply with demand B.207  After the lapse of the prescribed period, the 
employer, bargaining council208 or employer’s organisation, as the case may be, must be 
given at least 48 hours’ notice before  commencement of  strike.2097-days’ notice is required 
when the employer is the State. Where the employer is bound by a bargaining council 
agreement, and the issue in dispute relates to a collective agreement to be included in the 
council,210 it is sufficient that notice is given to the bargaining council.211  However, notice to 
the bargaining council will not suffice where the employer whose employees are intending to 
strike is not a member of the council.212 The notice to the employer must specify the precise 
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time of the commencement of the strike.213 It is insufficient merely to state that the strike will 
commence at some later time.214  
3.4 Historical Development of the Notice Requirement  
The inclusion of the requirement in the LRA of prior notice of industrial action215 took place 
in 1995 when the LRA came into operation and the inclusion of the notice was preceded by 
developments which will also be discussed herein. Initially the inclusion of the notice 
requirement was devised by the Industrial Court when it held in certain judgements216 in 1987 
and 1988 that employees who had gone on strike without giving any warning or notice to 
their employer had acted unfairly towards their employer. These were cases where 
employees, who had been dismissed for striking brought unfair labour practice claims against 
their employers under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 (“the 1956 Act”). Taking into 
consideration that the origin of the notice requirement in the LRA was the Industrial Court, 
this chapter will discuss decisions where the issue of the notice requirement was developed217 
There were many decisions where the courts consistently held that the resorting of workers to 
industrial action without prior notice to their employers to be unfair, holding that it was 
necessary for employees to notify the employer prior to embarking on industrial action. These 
cases demonstrate that the Industrial Court played a very important role in the development 
of the procedural requirement for protected industrial action in South Africa. It is necessary to 
discuss at least some of these cases in order to show how the idea of prior notice of industrial 
action originated and developed, which resulted in its ultimate inclusion in the new statutory 
dispute-resolution dispensation for labour disputes in post-apartheid South Africa.  
3.4.1 The introduction of the notice requirement  
                                                 
 
213 J Grogan, (note 176 above) 384.  
214 Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitaryware v National Construction Building & Allied Workers 
Union & others (2) (1997) 18 ILJ 671 (LAC); Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Professional 
Transport Workers Union (1998) 20 ILJ 260 (LAC).  
215 Section 64 (1) (b) of the LRA.  
216 MAWU v BTR Sarmcol (1987) 8 ILJ 815 (IC) at 836G and BAWU & others v Palm Beach Hotel (1988) 
9 ILJ 1016 (IC) at 1023G.  
217 MAWU v BTR Sarmcol (1987) 8 ILJ 815 (IC) at 836G and BAWU & others v Palm Beach Hotel          
               (1988)9 ILJ 1016 (IC) at 1023G.   
54  
  
The first indication of an obligation on the part of a union to give an employer a strike notice 
or warning before resorting to a strike, was given in the decision of the Industrial Court in 
Metal and Allied Workers Union v BTR Sarmcol.218 In this case the court referred to aspects 
of the union’s conduct before and during the strike, which it was displeased with. This 
included that the strike was conducted without prior warning and with machines simply left 
running.219 In 1988 the Industrial Court developed this principle further. In BAWU & others v 
Palm Beach Hotel220 it was held that even if the strike could be said to have been legal, the 
union and its members had acted unreasonably and unfairly by resorting to a strike without 
giving the employer “notice of when the strike would begin”. Although reference is made 
here and elsewhere in this discussion to a legal strike, the question whether, under the Labour 
Relations Act 28 of 1956, there was a right to strike and, therefore, whether one could talk of 
a legal strike, was a controversial one. This was because on its own, the 1956 Act did not 
expressly refer to a right to strike, but simply specified conditions which had to be fulfilled in 
order for a strike not to constitute a criminal offence. However, just before the end of the 
apartheid era, the old Labour Appeal Court handed down one of its most celebrated 
judgments in BAWU & others v Blue Waters Hotel221 which had as its basis an 
acknowledgement of the existence in South Africa of the right to strike. In this case the 
requirements for a legal strike in terms of the 1956 Act were described as being that “there 
had to be a dispute between employees or a union and an employer.”222 An application had to 
be made to the Department of Labour in terms of s 35 of the 1956 Act for the appointment of 
a conciliation board or industrial council to try to resolve the dispute through consensus.223 If 
a period of 30 days from the application for the establishment of a conciliation board, or from 
the delivery of the referral of the dispute to the industrial council, had lapsed without the 
dispute having been resolved, a secret ballot had to conducted to determine whether the 
majority of workers supported a decision to strike.224 Although the 1956 Act did not contain a 
specific provision recognising the right to strike in the work place, it did not prohibit strike 
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action. It simply provided for requirements which had to be complied with in order for a 
strike to be legal. These requirements included the holding of a secret ballot. Looking at case 
law that has been discussed in this chapter thus far and which will also be referred to later, it 
is clear that the inclusion of the notice requirement developed because it seemed unfair for 
the employer to see employees embarking on a strike without having been notified.225 The 
question of whether the rate of strikes depleted as a result of introduction of notice 
requirement by the court will be considered. However, this research intends to show that the 
notice requirement is not effective in curbing the strikes in the work place as instead, it 
simply prepares the employer for the impending strike rather than combating the likelihood of 
a violent and unprotected strike.  
3.4.2 The emphasis of the notice requirement by the Industrial Court  
From the time of the introduction of the notice requirement by the Industrial Court in 1987 
and 1988, it was considered relevant to determine the legality and fairness of strikes brought 
before it. Employers took advantage of the opportunity to have strikes declared illegal on the 
basis that the proper notice had not been provided. They used this as a basis to interdict strike 
action  
In MWASA & others v Perskor226 reasons which led to the union’s failure to give strike notice 
were provided. One was that a previous strike upon which the workers had embarked prior to 
the one in issue had served as a warning to the employer. Another reason was that the 
employer could not have believed that the situation would have remained static. It was also 
provided that the strike had not been planned and had arisen out of the frustration which the 
workers had been experiencing. The Industrial Court held that none of these factors or 
reasons outweighed the importance of the necessity  to notify  the employer of an intended 
strike, , where, as in this case, the employer’s business will be severely disrupted by a strike 
without warning.227 It was deemed only fair to do so. The Union took the matter on appeal. 
The Labour Appeal Court found that the dismissals were unfair and unlawful on the basis that 
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although the employer had been obliged to observe the audi alterem partem rule before they 
could dismiss their striking employees, they had failed to do so. What is fundamental from 
the appeal ruling in this case, is that even though notice was not given by the union before 
embarking on a strike, the Labour Appeal Court still saw it necessary for employees to be 
given an opportunity to explain the reasons for not giving notice of the strike, prior to 
dismissal.  
In discussing this case, I have intended to establish that the Industrial Court was more 
concerned about the giving of notice than assessing the fairness of the employees’ dismissals, 
both of which, I hold, had to be equally attended to as they are equally important. It is 
however, the argument in this research that the introduction of the notice requirement by the 
Industrial Court was a reasonable measure to deal with the propensity of violent strikes at the 
time. However, in applying the notice requirement the Industrial Court should not have 
overlooked the fairness of the dismissals of employees for having embarked on a strike 
without notice.  
It cannot be ruled out that these decisions were driven by the level of disruptions that these 
strikes ended up causing in the workplace. The notice requirement was introduced as means 
to curb the disruptive strikes. It will be established later as to whether prior notice was the 
best possible requirement to deal with disruptive strikes. This establishment will be necessary 
because the current LRA regulating industrial action now provides for the notice requirement 
preceding the strike, however, the labour market and especially the mining sector has 
experienced violent strikes. The Industrial Courts in dealing with the issue of strike notice, 
have paid less attention to the reasons for failure by the unions to give notice regardless of the 
possible reasonableness of their failure. They acted as if prior notice was a statutory 
requirement where they would be forced not to compromise. It is the argument in this chapter 
that in trying to address the issue of violent strikes, attention should also be paid to the rights 
of employees so that there is balance between the corrective measures needed to curb the 
violent strikes and the needs and rights of employees.  
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In NTE Ltd v South African Chemical Workers Union and others228 the employer had 
purported to institute a lock-out against his employees in order to put pressure on them to 
agree to a lower wage increase than the one they were demanding and to other new terms and 
conditions of employment. At that time the definition of lock-out in s 1 of the 1956 Act 
included what was termed the ‘lock-out dismissal’. Such a dismissal entailed an employer 
terminating the contracts of employment of his employees for the purpose of compelling 
them to agree to his demands.  A dismissal coupled with such purpose constituted a lock-out 
in terms of this section. In purporting to lock-out the workers by terminating their contracts of 
employment in this case, the employer did not give them notice of the termination of their 
contracts of employment which could have been construed as some kind of a lock-out notice. 
The Industrial Court held that notice of the impending lock-out was required. 
In Food and Beverage Workers Union & others v Hercules Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd229  the then 
Labour Court took the union’s failure to give the employer notice of when the strike would 
commence as underscoring the union’s intention to cripple the company financially and as 
supporting the employer’s contention that the union lacked bona fides in negotiating with it. 
This was an appeal against a decision of the Industrial Court,230 where it transpired that the 
union’s failure to give the employer prior notice of the strike was not one of the factors that 
the Industrial Court took into account when it dealt with the case.  Even though the issue of 
prior notice was not codified as a statutory pre-requisite for the determination of legality of a 
strike, it is the argument of this research that it ended up being an accepted norm in the 
workplace through the precedents made by the Industrial Court in the majority of cases 
discussed herein. Some unions and employers had accepted the need to give prior notice 
before industrial action and were beginning to incorporate the notice requirement in their 
collective agreements or recognition and procedural agreements. This appears from the 
arbitration award in Mercedes-Benz of SA (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA231 where the collective 
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agreement that had been concluded between the employer and the union in 1989 included a 
provision in the pre-strike dispute procedure in terms of which the union had to give the 
employer at 72 hours’ written notice of the commencement of industrial action before 
industrial action could be embarked upon. Despite the Industrial Court’s influence as shown 
and discussed above, another important factor which also contributed to the introduction of 
the notice requirement into the LRA was the appointment of the Technical Committee of the 
National Manpower Commission in 1990,232 chaired by Professor AA Landman. The 
Committee was asked to consider various proposals made by stakeholders regarding the 1956 
Act, in response to an invitation issued in the Government Gazette of 13 October 1989. One 
of the proposals that the Technical Committee made was that there should, amongst others, 
be a statutory requirement that before a strike could be said to be legal, it be shown that “24 
hours (or such other period as may have been agreed in writing) written notice of the 
commencement of the strike has been given”.233   
3.5 The Provisions of ELRA and PSLRA  
In 1993 two pieces of legislation were enacted which are very important to the historical 
developments that led to the inclusion of the requirement of notice of industrial action. These 
statutes were the Education Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as 
“ELRA”) and the Public Service Labour Relations Act (hereinafter referred to as “PSLRA”). 
Their importance lies in the fact that they marked the first occasion in the history of South 
Africa that a strike notice and a lock-out notice were included in a statute as a requirement for 
a legal strike and lock-out.  
The ELRA gave educators and/or teachers the right to strike, but the exercise of such right 
was subject to the provisions of the Act.234 The ELRA also precluded an employee 
organisation, office bearer ,official or member thereof, from calling or taking part in any 
strike unless written notice of at least seven days has been given to the employer or 
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employers concerned, stipulating the date of commencement of such strike.235 The ELRA 
precluded an employer from instituting a lock-out unless he has given written notice to the 
employee organization or organizations concerned, of the commencement of such lock-out.236 
These were now statutory requirements that compelled both the employee and the employer 
to issue  a written notice prior to embarking on industrial action. Failure to issue the required 
notice would render the industrial action illegal. Section 19 (1) of the PSLRA granted 
employees the right to strike and the employers the right to lock-out, provided that certain 
conditions were met. The PSLRA prohibited a strike unless certain conditions were met. One 
of these was that written notice of at least 10 days, of the date of the commencement of such 
a strike, had to have been given to the particular employer or employers concerned.237 Section 
19 (5) of the PSLRA further required an employer to give written notice of at least 10 days to 
the employees concerned. The first Minister of Labour238 in post-apartheid South Africa 
appointed a Ministerial Task Team to draft the Labour Relations Bill. The main responsibility 
of this Ministerial Task Team was to overhaul the laws regulating labour relations and to 
prepare a negotiating document in draft Bill form to initiate a process of public discussion 
and negotiation amongst the social partners, namely government, organised labour, business 
as well as other interested parties.239 It seems here that the post-apartheid government deemed 
it necessary to determine which parts of the pre-1995 jurisprudence on the law of strikes and 
lock-outs should be carried over into the new dispensation, bearing in mind the provisions of 
the supreme law of the land, the Constitution.  
In the Explanatory Memorandum prepared by the Ministerial Task Team which accompanied 
the draft Bill, as well as in the draft Bill itself, provision was made for the giving of prior 
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notice of strikes, lock-outs and protest action.240 In the terms of reference of the Ministerial 
Task Team it had to have regard to international law, and it is notable that the requirement of 
notice before industrial action is quite common internationally.241 It would have not escaped 
the attention of the Task Team, that case law suggested that failure to give a strike notice to 
the employer was regarded as unfair. It would also not have escaped the attention of the Task 
Team that the ELRA and the PSLRA prescribed the giving of prior notice of a strike and 
lock-out, nor would it have escaped their attention that the committee chaired by Professor 
AA Landman had recommended this requirement. It is this not surprising that the Ministerial 
Task Team included the requirement of notice in the Bill for industrial action to qualify as 
protected.  
3.6 Notice of Industrial Action by the LRA  
The LRA was passed in 1995 and it contained the requirement that notice be given before 
industrial action takes place in the workplace.  
The relevant provisions in the LRA are s 64 (1) (b), (c), (d), s 66 (2) (b) and s 77 (1) (b).  This 
marked the first time in the history of South African labour law that a statute of general 
application laid down such a requirement.242  The provisions of s 64 (1) (b), (c) and (d) of the 
LRA read as follows:  
(1) Every employee has the right to strike and every employer has recourse to lock-out if-  
(a) ……..  
(b) In the case of a proposed strike, at least 48 hours’ notice of the commencement of the 
strike, in writing, has been given to the employer, unless-  
(i) The issue in dispute relates to a collective agreement to be concluded in a 
council, in which case, notice must have been given to that council; or  
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(ii) The employer is a member of an employers’ organisation that is a party to the 
dispute, in which case, notice must have been given to that employers’ 
organisation; or  
(c) In the case of a proposed lock-out, at least 48 hours’ notice of the commencement of 
the strike, in writing, has been given to any trade union that is a party to the dispute or 
if there is no such trade union, to the employees, unless the issue in dispute relates to 
a collective agreement to be concluded in a council, in which case, notice must have 
been given to that council;  
(d) In the case of proposed strike or lock-out where the State is the employer, at least 
seven days’ notice of the commencement of the strike or lock-out has been given to 
the parties contemplated in paragraphs (b) and (c).  
Section 64, as quoted above, puts measures in place which striking employees and employers 
intending to lock-out employees should comply with in order for that strike or lock-out to be 
legal and in compliance with the LRA. The requirements for giving of proper notice in terms 
of this section has not been clear and the courts have assisted in interpreting the meaning of 
the section in this regard. The section is not specific as to who must give the notice, nor of 
precisely when it must be given.  
It is therefore imperative to analyse and discuss relevant case law so as to ascertain the 
meaning of this provision and how the courts have dealt with its interpretation. In SATAWU 
and others v Moloto NO and another243 the court also elaborated on the purpose of the 
requirement of giving notice and how the relevant provision of the LRA should be 
interpreted.244  The issue in this case was whether employees who were not identified in the 
strike notice were entitled to go out on strike in terms of that same notice, or whether they 
were required to issue a separate notice to the employer before going on a protected strike.  
SATAWU was the majority union at the workplace. The union had decided to embark on a 
strike after it had deadlocked with the employer and after the dispute remained unresolved 
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thereafter. The employer on the other side had been assured by the minority trade unions in 
the workplace that they were not party to the dispute and that their members would not be 
joining the strike. SATAWU members then embarked on a strike and it transpired that a 
certain few non-SATAWU members joined along and participated in the strike action.   
The employer having noted the participation of non-SATAWU members was satisfied that 
those members were not covered by the striking notice that had been issued by SATAWU. 
These members were subsequently dismissed as a result of the strike which was classified as 
unprotected in respect of those employees who had not been members of SATAWU at the 
time of the issue of the strike notice. SATAWU then referred the matter to the Labour Court, 
which ended up being heard by the Constitutional Court, arguing that the dismissals were 
unfair. The employer on the other side argued that it was an implied requirement of s 64 (1) 
(b) that the strike notice would only be valid in respect of those employees who had referred 
the dispute and on whose behalf the notice had been given.245 The Labour Court ruled that a 
trade union was entitled to increase its membership during the course of a strike action and 
therefore, the members in question were members of SATAWU.246  Thus the notice covered 
them even though they had not been members of SATAWU at the time of the issue of the 
notice. In terms of this ruling the employer was found to have unfairly dismissed the 
employees as they were participating in a protected strike. The court also stated that it had to 
adopt a purposive interpretation of the provisions of s 64 (1) (b) and accepted that the purpose 
of this section was set out by the Labour Appeal Court in the case of Ceramic Industries Ltd 
t/a Betta Sanitary ware v National Construction, Building and Allied Workers Union.247 It 
held such purpose as being  to give the employer advance warning of the proposed strike so 
that an employer may prepare for the power play that will follow. The court also ruled that 
the section did not place any limitation on who should give notice, nor on whose behalf it 
could be given. The court ruled that it did not require that the notice give an indication of how 
many employees would go on strike nor of which unions they belonged to. The court also 
ruled that to limit the right to strike to those whose union had issued a strike notice would be 
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a limitation over and above the limitations on the right to strike as provided by the LRA and 
as such the effect would be to deny the employees their fundamental right to strike.  
The employer referred the matter to the Labour Appeal Court.  
On appeal,248 the disputed issue was whether the Labour Court had correctly classified the 
dismissal as automatically unfair as the form of a dismissal for participation in a protected 
strike. The Labour Appeal Court unanimously found that SATAWU had failed to discharge 
the onus of proving that the dismissed employees were their members at the time of the 
strike.249 However, the court was divided on the question of whether the notice of intention to 
strike issued by the union also entitled the non-union members to strike. The majority held 
that the non-union members were permitted to join the strike in respect of the same notice 
issued by SATAWU. The court held that this approach would not undermine orderly 
collective bargaining. The court also emphasised that the plain meaning of statutes should be 
given effect to. That is why it reasoned that there was no requirement in section 64 (1) (b) 
that the strike notice should identify precisely who was to go on strike. It further stated this 
requirement that the notice should identify who was to go on strike should not be introduced 
by the court.  
However, the minority judgment in this case by Zondo JP found that the use of the word “we” 
in the strike notice implied that it would only be SATAWU members who would participate 
in the strike action. He found that just as it was permissible for trade unions to limit the right 
to strike of non-union members by way of a collective agreement with the employer, so they 
should be held to any limitations on the strike action implied by their strike notice.250  
The matter was further referred to the Supreme Court of Appeal.251 The Supreme Court of 
Appeal rejected the approach taken by the majority of the Labour Court of Appeal and 
preferred the minority view of Zondo JP. The SCA accepted and agreed that constitutional 
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rights should not be unnecessarily limited. It held that the primary objects of the LRA include 
‘providing a framework for and promoting orderly collective bargaining and promoting the 
effective resolution of labour disputes’ and that s 64 (1) (b) was clearly designed just for that 
reason.   
The SCA held that the question for it to decide was “whether employees who have not given 
notice of a proposed strike defeat orderly collective bargaining when they participate in a 
strike where other participants have given notice”.252The SCA found that it was not necessary 
to ‘read in’ to s 64 (1) (b) the requirement that those going to strike should be identified. The 
SCA also found that every employee who intends to go on strike must notify his employee of 
that intention personally or through a representative for the strike action to be protected. It 
found that to hold otherwise would lead to disorderly collective bargaining and usher in an 
era of chaotic collective bargaining in our labour dispute resolution system.253 The SCA 
finally found that the strike was unprotected and the employees’ dismissals were not 
automatically unfair. It therefore, overturned the ruling of the Labour Court of Appeal.  The 
matter was then referred to the Constitutional Court where the fundamental question to be 
decided was “whether the dismissed employees met the provisions of s 64 (1) (b) by 
engaging in a strike when only SATAWU issued a strike notice on behalf of its members”. 
The minority judgement followed the decision of the SCA. It held that “the purpose of the 
strike notice is more than a mere trigger for the 48-hour window period that precedes the 
commencement of a strike, but rather a mechanism meant to enable an employer to prepare 
properly for the impending power play”.254 The minority judgement reasoned, the strike 
notice should necessarily identify who was to participate in the strike. The majority decision 
on the other hand overturned the decision of the SCA. The court found that it should follow 
the purposive approach to interpretation. It was further stated that where the language was 
clear, the court could not speculate about issues which the legislature saw fit not to detail in 
the section. The court also stated that “the procedural pre-conditions and substantive 
limitations of the right to strike in the LRA contain no express requirement that every 
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employee who intends to participate in a protected strike must personally or through a 
representative give notice of the commencement of the intended strike, nor who will take part 
in the strike”.255 
The court found that the employees had been dismissed for engaging in protected strike 
action, and that their dismissals were automatically unfair.  
The implications of this judgement are that the employees have now been vindicated in that 
they are at liberty to embark on a strike action spontaneously and that strike action may result 
in participation of more employees than those who had initially notified the employer. The 
underlying requirement in terms of this ruling is that the strike must be protected. In a way, 
this therefore weakens the effect of the notice requirement in terms of s 64 (1) (b) of the 
LRA. On the other hand, it may be argued that this interpretation of the section by the 
Constitutional Court should be blamed as it fails to be specific. Had it been specific it would 
be clear who is entitled to participate in a strike preceded by the ‘notice requirement’. That is 
why the research in this chapter finds that the notice requirement is not effective and 
therefore, cannot be the best option available to curb the prevalent violent strikes in the 
workplace. 
Section 66 of the LRA will not be discussed in detail as the entails almost the same 
requirement as section 64. However, it would be necessary to briefly quote what the section 
entails as it also speaks about the issue of the notice requirement. Section 66 (2) (b) provides:  
 (2) No person may take part in a secondary strike unless:  
(a) …  
(b) The employer of the employees taking part in the secondary strike or, where appropriate, 
the employers’ organisation of which that employer is a member, has received a written 
notice of the proposed secondary strike at least seven days prior to its commencement.  
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This provision shares the same finding as section 64 (1) (b) which the courts have found in 
respect of section 64 (1) (b). It is also not clear who bears the obligation to give notice of a 
secondary strike, as nothing is expressly stated in the section. However, it is doubtful that the 
secondary employees have that obligation. There is also no doubt therefore, that this section 
bears a possibility of sharing the same legal implications as section 64 (1) (b) of the LRA.  
Section 77 (1) (b) and (d) of the LRA also entail the notice requirement. It provides that:  
(1) Every employee who is not engaged in an essential service or a maintenance service has 
the right to take part in a protest action if-  
(a) …  
(b) The registered trade union or federation of trade unions has served a notice on  
NEDLAC stating-  
(i) the reasons for the protest action; and   
(ii) the nature of the protest action;  
(c) …  
(d) At least 14 days before the commencement of the protest action, the registered trade 
union or federation of trade unions has served a notice on NEDLAC of its intention to 
proceed with the protest action. 
 
The fundamental difference in this section, in respect to the aforementioned section, is the 
required number of days after which a protest action could take place. What is in common is 
the necessity for prior notice of the protected industrial action. Again, this section is no 
different from what has been found in section 64 of the LRA in as far as the interpretation 
and possible legal implications are concerned.  
 
3.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed the procedural restrictions provided by the LRA preceding an 
industrial action in order for it to be protected in terms of the LRA. Special reference was 
made to the notice requirement which employees ought to comply with before embarking on 
a strike. It was necessary that before much could be said about the notice requirement, a 
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historical development of the notice requirement into the LRA be dealt with so as to 
understand factors that influenced the legislature to introduce this requirement.  
This chapter highlighted through the historical development of the notice requirement 
discussed above, that there is no doubt that this requirement was introduced as a measure that 
was meant to curb the prevalence and destruction caused by such strikes to the workplace. It 
was also shown that the relevant provisions in respect of the notice requirement, introduced 
since 1995 into the LRA by the new democratic dispensation, have not been effective in 
curbing the violent strikes in the workplace. This has been shown by raising ambiguity of the 
provisions of the LRA such as the ‘notice requirement’. To support the ambiguity relevant 
case law was discussed which has shown in my view the negative legal implications of these 
provisions.  
In the next chapter, this research will explore characteristics of recent unprocedural strike 
actions in South Africa. Reference will be made to various incidents wherein unprocedural 
strike actions played out, such as in the case of, the Marikana Massacre, the Gold Mine strike 
and NUMSA strike. It will further be shown that it is mainly because of strike actions such as 
these that a re-evaluation of our collective bargaining laws is necessary.   
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CHAPTER 4: UNPROTECTED INDUSTRIAL ACTION IN THE MINING SECTOR   
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter will explore the unprotected strike actions that have taken place in the mining 
industry and in other sectors. Reference will be made to various incidents wherein 
unprotected strike actions played out for instance in the Marikana Massacre,256 Amplats,257 
Gold Mine strike258 and Farm Workers strike.259 It will be argued that it is as a result of the 
type of strike action characterising the Marikana Massacre, Amplats, Gold Mine strike and 
Farm Workers strike, that our strike law must be urgently re-evaluated.  In South Africa, the 
right to strike is a constitutional right and it is regulated by the Constitution and the LRA.260 
Section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa confers on every worker the 
right to strike.261 It further provides that “every trade union, employers’ organization and 
employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining”262 and goes on to provide that 
national legislation may be enacted to regulate these rights.263  In South Africa all sectors of 
employment are experiencing strike actions.264 While some of the strikes are legal and 
protected within the ambit of the law, others have been found to be illegal and unprotected.265 
These types of illegal and unprotected strikes have been prominent in the mining industry. 
The mining industry accounts for substantial foreign exchange earnings of the country and 
                                                 
 
256 This was a strike action embarked upon by mine workers of Lonmin Platinum Mine which later 
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also hires a huge number of workers.266 Violent strikes have produced a lot of ugly incidences 
during the apartheid regime and it seems not to be declining during the post-apartheid 
democratic dispensation.267 The issue of illegal and violent strikes has been a trend in the 
mining sector over the last 3 to 4 years. If strike action is not compliant with the LRA it will 
be an unprotected strike and may result in negative consequences for the participants, 
including the possibility of dismissal. 
4.2 The Extent and Practice of Strike Actions in South Africa  
The right to strike has been widely recognised as a fundamental element of stable collective 
bargaining. Industrial action is one of the essential means available to employees to promote 
and protect their economic and social interests, and to resolve industrial disputes. Employers 
may also use industrial action (for example through lock-outs).268 There can be no effective 
collective bargaining without the exercise of the right to strike. This right compels the 
unwilling employer to consider the grievance(s) of the employees in the workplace and is the 
only instrument at the disposal of employees to ensure successful collective bargaining. The 
right to strike and the extent to which people can strike are fundamental freedoms which 
distinguish a participative democratic government from a more authoritative one.269 In a 
democratic and participative government where the right to strike is recognised, as in South 
Africa, the employee will not be regarded as having contravened his contract of employment 
by striking and  those on strike may not be penalised for striking. However, this does not 
allow the employees to disregard the substantive and procedural requirements for protected 
strike action as provided by the LRA. Employees who participate in a protected strike are 
protected against any form of victimisation by the employer.270 However employers may 
dismiss workers for misconduct committed during the strike, or for reasons based on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
               imperatives and implications” Dutch -Reformed Theological Journal, 43(3&4) 530-542. 
266 M Altman, “Low Wage Work in South Africa” (2006) HSRC 12. 
267 K Odeku, “An overview of the right to strike phenomenon in South Africa” (2014) Vol 5 MJSS 695.  
268 J Romeyn, “Striking a balance: the need for further reform of the law relating to industrial action” 
Parliamentary Research Paper, Parliament of Australia 33 (2008) 7. 
269 M Davidmann, “Slavery, compulsion and freedom: the right to withdraw one’s labour” (1996).                       
               http://www.solhaam.org/articles/right.html. (Last accessed on 4 June 2013). 
270 J Grogan J, Collective Labour Law (2007) 383.  
70  
  
employer’s operational requirements.271 These employees are also protected against dismissal 
and civil legal proceedings by the employer.272 The Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction to 
interdict or restrain strikes which are violent and unprotected.273 An example of an 
unprotected and violent strike would be strikes such as those we have witnessed in Marikana 
at Lonmin Mine in 2012, where a huge number of workers lost their lives. Participation in 
unprotected strike may constitute a fair reason for the dismissal of an employee.274  While it 
may be generally accepted that the right to strike is the most precious tool the strikers have 
against the employer,275 this right is not absolute as it is limited in terms of the LRA.276 There 
have been instances of unreasonable and incessant strikes in South Africa that have 
negatively impacted on other sectors because they were not prevented. In South Africa a 
strike may well drag for quite some time without any intervention from the government and 
all other areas of service would be disrupted. This we have also witnessed through the 
Marikana strike as indicated above. It is understandable that the government is supposed to be 
seen to be neutral regarding labour disputes, however, when the dispute is as a result of a 
sector which sustains the economy of the country, such as mining, the government could 
intervene by ensuring that the dispute is either prevented or resolved amicably after it has 
started. The government therefore, should ensure that the Mining Charter is not only left as 
theory but is implemented and that there is accountability. The recent mining strikes 
including the Marikana, Amplats and Gold Fields strikes have suggested a radical departure 
from the established collective bargaining and labour dispute resolution procedures, as 
provided by the LRA.277 The employees have used these unprotected strikes to achieve their 
demands. Violence and intimidation was also one tactic which was used, whereas in terms of 
the available labour dispute resolution procedures such actions are prohibited. The trend that 
we have seen from these strikes, is the disregard of the procedural requirements of the LRA 
and a breach of provisions of the existing collective agreements which have been duly 
executed by elected labour union officials. Such breaches have taken the form of wildcat 
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strike actions, which employ violence, arson, intimidation and threats in order to force 
employers to accede to their demands. Although the right to strike is protected, and 
employees are free to engage in a strike once the prescribed requirements have been met, 
employees should not make themselves guilty of misconduct during their strike action. 
Violence during both protected and unprotected strikes has become a serious concern in 
South Africa. In 2006, during the strike by the security industry, employees who were 
members of SATAWU, damaged  property to an estimated value of  R1, 5 million.278 Again 
in October 2012, truck drivers also embarked on a strike which also turned violent; trucks 
were set on fire and drivers who did not take part in the strike were assaulted.279 The drivers 
embarked on a strike on the basis that the employer offered the drivers an 8, 5 percent 
increase whereas they were demanding 10%. In the same year, farm workers went on strike in 
the Western Cape demanding more than double their current pay, and property worth of 
millions of Rands was destroyed during the strike.280 The LRA offers protection for strikers 
taking part in a protected strike. However, it does not promote violent conduct during a strike. 
This trend of strikes has taken place despite the procedural requirements in the LRA which 
are intended to limit the possibility of unprotected strikes.  The balance of power in industrial 
relations favours employers over employees.281 This is so because in the workplace the power 
is vested in the management. It is the management that takes decisions on behalf of the 
employees. Industrial action and strike action in particular, therefore, is used as a tool by 
employees to bring some balance and close the gap between them and the employer. In 
BAWU v Prestige Hotels CC t/a Blue Waters Hotel,282 the following was stated with regard to 
the functionality of a strike:  
A lawful strike is by definition functional to collective bargaining. The collective negotiations 
between the parties are taken seriously by each other because of the awful risk they face if a 
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settlement is not reached. Either of them may exercise its right to inflict economic harm upon 
the other. In that sense the threat of a strike or lock-out is conducive and functional to 
collective bargaining.  
From what the Labour Appeal Court stated, a lawful strike is useful to facilitate collective 
bargaining.283 Manamela and Budeli,284 submit that  
“a violent strike is not functional to collective bargaining and that it is not conducive to 
bargaining in good faith. The right to strike does not offer striking employees a licence to 
engage in unruly or criminal conduct”.285  
Furthermore, they state: 
When employees embark on a strike they do not obtain any permission to conduct themselves 
in a manner that poses a criminal behaviour. Violence during strike is actually an abuse of the 
right to strike. In addition to the right to strike, the LRA permits employees on strike to picket 
peacefully in support of a protected strike. Employees who therefore, commit act of 
misconduct during a strike should be held accountable for their actions.286 
4.3 Elements of Unprotected Strikes.  
An unprotected strike is not a criminal offence punishable by law as was the case under the 
1956 Act. During the application of this Act if workers were found to have taken part in an 
unprotected strike they risked the chance of being criminally charged, as the Act provided for 
such participation to be criminally punishable if it was found to be an unprotected strike. 
However, although it is not criminalised, participation in an unprotected strike is an act of 
misconduct which may result in disciplinary action, including dismissal.287 If the strike does 
not comply with the procedural requirements, or there are limitations in terms of s 65, the 
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strike will not enjoy protection. The LRA stipulates that ‘no person may embark on a strike if 
that person is bound by a collective agreement which prohibits a strike in respect of the issue 
in dispute’.288 If employees embark on a strike in respect of an issue which they know  is 
governed by a collective agreement which they have signed, that strike will be unprotected 
and can result in dismissal on the grounds of misconduct.289 This section further provides that 
‘no person may embark on a strike if he is bound by an agreement which requires that the 
issue in dispute should be referred for arbitration’.290 If employees embark on a strike in 
respect of that issue without having referred it for arbitration first, then that strike will not be 
protected. The immunity that applies in the case of protected strikes does not apply to 
unprotected strikes. The nature of the unprotected strikes which have been prevalent recently, 
in our country, and more particularly in the mining sector, will be discussed in detail. These 
strikes will the depict typical characteristics of unprotected strikes. Unprotected strike action 
can also take form of what is generally referred to as a wildcat strike.291 A wildcat strike is an 
unofficial strike which is characterised by violence and which at the end may result into 
damage of property. In some instances, wildcat strikes are directed against some policies or 
agreements accepted by union leaders on behalf of the workers. This is what reportedly 
transpired at Lonmin Marikana Mine near Rustenburg in 2012 whereby employees disagreed 
with a collective agreement between the union NUM and the management on 
remuneration.292 It is clear that strikes which take place without the endorsement of the union 
and which are not in compliance with the statutory requirements of the LRA are unprotected. 
The data collected and analysed in 2013 by the Department of Labour indicates a continuous 
rise in the number of strikes as from 2002. The Labour Department recorded 114 industrial 
incidents in 2013, up from 99 recorded in 2012. The Department had reported that out of the 
99 strike actions embarked upon by workers in 2012, about 45 were unprotected. All of these 
strikes were characterised by violence, with a total of 241 391 workers participating in the 
strikes. The mining industry in 2013 continued to experience more working days lost  than 
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any other sector, totalling 515 971 during that year,293 In other reports, however, it is indicated 
that 52 percent of the strikes in 2013 were unprotected as compared to 48 percent protected 
strikes.294 These statistics show that the unprotected strikes in South Africa are in fact rising 
instead of going down and the figures point towards a trend where the procedural 
requirements which employees are required to comply with prior to embarking on a strike 
action, are being deliberately ignored by employees and/or alternatively, are not effective in 
curbing the rise of unprotected strikes.  
4.3.1 The Marikana strike  
The August 2012 , the Lonmin Platinum mineworkers strike, commonly referred to as the 
“Marikana massacre”, set the pace for a plethora of similar strike actions within and beyond 
the mining industry.295 This strike has set a precedent for a large number of similar strikes that 
could change the way in which strike action is conducted in South Africa in the future. Most 
of mineworkers involved in the Marikana strike were registered members of the recognised 
trade unions operating within the mining company. These unions were the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM), the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU), 
and Trade Union Solidarity (TUS), with NUM having the majority membership as the time. 
NUM as the majority union negotiated and signed a two-year collective agreement with the 
Lonmin Platinum Mine in October 2011 and the agreement remained binding on all parties 
until its expiration in 2013. According to an official of the NUM, “Unions signed a two-year 
salary agreement with Lonmin and we cannot negotiate now because of that.”296 With this in 
mind, and in terms of the LRA, no wage negotiation could be contemplated until 2013 unless 
the parties to the subsisting collective agreement, i.e. the employer and unions, expressly 
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agreed to re-open negotiation for that purpose.297Notwithstanding the valid collective 
agreement, about 3000 mineworkers sought to engage in direct wage negotiation with the 
management of the mining company. The miners demanded an increase in their salary. The 
workers appointed a “workers representative” to negotiate with the employer on their behalf, 
rather than a trade union representative. Members of the worker representatives, according to 
Mogkata,298 emphasised that the strike action and protests embarked upon by the miners were 
not trade union organised but were rather coordinated under ‘the hat’ of the workers of 
Marikana. Not surprisingly the management of Lonmin Platinum mine refused to recognise 
or negotiate with the representatives appointed by the striking workers. This provoked the 
workers who perceived management to be uninterested in their economic well-being. The 
striking workers did not comply with various notices issued by management, which ordered 
them to return to work or face dismissal. The illegal strike and protest action escalated and 
became increasingly violent The workers continued their action and violence continued to 
escalate, ultimately leading to the death of at least 10 people, including two policemen and 
two security guards engaged by management.299 This development persuaded the police 
authorities and trade union officials to approach the striking miners to negotiate, after the 
employers had obtained an interdict from the Labour Court declaring the strike action by the 
miners as illegal. The attempt to negotiate was unsuccessful and the striking miners gathered 
on a hill that overlooks the Lonmin Mine.  The striking miners were deliberately and 
defiantly in breach of the interdict. On the 16th of August 2012, a leader of the AMCU, in an 
effort to persuade the striking miners to call off the illegal strike and return to work, 
announced that Lonmin management had given the unions an undertaking that it would not 
dismiss strikers, provided they reported for duty.300 Chauke and Strydom also reported that 
the AMCU official told the striking miners that we are pleading with you to consider the 
request to return to work and that the mining company is willing to listen to your demand”. 
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The striking workers did not heed the call, and instead confronted the South African Police 
Service who had been called in to disarm and disperse the striking miners. The confrontation 
that ensued eventually led to the death of 34 protesting miners, while another 71 were 
injured.301The striking mine workers disrupted operations at the company and intimidated 
those workers who chose not to join in on the strike. 302As a result of the tragedy, the Ministry 
of Labour led by Mr Ngoako Ramatlodi, together with the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration, the management of Lonmin Platinum mine and labour unions at 
the company, reopened negotiations with the representatives of the striking workers. The 
striking workers appointed neutral persons, including clergymen, to lead negotiation with the 
parties mentioned above. Samuel303 points out that this procedure was a clear departure from 
the collective bargaining process stipulated by the LRA. The employer was forced, because 
of the violent unprotected strike action, to re-open negotiations despite the collective 
agreement that was still applicable at the time and despite the striking workers having 
breached the procedural requirements put in place by the LRA.  The Marikana strike was 
‘generally characterised by illegality, violence, intimidation, lawlessness and climaxed with 
casualties’.304 Regardless of the violence and unprotected strike action embarked upon the 
workers, they succeeded in their demand for a wage increase, thereby redefining the 
collective bargaining and dispute resolution mechanisms in the LRA.305  Collective 
Bargaining and dispute resolution procedures are provided in terms of the LRA in order to 
resolve disputes and find a common ground between the parties. This process was never 
utilised in Marikana, instead miners insisted on their needs through violence and intimidation 
until they received a response that was favourable to them. There is however, no evidence on 
the part of the employer showing measures taken to resolve this issue.  
4.3.2 The possible causes of the Marikana strike  
                                                 
 
301 Z Mogkata “Massacre at Marikana; hardship and confusionhttp://www.financial 
mail.co.za/fm/2012/08/23/massacre-at-marikana.  
302 Ibid.  
303 MO Samuel (note 296 above) 251.  
304 Ibid 251. 
305 Ibid 251J  
77  
  
Of all the mining strike actions discussed, the Marikana Strike was the most violent and had 
the most far reaching consequences. The Marikana strike has been dubbed the “Marikana 
Massacre” because of the loss of life involved. This strike set a precedent and a number of 
strikes in the mining sector followed immediately after the Marikana strike. It is therefore, 
crucial to assess what the possible causes were, that led to the strike.  
Neil Coleman306 wrote in the Mail and Guardian that the following questions need some 
answers:  
 Will the Marikana events turn out to be the democratic era’s equivalent of the 1973 
strikes? Have workers rejected their unions as being ineffective and unaccountable, 
just as the old toothless Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) was rejected? 
Is the most powerful and largest union federation in Africa on the brink of collapse?  
 Does Marikana represent the nascent emergence of a new, powerful, independent 
union movement and, more broadly, a political movement that will realign politics in 
the country?307 
 
Twala308 argues that these questions and the possible answers provided could help in 
shedding some light on the actual causes of the Marikana Massacre. One would agree with 
Twala because, besides the well-known cause which was wage related, the miners embarked 
on this wild cat strike because they had, amongst other things, lost confidence in their trade 
unions including NUM, which they had relied on for the past years. Twala sets out his 
assessment of the miner’s grievances309 which were the causes of the Marikana strike and 
these will be discussed below.  
 
4.3.3 The Anglo-Ashanti Gold strike  
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On the 2nd of November 2012, the Anglo-Ashanti Gold Mine announced it was suspending 
operations at two of its mines. Striking mine workers barricaded roads linking Rustenburg to 
Marikana, with rocks and burning tyres. The workers had started embarking on a wildcat 
strike in September 2012, without following the procedural requirements provided by the 
LRA. The striking miners were demanding a monthly salary of R16 000.00 including 
allowances. Subsequent to this unprotected and violent strike, Hedley310 reported that more 
than 8, 000 of the striking miners were dismissed as a result of the unprotected strike action. 
It is important to make mention that AngloGold Ashanti’s management had, prior to the 
dismissals, issued an ultimatum on the 22nd of October, for striking workers to return to work 
by no later than 12h00 on the 24th of October, or face dismissal proceedings. However, about 
12,000 workers remained on the unprotected strike and this was despite the concerted 
attempts made to resolve the issue through the gold industry’s collective bargaining 
framework which includes the Chamber of Mines and organized labour.  This strike was 
more or less similar to that of Marikana save to say that it did not result to any loss of life. 
The distinguishing factor here is that the management, after establishing that the strike was 
unprotected and in contravention of the provisions of the LRA, subjected the workers 
involved to disciplinary proceedings which eventually led to their dismissals. This was 
however, not the case in the Lonmin strike as striking miners retained their jobs even after 
having engaged themselves in an unprotected strike which lasted for more than five months.   
4.3.4 Anglo Platinum (Amplats) strike  
Following the precedent already set by mineworkers at Lonmin mine, coupled with the wage 
increase achieved by the striking miners, more than 12,000 mine workers from four Anglo 
Platinum (Amplats) mines marched on NUM offices to withdraw their membership.311 On the 
30th of October 2012, it was reported that instead of returning to work, the miners at Amplats 
barricaded the roads with rocks, logs and burning tyres, blocking fire engines and confronting 
a police helicopter, water cannons and several armoured vehicles.312 The striking miners went 
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on to set a power sub-station at the Khuselekani shaft in Rustenburg on fire and the NUM 
office was also targeted. This strike was also characterised by violence and intimidation 
which caused the strike to be unprotected. The strike took place after the Lonmin strike and 
considering what the striking miners achieved at Lonmin, Amplats’ strike took the same route 
as the Lonmin strike.  
4.3.5 Coal mining strike   
In October 2012 the workers at Forbes and Manhattan Coal and South African Coal Mining 
Holdings, also went on an illegal strike to demand wage increases.313 Kirilenko further 
reports that the situation was aggravated by a deadly outbreak of violence resulting in the 
shooting of two striking workers by security guards at one of the mines owned by Forbes and 
Manhattan Coal. During the unprotected strike, the striking workers would infiltrate the 
production areas, assaulting on-duty employees. As a result, one of the on-duty employees 
was fatally wounded.  
4.3.6 The farm workers strike  
The practice of unprotected strikes by workers had now escalated to other sectors such as 
farming in the Western Cape. These sectors had witnessed a number of violent strikes such as 
those discussed above, unfolding to the benefit of the workers. The farm workers in Boland 
near De Doorns, also decided to go on an illegal strike to demand a wage increase from 
R70.00 to R150.00 a day.314 This strike, like those in the mining sector, was organised by  
workers outside of  trade union structures. The strike was characterised by violence, 
intimidation, arson and killing. Farm properties were set on fire and  a farm worker was 
killed.315 One of the striking farm workers was reported to have said, as was the case at 
Marikana and other mines, that the workers had started to form their own representative 
groups and had distanced themselves from the control of the existing unions under the ambit 
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of  the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). It was however, reported that 
although the strikes were not organised by the trade unions, trade union officials nevertheless 
provided support and direction to the striking farm workers.  This strike, even though it was a 
strike taking place in a different sector of employment, had characteristics which were the 
same as the mining strikes discussed above and especially characteristic of the Marikana 
strike. This strike also involved violence, intimidation, malicious damage to property and loss 
of life. The only inference to be drawn is that the Marikana strike set a precedent for these 
workers and as such they adopted the same method and approach that the Marikana mine 
workers used when embarking on their strike.  
The Marikana strike has had a significant impact on the labour relations landscape in South 
Africa.316 The strikes , most specifically those in the mining sector which followed after the 
Marikana strike, were influenced by the latter because most of these strikes took more or less 
the similar route in the name of  demanding a wage increment. On the other hand, it can also 
be seen simply as the inevitable result of the continuation of the trend of unprotected strike 
action associated with violence and criminal behaviour. One of the biggest ramifications of 
Marikana, aside from the tragic deaths of so many, is the perception that the anarchy that was 
associated with the strike benefited the strikers.  
The dangerous trends of unprotected strikes that we have witnessed pose a wide range of 
implications for South Africa’s labour relations practice.317 This research agrees with this 
notion and it is as a result of this idea that this research is suggesting a need to revisit the 
LRA, to establish how the right to strike can be better regulated in order to curb the 
propensity for unprotected strikes characterised by violence and intimidation. It therefore 
goes without saying that with the growing popularity of unconventional and unprocedural 
strike actions amongst workers, a peaceful and sustainable labour environment can no longer 
be guaranteed in the workplace. This is because the mining sector has set the tone and 
furthermore, we have witnessed employees from other sectors of employment such as 
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farming in the Western Cape stating that they were also embarking on unprotected strike 
using the Marikana modus operandi because it has worked for the workers. This situation 
therefore, cannot be left unattended. It is necessary that the right to strike is better regulated 
so that a peaceful and sustainable labour environment is guaranteed in the workplace.   
 
4.4. The Role of Employers and the Mining Industry  
“In the recent years since the democratic dispensation massive platinum boom in the 
Rustenburg area has generated extensive wealth for companies and executives but ironically 
the platinum community has not enjoyed the wealth of its mines and instead tensions and 
poverty for workers and communities has worsened.”318  
The industry “deliberately fragments its workforce of 180, 000, and out of that about 82, 000 
of which are employed through labour brokers and exploited.”319  
“With workers consciously divided on ethnic, racial and religion lines, huge frustrations have 
resulted among workers, from whose perspective the industry and employers continue to 
become rich, while they sweat underground, face death on a daily basis and sink deeper into 
poverty.”320  
Close to a half of the 180 000 miners are employed through labour brokers which is 
perceived as cheap labour by the employer wherein employees are used as commodities by 
the employer to generate profit. These employees are not directly employed by the mine and 
therefore, their benefits and allowances would not be the same as those employees who are 
directly employed by the mine. By so doing, the mine is cutting down personnel costs so it 
can generate more profit. Furthermore, the issue of dividing employees through their ethnic 
origins and race is what keeps the gaps between them and ultimately causes lack of social 
cohesion in the workplace.   
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4.5 The Government’s Ineffectiveness in Implementing the Mining Charter  
In 2010, South Africa launched a new mining charter to facilitate the sustainable 
transformation and development of its mining industry, with emphasis on a target of 26 per 
cent black ownership of the country’s mining assets by 2014.321 This launch followed the 
Mining Charter of 2002. This new charter was aimed at addressing various shortcomings in 
the implementation of the Mining Charter of 2002.322 The Mining Charter of 2002 was 
accused of having failed to consider the rights of communities in terms of community 
consultation, community input into planning for mining developments; and direct community 
control of shares in mining companies.323 The workers, in a nutshell, claimed that there was 
no serious attempt to enforce the industry’s legal obligations including the provision of 
housing for miners.  
4.6 Labour Movements  
A trade union324 is defined as ‘an association of employees whose principal purpose is to 
regulate relations between employees and employers, including any employers’ organisation’. 
South Africa’s collective bargaining legislation, with clear guidelines regarding the 
responsibilities of employers, labour movements and workers, was regarded as among the 
best in the world prior to the Marikana incident.325  Sthembiso Msomi326 wrote in the Sunday 
Times that ‘all the labour related gains achieved over the years in South Africa and 
particularly in the post 1994 period were undone overnight by the labour movements who 
failed to represent the workers effectively in the bargaining chambers’.327 According to 
Msomi ‘many workers belonging to the labour movements claimed that they were expelled 
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from being members if they voiced discontent against the leadership’.328 This labour 
movement was NUM. Msomi attributed this  to the poor communication between the trade 
union leaders and members.329 ‘According to the workers there was no proper feedback given 
to the members on the labour issues raised in their meetings and in most cases,  after 
collective bargaining, leaders would simply tell them about the wage increases without 
explaining much on their working conditions and other related perks’.330 It was also 
interesting to note the disagreements and evolution of hatred that existed between the 
members of NUM and Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) over 
the dominance of the mining sector. AMCU leaders accused the NUM of collaborating with 
the ‘enemy’ namely, the employer.331 NUM leaders blamed the labour unrests on the rival 
AMCU and indicated that its members were forced to join the unprotected strike. The 
situation was further complicated by the tripartite alliance – specifically COSATU’s strong 
ties with the ruling ANC. The events in Marikana which led to the massacre had some 
unwarranted consequences for the mining industry in South Africa and amongst other causes 
this could be blamed on the labour movements who failed to effectively manage and 
represent the workers when it mattered most. However, having stated these causes, they do 
not justify in law, the departure by the mining workers from the collective bargaining process 
provided by the LRA. Furthermore, this research argues that besides the stated causes, the 
LRA provisions pertaining to the industrial action and/or right to strike in the workplace still 
need to be revisited in order to curb the propensity of violent strikes in the mining sector and 
all other employment sectors.  
4.7 Government’s Reaction to Unprotected Strikes  
The government, having witnessed the wild cat strikes in the mining industry, made some 
efforts to curb the wave of unprotected strikes. Amongst these efforts, the Minister of Labour 
tabled  the Labour Relations Amendment Bill before parliament in March 2012 for 
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approval.332 The unions would, in terms of the amendments introduced in the Bill, conduct 
ballots to ensure that the majority of members agreed to the need to strike before a strike 
would be embarked on.333 The perception was that several unlawful acts such as violence and 
damage to property mostly occur where only a minority supported the cause of their strike.334  
This research will suggest, as stated in Chapter 1 above, that there is a need for the 
introduction of ballots as a prior requirement before a strike is embarked upon, but it further 
argues that the ballots alone would not be effective in successfully curbing the wave of 
unprotected strikes in South Africa.   
The proposed introduction of ballots was strongly rejected by COSATU at the National 
Assembly. COSATU argued that unions had a right on how to consult workers before calling 
a strike. COSATU successfully blocked the proposed amendment and the requirement for 
strike balloting was excluded from bill.335 The Bill was then adopted by the National 
Assembly without the ballot requirement. This attempt by government clearly shows that the 
government considers that the existing provisions in the LRA pertaining to the right to strike 
have had limited effect in dealing with the wave of unprotected strikes that have recently 
unfolded, especially in the mining sector.  
4.8 The Legal Consequences of an Unprotected Strike  
The consequences of an unprotected strike can be far reaching in many ways. Even though 
the right to strike is recognised under the LRA, s 68 of the LRA explicitly provides for the 
consequences of a strike action embarked upon against the law.  
During the operation of the 1956 LRA, non-compliance was visited with criminal liability as 
well as possible dismissal. The current LRA merely discourages strikes that do not comply 
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with the statutory requirements by “strengthening the hand of the employer.”336 The remedies 
through which the employer deals with employees who were involved in unprotected strikes 
will be discussed below. These are the legal consequences that may result in the event of 
unprotected strikes:  
The Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction to interdict strikes not in compliance with the 
Act.337 Employers are able to sue for compensation for losses occasioned by an unprotected 
strike;338 and employers are provided with a fair reason to dismiss employees who participate 
in a strike that does not comply with the provisions of the LRA.339 As part of the remedies, an 
employer who is faced with an unprotected strike has a certain amount of  leverage in that the 
employer may have recourse to lock-out.340 A lock-out is seen as an employer’s economic 
weapon that gets used during the collective bargaining process to compel employees to accept 
an offer or proposal on the table which the employees are under no legal obligation to 
accept.341 The employer is exempted from complying with statutory requirements for a 
protected lock-out if the lock-out is in response to an unprotected strike. The lock-out may be 
seen as an economic weapon according to Grogan342. It is also a remedy that assists the 
employer in preventing striking employees from entering the workplace to cause damage.   
4.8.1 Court interdicts  
The Labour Court has an exclusive jurisdiction to grant an interdict restraining any person 
from participating in a strike that does not comply with the provisions of the LRA, or any 
conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of such a strike.343 In terms of s 68 an employer is 
entitled to apply to the Labour Court for an interdict prohibiting the unprotected strike action 
in terms of the LRA. Section 68, however, does not apply where the employer experiences 
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criminal conduct or material destruction to property or any unlawful conduct by striking 
employees emanating from a protected strike. This means when employees comply with the 
necessary procedural requirements prior to embarking on a strike as required by the LRA, and 
in the course of the same strike the employees happen to adopt criminal behaviour resulting 
in damage to property and causing the employer to suffer, this section will not apply. It only 
applies to unprotected strikes. In simple terms therefore, the employer is entitled by the LRA, 
when he is satisfied that the strike embarked upon by the employees is unprotected, to apply 
to the Labour Court for an interdict to prevent the striking employees from continuing with 
the strike action.   
An order in terms of this section can relate, however, only to a strike over a particular issue. It 
cannot be so framed as to deprive employees of their right to strike over other issues, as this 
would constitute an unreasonable limitation of the employees’ constitutional right to strike.344 
An employer, has to adhere to special procedural requirements when seeking  a strike 
interdict. These are provided by section 68 (2) of the LRA as follows: 
 (2) The Labour Court may not grant any order in terms of subsection (1) (a) unless 48 hours' 
notice of the application has been given to the respondent: However, the Court may permit a 
shorter period of notice if-  
(a) The applicant has given written notice to the respondent of the applicant's intention to 
apply for the granting of an order;  
(b) The respondent has been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard before a decision 
concerning that application is taken; and  
(c) The applicant has shown good cause why a period shorter than 48 hours should be 
permitted.  
The Labour Court, in granting the interdict that the employer is seeking, has to satisfy itself 
that at least a 48-hour notice of the application has been given to the employees or the union 
organising the strike. Where the employer is seeking the order on far more urgent basis, the 
notice period may be reduced by leave from the court, provided that there is proof by the 
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employer that he has given written notice to striking employees or union of his intention to 
seek for the order and that the employees have been given an opportunity to be heard, before 
a decision is given by the court. Furthermore, the court has to be sure when the employer 
seeks an order on shorter notice than the stipulated 48-hours, that the basis of urgency is 
compelling enough for the notice to be dispensed with.  
The employer would normally seek an urgent interdict in circumstances where employees are 
engaged in a wild cat strike which is characterised by violence, intimidation and malicious 
damage to property. These interdicts are meant to prevent and put a stop to unprotected 
strikes. The effect of court interdicts in circumstances of wild cat strikes will be discussed in 
the following chapter where it will be established whether the unions and employees have 
strictly obeyed these orders as expected by the courts.  
4.8.2 Compensation  
An employer is entitled to approach the Labour Court and claim compensation for any loss 
experienced as a result of an unprotected strike.345 The Labour Court may, upon considering 
the application for compensation by the applicant, order the payment of ‘just and equitable 
compensation’ for any loss resulting from an unprotected strike.346 This provision is intended 
to punish the employees who cause damage to the employer’s property during the course of a 
violent strike which is unprotected. The employer would determine the value of the damage 
and subsequently sue for compensation thereof. In deciding the issue of compensation, 
Landis347 provides that the court also takes into account the degree at which it should award 
just and equitable compensation which he summarises as follows:  
1-The extent to which attempts were made to comply with the law;  
2- Whether the strike action was premeditated or just spontaneous;  
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3- Whether the strike was in response to unjustified conduct by either party to a dispute;  
4-Whether there was any compliance with the restraining order;  
5- Whether the action is in the interest of collective bargaining; and the duration of the action 
itself and the financial position of the employer, trade union or employees respectively.348 
These are factors which the court would consider in order to arrive at a ‘just and equitable’ 
order of compensation in favour of the employer. In Manguang Local Municipality v 
SAMWU 349 the Labour Court held that where the trade union has a collective bargaining 
relationship with the employer, and its members embark on an unprotected strike of which 
the union is aware but in which it has ,without just cause, failed to intervene, the union will in 
terms of s 68 (1) (b), be held liable to compensate the employer for any loss incurred as a 
result of the strike.    
In this case the union had entered into a collective agreement with the municipality and the 
issue in relation to their decision to embark on an unprotected strike, was an issue governed 
by the collective agreement that the union was aware of. Despite knowledge of the collective 
agreement, the union embarked on a strike which was unprotected. The union leadership was 
proved to have failed in intervening in the process of the unprotected strike, which eventually 
resulted in the employer experiencing damage in the workplace. It is on that basis that the 
court ordered the union to compensate the municipality.  
4.8.3 Dismissal   
An employer in the workplace has the power to dismiss an employee who has been found to 
have committed an act of misconduct, provided that the misconduct amounts to a dismissible 
offence. Section 68 (5) of the LRA provides that participation in an unprotected strike or 
certain forms of conduct in contemplation or furtherance of an unprotected strike, may be a 
fair reason for dismissal. Manamela350 provides that, as the case may be in any other act of 
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misconduct, participation in an unprotected strike does not necessarily justify dismissal. A 
dismissal will only be fair if it is both substantively and procedurally fair.351  
Mawasha352 emphasises that this means that employers do not have a free hand to dismiss at 
will – the dismissals must be substantively and procedurally fair. In respect of procedural 
fairness, the courts have emphasised that employees must be afforded an opportunity to be 
heard irrespective of whether an ultimatum has been issued or not.  
An ultimatum is a requirement which the Code of Good Practice demands the employers to 
issue, before unprotected strikers can be fairly dismissed. The purpose of an ultimatum is to 
provide strikers with the opportunity to reconsider their positions before termination of their 
contracts and it further provides the employer with the necessary opportunity to not act 
irrationally when deciding on the employees’ dismissal.  
4.9 Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed the unprotected industrial action that has recently taken place in 
South Africa, particularly in the mining sector. The events that occurred and the mining 
companies where these unprotected industrial actions took place have been discussed with the 
aim of exploring the characteristics of an unprotected strike.   
These unprotected strikes have been found to have been mainly coupled with violence, 
intimidation, killings and damage to property. Further it was the Marikana strike that 
transpired as a typical example of an unprotected strike. The subsequent strikes in the mining 
sector have also proved to have taken the same route as the Marikana strike by virtue of the 
same modus operandi. It has been established that despite the possible grievances that may 
have existed in the mining sector, the striking workers have deliberately departed from the 
collective bargaining process as provided by the LRA.  
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The LRA provides for legal consequences in the event that employees are found to have 
embarked on an unprotected strike. These have also been discussed so as to assess their effect 
in dealing with the deliberate departure from collective bargaining process by the employees. 
The problem found is that these are not really effective in curbing the propensity of 
unprotected strikes and despite that, they have their own limitations which in some 
circumstances result in the employees escaping punishment even though they are found to 
have participated in unprotected strikes.   
In the next chapter, this research will discuss the role of the Labour Courts in relation to strike 
action as contemplated by the LRA. An assessment of how the courts have construed the 
right to strike will be considered. This will be achieved through an analysis of judicial 
decisions dealing with violent strikes. A further assessment will also be conducted on the 
cooperation between trade union leadership and the courts, where court orders that require g 
compliance from the unions, have been made. This will talk to the trend of court interdicts 
and how these have been perceived by the striking workers.   
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CHAPTER 5: THE LABOUR COURTS AND TRADE UNIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF 
VIOLENT STRIKE ACTION.   
5.1 Introduction  
It is the intention of this chapter to discuss the role played by the Labour Courts (hereinafter 
referred to as “the courts”) in dealing with strike actions brought before them, which are 
deemed to be unprotected and which end up violent in nature. The chapter will explore the 
interpretation of strikes given by the courts when dealing with same. As much as this research 
focuses on the mining strike actions, the analysis of case law in this chapter will also include 
cases which emanate from other sectors of employment, as strike action by employees would 
be treated in the same manner by the courts regardless of the employment sector where the 
strike action emanated. The role of trade union leadership in ensuring that their members 
embark on legal strikes which do not result in violence will also be discussed in order to 
establish whether they play their role as expected. An assessment will also be conducted in 
relation to their compliance with court interdicts interdicting strike actions which have been 
found by the courts to be unprotected.   
5.2 Jurisdiction and Powers of Labour Courts  
In South Africa, the Labour Court is tasked with upholding the provisions of the LRA and it 
has the jurisdiction and power to interdict unprotected strikes and strike violence.353 Section 
157 (1) of the LRA provides that: “the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of 
all matters that elsewhere in terms of this Act or in terms of any other law are to be 
determined by the Labour Court.”  
It is by virtue of this provision that the Labour Court is mandated to deal with matters over 
which it has exclusive jurisdiction, subject to s 173 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction of 
Labour Court in terms of this section means that when an Act requires the Labour Court to 
adjudicate a matter, no other court has jurisdiction.354    
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The Labour Court however, shares the same jurisdiction with the High Court in respect of any 
alleged or threatened violation of any fundamental right entrenched in Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution,355 which arises from ‘employment and from labour relations.’356 This simply 
means that the High Court would in certain circumstances, depending on the cause of action, 
share the same jurisdiction as the Labour Court. It is understood that there is a thin line 
between the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and that of the High Court. This should 
however, not be misinterpreted because the Labour Court, in terms of the LRA has an 
exclusive jurisdiction in matters that strictly arise from the LRA. The Labour Court shares the 
same jurisdiction with the High Court in respect of disputes arising from contracts of 
employment, even if they involve basic conditions as laid down by the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act in s 77 (3).357  
In terms of s 158 (1) of the LRA the Labour Court may-  
 
(a) Make any appropriate order, including:  
(i) The grant of urgent interim relief;  
(ii) An interdict;  
(iii) An order directing the performance of any particular act which order, when 
implemented, will remedy a wrong and give effect to the primary objects of this 
Act;  
(iv) A declaratory order;  
(v) An award of compensation in any circumstances contemplated in this Act;  
(vi) An award of damages in any circumstances contemplated in this Act; and (vii) An 
order for costs.  
 
In terms of this section the Labour Court is entitled to make any appropriate order including 
the granting of interim relief, an interdicting order or declaratory order. The Labour Court 
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therefore has the same powers as the High Court. This chapter will however focus mostly on 
case law that has been heard by the Labour Courts. 
5.3 The Approach of the Courts  
Approaches that have been utilised by the courts in adjudicating matters regarding 
unprotected strikes will be discussed. The courts, in dealing with unprotected strikes have 
adopted certain principles, which amongst others, involve the issue in dispute, the notice of 
strike, the functionality thereof, the employer’s economic circumstances and the strike 
ultimatum.358 These are the principles which the court considers when faced with applications 
interdicting or declaring a strike as unprotected and unlawful. The earliest approach by the 
courts under the 1956 Act was the contract-based approach, namely: that an economic strike 
was a manifestation of a breach of contract.359 Under this Act, a strike related to a grievance 
concerning employees’ economic needs, for an example salary increment, would be treated 
by the courts as a breach of contract. This was informed by the contract of employment 
existing between employer and employee which entailed this principle. This however, is no 
longer the position under the LRA. Under the LRA the courts tend to focus more on the 
functional approach. The main purpose of the functional approach is to acknowledge that 
protection against dismissal is justified insofar as the strike remains conducive to collective 
bargaining. Le Roux provides that in assessing the different principles adopted by the courts, 
the ‘employer’s economic circumstances’ and ‘functionality’ are two determining factors that 
the court considers when handing down its ruling.360 In dealing with unprotected strikes the 
courts have handed down interdicts, interdicting strikes which are found to be unprotected. 
Despite such interdicts employees sometimes tend to ignore those court orders and continue 
with their unprotected strikes. This too will be discussed to establish how the courts react to 
such disobedience by employees. Myburgh SC361 suggests that the court in dealing with 
unprotected strikes should not compromise in upholding the dismissal of unprotected strikers. 
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Myburgh SC362 provides that “when it comes to dealing with employees who have been 
dismissed for unprotected strike action after having disobeyed a court order; it seems likely 
that the Labour Court will view this as a severely aggravating factor”.  This may indeed be an 
aggravating factor because the LRA also emphasises that employees engaged in protected 
protest action forfeit protection from dismissal if their conduct is in breach of or in contempt 
of Labour Court order.363Myburgh SC364 also refers to Conradie JA in his minority judgment 
at para 120 in Modise & Others v Steve’s Spar Blackheath365, where he states that   
 
It is becoming distressingly obvious that court orders are not invariably treated with the 
respect they ought to command. It is a worrying tendency, one which can only be effectively 
combated by the courts displaying a marked reluctance to condone non-compliance. 
Obedience to a court order is foundational to a state based on the rule of law. The courts 
should by a strict approach ensure that it remains that way. I do not perceive any good reason 
why the appellants should not be penalised for their non-compliance. They cannot plead 
ignorance. Their union was closely involved. There is little, then, that can be said in favour of 
exercising discretion in favour of the appellants and I do not consider that they are, taking the 
above factors together, entitled to this court’s assistance.366  
 
Here, Conradie JA was stressing his concern over the trend by employees to continuously and 
deliberately ignore court orders preventing them from proceeding with strikes which have 
been interdicted and declared unprotected by the courts.367 The majority decision in the 
Labour Appeal Court was however, that the dismissal of strikers was unfair on account of 
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them not having been afforded a pre-dismissal hearing, which resulted in them being 
reinstated with six months back-pay.368  
The Labour Appeal Court in this case handed down a reasonable judgment because for an 
employee to have been fairly dismissed, he or she must have been subjected to a disciplinary 
process where his/her side of the story relating to the alleged misconduct would be 
considered and evaluated. Therefore, any dismissal without having been subjected to a 
disciplinary hearing would have been made in a vacuum and would be unfair.   
The facts of the Modise case were briefly as follows 
The appellants were in the employ of the respondent. The respondent had other employees in 
addition to the appellants. The respondent’s employees embarked upon a strike. That strike 
continued for about two weeks until the respondent issued the strikers with letters of 
dismissal. Although it appears from the record that it was in dispute whether the appellants 
had taken part in the strike, during argument it was clarified that the appellants were not 
denying that during the strike they were part of the group of workers who were on strike.   
The appellants point was that they were not willing participants in the strike. The strike had 
been organised by the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union 
known as SACCAWU of which some of the respondent’s employees were members. The 
appellants case was that they were not members of that union. The respondent maintained 
that they were. The respondent also maintained that the strike was unprotected. There is also 
a dispute between the appellants and the respondent on what the demand was which was 
sought to be enforced through the strike. The respondent contended that the demand was that 
it and other Spar stores in the region in which the respondent operated, should bargain 
regionally with SACCAWU. 
  
In SA Post Office Ltd v TAS Appointment and Management Services CC & Others369, an 
interim interdict was granted on 23rd January 2012, on an urgent basis, declaring the strike 
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action of the fourth to further respondents to be unprotected strike action in terms of the LRA. 
The strikers were interdicted from continuing with the strike , prohibited from interfering in a 
variety of ways with the business of the applicant and they were  restrained from coming 
within 500 metres of the applicant’s premises.370  The strikers were however, not employees 
of the applicant, the Post Office, but employees of various subcontractors providing labour to 
the Post Office to perform mail-sorting duties at approximately 23 depots in Gauteng 
province. The first to third respondents were the subcontractors whose employees were on 
strike.371   
The strikers main demand was that they be made permanent employees of the applicant 
instead of remaining subcontracted workers. Prior to the strike commencing they did not refer 
any dispute to the CCMA nor did they give any notice of the strike before it commenced. 
There was also no new evidence contradicting the assertions made by the applicant, on the 
return day. Accordingly, there is no reason to doubt that the strike was an unprotected one in 
terms of s 64 (1) (a) and (b) of the LRA.372 
On the return day, the application was opposed by the individual respondents. The opposition 
was based on a single legal question, namely whether or not this court was entitled to grant an 
interdict of this nature in a case where the applicant was not the strikers’ employer. The 
respondent’s representative characterised the point as a jurisdictional one, whereas the 
applicant’s representative argued that it really concerned the question of whether the 
applicant had locus standi to bring the application.373  
The court found that there was undisputed evidence in that the conduct of strikers included 
acts of assault and intimidation of permanent and replacement workers, the invasion of the 
applicant’s various premises and malicious damage to property. These various actions all 
amounted either to an unlawful interference in the applicant’s employment contracts with 
other employees, or breaches of the employer’s property rights, or criminal offences, or 
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alternatively a combination of one or more of these types of infringement. The court further 
found that the combination of the striker’s withdrawal of their own labour, together with 
preventing the applicant from being able to make use of replacement labour, clearly 
interfered with the fulfilment of the labour brokers’ contractual obligations to the applicant to 
the obvious detriment of the applicant. 
The court therefore confirmed the rule which both prohibited the strike and the other unlawful 
conduct associated with the strike. It is clear that the court herein, had established that the 
strike entailed violence and intimidation and on top of that the intended strike was never 
referred to CCMA and neither was the notice issued. The court was therefore, left with no 
option but to declare the strike as unprotected. Considering that the strike was accompanied 
with violence and intimidation, the court had to interdict and declare the strike unprotected 
because the process employed by the strikers was not functional to the bargaining processes.  
  
In National Union of Mine Workers v Wanli Stone Belfast (Pty) Ltd374, NUM had submitted 
wage demands to the respondent. These wage demands were contained in a letter dated 9 
March 2007. A meeting was held between representatives of NUM (including Mr Mnisi) and 
representatives of the respondent (including Ms Modlin). The meeting was held on 29 March 
2007. At the meeting, Modlin informed the applicant that the respondent was not prepared to 
discuss wages and that the reason was that the respondent had already implemented wage 
increases for the year 2007 with effect from January 2007.375  On 30 March 2007, Mnisi 
referred a dispute to the CCMA. He described the dispute as “the refusal of the company to 
negotiate wages with the representative union”.376 Mnisi further recorded that the result of the 
conciliation should be “that the company must negotiate with the representative union.”377 
In a further letter to the CCMA dated 23 July 2007, Mnisi further advised the CCMA that  
‘‘we hereby notify you that the company refused to negotiate with the representatives from 
the Trade Union at plant level, hence an application to the CCMA.’’ 
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Modlin’s unchallenged evidence in this regard was that she repeatedly advised Mnisi that the 
dispute concerned a refusal to bargain. In fact, Mnisi conceded during cross examination that 
the company refused to negotiate and that was why a dispute was referred to the CCMA so 
“that the company would now negotiate wages.”378 Despite the fact that no advisory award 
had been issued by the CCMA, NUM issued a strike notice on 1 August 2007. In fact, the 
strike notice was issued on the very same day that the parties met for conciliation at the 
CCMA. 
Due to the fact that conciliation only took place on 1 August 2007, it is reasonable to accept 
that the employees must have already decided prior to the conciliation meeting that they 
wished to embark on strike action.379 On 3 August 2007, just after 8h00, the respondent 
delivered a letter to the applicant advising them that the strike was unprotected and that 
should the strike not be called off, the Labour Court would be approached for an interdict.380 
It is common cause that shortly before 16h00 on the same day, the respondent delivered a 
notice of motion and the founding affidavit in the urgent application to NUM. As already 
pointed out, the court granted the interdict. Part of the order declared the strike unprotected 
because the dispute concerned a refusal to bargain and no advisory award has been issued in 
respect of the dispute. The order was confirmed on the return date.381 
In stating the reason(s) for its decision the court provided that it is trite that participation in a 
strike that is not in compliance with LRA constitutes misconduct although participation in an 
unprotected strike will not necessarily result in a fair reason to dismiss. In deciding whether it 
was fair to dismiss, the court must take into consideration various facts, including, but not 
limited to, the seriousness of the contravention of the LRA, attempts to comply with the LRA 
and whether or not the strike was in response to unjustified conduct by the employer. 
  
                                                 
 
378  Ibid para 9.  
379  Ibid para 10.  
380  Ibid para 11.  
381  Ibid para 12.  
99  
  
In evaluating these considerations, the court must also consider the primary objects of the 
LRA which is to advance labour peace and to give effect to and regulate the fundamental 
rights conferred by s27 of the Constitution (which recognises the right to strike for purposes 
of collective bargaining); to promote orderly collective bargaining and to promote the 
effective resolution of labour disputes. Careful attention should also be given to the 
seriousness of the contravention of the provisions of the LRA and whether the conduct of the 
strikers had the effect of subverting the primary purpose or object of the LRA. It is also 
important to consider whether the employees who participated in an unprotected strike 
participated in the unprotected strike knowing that their conduct constituted a contravention 
of the LRA and therefore amounted to an unprotected strike.  
  
Therefore, the Court ruled that the dismissal of the applicants was substantively and 
procedurally fair. It is important make mention that the court, in making its ruling, considered 
the seriousness of the contravention of the LRA in respect of collective bargaining 
provisions. By so doing the court assessed whether the strike action by the employees was 
within the ambits of the LRA and having found that the strike action was unprotected, it 
further assessed what extent that the LRA has been contravened. It is clear that the functional 
approach herein was adopted by the court, hence it found amongst other issues that the strike 
was not in compliance with the provisions of the LRA pertaining to collective bargaining.   
In RAM Transport SA (Pty) Ltd v SATAWU & Others382, the court was again faced with the 
duty to decide on whether a strike by workers was unprotected and whether or not to grant an 
interdict. In this case workers had embarked on a strike which was violent and intimidating in 
nature. Justice Andre Van Niekerk, before handing down his judgement, registered his 
concern in respect of the strike action accompanied by violence where he stated that  
 
 Regrettably, the detailed incidents of violence and damage to property perpetrated by  
 unidentified persons that are recorded in the papers are representative of a blight that has  
 come to characterise the South African industrial relations landscape. This court is always 
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 open to those who seek the protection of the right to strike. But those who commit acts of 
 criminal and other misconduct during the course of strike action in breach of an order of this 
 court must accept in future to be subjected to the severest penalties that this court is entitled to 
 impose.383   
 
The court in its ruling found that the strike action embarked upon by the third to further 
respondents, at the instance of the first respondent, was unprotected and unlawful and that the 
respondents were interdicted from participating in the unprotected strike.  
  
In FAWU obo of Kapesi v Premier Foods t/a Blue Ribbon Salt River384, the union (“FAWU”) 
and its members (the individual Applicants) embarked on a protected national strike on 5 
March 2007 in support of the union’s demand for centralised bargaining. The demand for 
centralised bargaining was aimed at bringing the wages of rural employees up to the levels of 
employees in the urban areas.385 Certain workers at the Salt River plant chose not to 
participate in the strike, as they were entitled to do. Several of the non-striking workers as 
well as members of management were thereafter targeted by violent criminal conduct.  
The Court heard evidence from some of the victims who testified that their homes and those 
of the workers who chose to continue working were firebombed and ransacked.  
 
The court also heard evidence of cars and possessions of employees being set alight. Non-
striking employees were visited at night by groups of individuals who threatened them. Even 
after the strike had ended, the acts of intimidation and threats of violence did not cease. Even 
as late as 30 November 2007 the house and vehicle of one of the non-striking employees 
were set alight and shots were fired at the house.  
                                                 
 
383 Ibid para 9.  
384 Ibid. 
385 Ibid para 3.  
101  
  
A neighbour subsequently identified some of the attackers. Shortly thereafter he was shot and 
killed near his home.386   
The court also heard evidence of a conspiracy that was put in place to have the respondent’s 
regional director assassinated, and there was evidence that money had been collected for that 
same purpose from some of the striking employees.  
Although criminal charges were laid against certain individuals, the charges were never 
prosecuted to finality. The non-strikers were completely defenceless, and the police services 
failed to protect them. The judge stated that although a certain measure of rowdiness and 
boisterousness behaviour were to be expected in most strike action, the acts that characterised 
this particular strike were particularly violent and senseless and stretched far beyond the kind 
of conduct that normally occurs during a strike.387   
The judge further stated that  
 
 Strikes that are marred by this type of violent and unruly conduct are extremely detrimental 
 to the legal foundations upon which labour relations in this country rest. The aim of a strike is 
 to persuade the employer through the peaceful withholding of work to agree to their demands. 
 As already indicated, although a certain degree of disruptiveness is expected, it is certainly 
 not acceptable to force an employer through violent and criminal conduct to accede to their 
 demands. This type of vigilante conduct not only seriously undermines the fundamental  
 values of our constitution, but only serve to seriously and irreparable undermine future  
 relations between strikers and their employer. Such conduct further completely negates the 
 rights of non-striking workers to continue working, to dignity, safety and security and privacy 
 and peace of mind.388 
  
The judge herein is expressing the fact that the strikes in almost all sectors of employment 
have recently been characterised with violence. He provides that this tendency by employees 
is harmful to collective bargaining and to the continued employment relationship between 
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employer and employee. He further emphasised that the strike action was not being used bona 
fide by the striking workers for purposes for which it was intended, that being to engage in 
constructive collective bargaining without infringing on others rights in the process. Instead it 
was being used to violently force the employer to accede to their demands. 
  
In respect of evidence relating to violence herein, Mr. Oosthuizen for the Respondent also 
argued that this type of conduct by striking employees will destroy the workplace relationship 
after the strike is over. In this regard, Mr. Lavery (the Respondent’s regional director for the 
Western and Eastern Cape) testified that it would constitute a threat to harmonious inter-
personal relations between staff if the Applicants were allowed to return to work. I am in 
agreement that it is difficult to envisage how workplace relationships could be re-established 
after a particular violent strike marked by intimidation  especially to the degree in this 
particular case) comes to an end and how one can expect to resume a workplace relationship 
with someone who is suspected of violent criminal acts which threatened that employee or 
even his/her family.389   
After the strike was called off, the striking employees were ordered to return to work. 
Subsequently they were suspended on full pay and advised that they were going to be charged 
with serious misconduct for having allegedly committed acts of violence and intimidation 
during the strike. It then transpired that the employer could not proceed with the disciplinary 
hearing as planned due to witnesses who were too fearful to testify or who had disappeared. 
The employer then decided to proceed by way of the s 189 procedure, that being the 
operational requirements termination process.  
  
The main contention of the applicants was that the respondent was not entitled to substitute 
the misconduct proceedings (which involve charging the employees with misconduct and 
requiring them to appear before a disciplinary hearing and proving their guilt) with a s 189 
(operational requirements) procedure. It was the respondent’s case that it was not possible to 
proceed with disciplinary hearings against the individual applicants because some witnesses 
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had disappeared and others were too afraid to testify. In the circumstances the respondent had 
therefore abandoned efforts to proceed with disciplinary hearing and elected rather to initiate 
consultations in terms of s 189 and 189A of the LRA, relating to the proposed termination of 
certain of the respondent’s employees on the grounds of operational requirements. The 
respondent argued that the incidents of criminal violence posed a threat to the running of the 
respondent’s business and that it therefore had no option but to resort to the retrenchment 
route  in order to dismiss the applicants.390  
AC Basson J found that the dismissal of the applicants was substantively and procedurally 
unfair. Even though there was evidence that the strike action was not conducive to collective 
bargaining, the court found in favour of the applicant (the strikers) in that their dismissal was 
unfair on the basis that they were never subjected to any disciplinary hearing.  
  
In terms of the above case law, it has been established that the courts when adjudicating upon 
applications based on strike action, focus on certain principles in order to determine whether 
it is justifiable for a particular strike action to be interdicted from proceeding and/or declared 
unprotected and unlawful. The courts have used mainly the functional approach. This 
approach assesses whether protection against dismissal is justified and whether the strike was 
conducive to collective bargaining and the dictates of the LRA. What can be learnt from the 
case law is that a dismissal has to be justified before it can be confirmed by the court, and that 
it must be proved that the strike action for which the employee was dismissed was 
unprotected.  
  
5.4 The Role and Liability of Trade Unions  
 There is a duty upon trade unions to take all reasonable steps to stop and prevent violence, 
damage to property and other acts of misconduct during a strike.391 A union can be held 
vicariously liable for the acts of its members if the employer can establish that there was a 
wrongful act committed by the union members and that it was liable for its member’s 
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actions.392 Although s 17 of the Constitution grants everyone the right to assemble, 
demonstrate, picket, and present petitions, all these rights must be exercised peacefully. 
These rights are further limited by s 11 (1) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act (hereinafter 
referred to as the “RGA”)393 which provides that if any riot damage occurs as a result of a 
gathering or demonstration, the organisation or convener responsible for such gathering or 
demonstration, shall be jointly and severally liable together with any person who unlawfully 
caused or contributed to the damage. 
In terms of the RGA, the convener, prior to embarking on a gathering or demonstration, must 
notify the relevant local authority in writing specifying the estimated number of people to 
participate in the demonstration and the exact time when the demonstration will be taking 
place.394 If these requirements have not been complied with, the intended gathering or 
demonstration will be unprotected and unlawful. This Act however applies to members of the 
community who intend to demonstrate against a local authority in addition to employees who 
intend to demonstrate against their employer. 
In SATAWU v Garvis and others395, SATAWU organised a protest march, which constituted a 
gathering in terms of the RGA, as part of its national strike. This resulted in people being 
killed and property damaged. The respondents claimed damages in the High Court from the 
union in terms of s11 of the Act. SATAWU denied liability and challenged the 
constitutionality of s11 (2) (b) of the Act, on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the 
constitutional right to assemble, demonstrate and picket. The court found against SATAWU, 
which then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal (hereinafter referred to as the ‘SCA’). 
The SCA dismissed the appeal and SATAWU appealed to the Constitutional Court which 
found that s 11 was not irrational, and that the constitutional right to assemble and 
demonstrate was constitutionally protected and guaranteed as long as it was exercised 
peacefully. The Constitutional Court further held that seeing as the decision to assemble 
resides with the organisation, the organisation should be responsible for any reasonably 
foreseeable damage arising from that gathering because the purpose of s 11 (2) is to protect 
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the safety and property of the public from any foreseeable damage. SATAWU’s appeal was 
dismissed as a result The essence of this case is that where a strike organised by a trade union 
ends up causing damage to the employer’s property, the union would then be vicariously 
liable for that damage. The test used by the court was whether the ensuing damage was 
foreseeable and whether it was caused by the members of the union. It was clear that the 
union leadership in this case had fallen short in playing its proper role, which was to ensure 
that its members conducted themselves lawfully in the course of their strike action. 
 In XSTRATA South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union & 
Others396, blame for the damage cause to the employer’s property was directed at the trade 
union as it also failed to play its role in ensuring its members conduct themselves lawfully 
during the course of the strike. The court had to consider three applications in this case. The 
first two concerned extended return dates of a rule nisi. The first application was brought by 
the Applicant (Xstrata) to confirm an interim order (in the form of a rule nisi) granted by 
Molahlehi J on 11 June 2013, in terms of which the court interdicted an unprotected strike 
action and strike related misconduct. This application was the main application and was 
opposed only by the First Respondent, Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘AMCU’). The second was an application brought by Xstrata to 
confirm an interim order (in the form of a rule nisi) granted by Snyman AJ on 26 July 2013, 
which placed AMCU, the Second Respondent, National Union of Mineworkers (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘NUM’) and the individual respondents in contempt of Court on the grounds 
that they had contravened the order of Molahlehi J. Lastly, 
an application was brought by AMCU to strike out a portion of Xstrata’s founding affidavit in 
the “contempt application”. This will be referred to as the “Strike out application”. This 
application was opposed by Xstrata.  
  
In discussing this case the background to these applications will be briefly discussed so as to 
understand the initial cause of the applicant turning to the court for relief. The applicant 
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operated mines at Thorncliffe, Helena and Magareng (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 
company’s mines’). These mines employed about 1 256 hourly paid employees, who were 
members of both AMCU and NUM. On 28 May 2013, the individual respondents embarked 
on an unprotected strike at the mines, as had been their pattern in the past..397   
 
On 30 May 2013, the individual respondents were dismissed. The dismissals were confirmed 
on 5 June 2013. Incidents of violence followed the dismissals on 6, 7 and 10 June 2013. The 
applicant then launched an urgent application to interdict the unlawful behaviour on 10 June 
2013. On 11 June 2013, Molahlehi J granted an interim order (in the form of a rule nisi) to 
the effect that the strike which commenced during the morning of the 28th of May 2013 was 
not in compliance with Chapter IV of the LRA and was therefore unprotected. The order 
further stated that the respondents were interdicted and restrained from gathering at any of the 
applicant’s entrances to the workplace and that they were restricted from encouraging or 
inciting any of the applicant’s employees to participate in the unprotected strike.398 
On 22 July 2013, the order was formally served on AMCU at its head office and also on  
NUM by telefax. Following further incidents of intimidation and violence during the period 
11 to 25 July 2013, the applicant then launched the contempt application. On the 26th of July 
2013, Snyman AJ issued a rule nisi ruling to the effect that: 
 
The First and Second Respondents are in contempt of the Court order dated 11 June 2013; 
The Fifth to Further Respondents are in contempt of the Court Order. The First and Second 
Respondents, are ordered to appear in court on 12 September 2013 to show cause why the 
First and Second respondents should not be ordered to each pay a fine to be determined by the 
court for their contempt of the court order. Further it was ordered that the 20 individuals 
which had been specified on the order are ordered to appear in court on the 12th of September 
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to show cause why they should not be imprisoned for a period to be determined by the court 
for their contempt of the court order.399 
 
The applicant sought a final order that AMCU “ensures” that its members comply with the 
court order granted by Molahlehi J. AMCU conceded that it was in a position to take 
reasonable steps to ensure that its members comply with the court order. It however opposed 
the granting of the order arguing that it would be inappropriate for the Court to order that 
AMCU “ensures” compliance by its members with the court order.  
 
Furthermore, AMCU held the view that to order it to “ensure” compliance would be to place 
an obligation on a trade union, for which there was no legal basis. AMCU had further 
submitted that as an independent trade union, its relationship with its members was governed 
by its constitution. AMCU provided that there was no duty that arose either in contract, 
delict, or statute as between union and its members that would compel a union to police its 
members and to ensure that its members acted in a lawful manner. AMCU acknowledged that 
it was obliged to act within the scope of the LRA in its collective bargaining relationship with 
an employer, but stated however, that there was no duty owed by a union to an employer to 
ensure that its members do not engage in unlawful activities, especially in an unprotected 
strike that was not authorised, instigated, ratified, promoted or encouraged by the union, and 
where the union did not support such activities. Lastly, it was argued that any obligation 
placed on a union to physically “police” its members, in circumstances where its members are 
engaged in unlawful activities could result in “disastrous consequences”.400   
The applicant’s arguments in seeking confirmation of the order was that all that was required 
of AMCU was to do what was “reasonably necessary” to ensure compliance. Secondly, that 
there existed a legal and factual basis for the ensure compliance order due to the fact that 
AMCU had a collective bargaining relationship with the company. Thirdly, that the 
unprotected strike was called for and engaged in by a large group of members of AMCU and 
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was called primarily in opposition to the company’s decision to take disciplinary action 
against Mr. Malibu, an AMCU full time shop steward and mine branch secretary, and also 
against Mr. Mohlala, an AMCU member. Malibu was the chief protagonist in the strike and 
had called upon his fellow AMCU members to join the “fight against the company”. The 
company had held various meetings with AMCU during the course of the strike and had 
communicated with AMCU members through it during the course of the strike. The company 
had met with AMCU, including its president, Mr. Mathunjwa after the dismissals in an 
attempt to resolve the matter. At no stage did AMCU distance itself from the conduct of its 
members and AMCU continued to represent the individual respondents.401 
The judge made mention of the fact that the relationship between trade unions and employers 
was usually governed by recognition agreements (or collective agreements), which set out the 
rules regulating the relationship between them. However, the collective bargaining agreement 
cannot of course deal with every possibility. The judge explained that rules would evolve as 
the relationship progresses and that it would also develop to take account of judicial 
pronouncements on the regulations of the collective bargaining relationship. In the case of 
strike action, the LRA provides for the picketing rules to be agreed upon, in terms of s 69 of 
the Labour Relations Act. Section 69 is the only provision in the LRA that places an 
obligation on the union and its members to act “peacefully”.402   
The judge pointed out that the LRA does not regulate the relationship between the trade union 
and its members, other than to the limited extent provided for by s 98, 99 and 100 of the 
LRA. Even then, the monitoring and enforcement in that regard is left to the Registrar of 
Labour Relations under the Department of Labour.403 
The judge held that  
 
 “It has become noticeable that unions are readily and easily prepared to lead employees out 
on any form of industrial action, whether lawful or not. The perception that a union has no 
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obligation whatsoever to control its members during such activities, which are invariably 
violent in nature, cannot be sustained”.  
 
The judge then went on to explain that there are various grounds upon which there is an 
obligation on unions to “police” their members.  
The first is a constitutional obligation. In terms of s3 of the LRA the act must be interpreted, 
inter alia, in compliance with the constitution. 
The court held that: 
 
[t]hus when a union calls upon its members to take part in strike action or some form of 
protest action, this will lead to further activities associated with the strike including marches, 
demonstrations and handing over of petitions. To the extent that the union members would be 
engaged in these activities during that strike, section 17 of the Constitution places an 
obligation on them to do so “peacefully” and “unarmed”. By implication, the same 
obligation is placed on the union to ensure that its members indeed exercise these rights 
likewise and within the confines of other laws of the land..404 
 
On this basis the court held that trade unions have the responsibility to sensitise their 
members to their obligation to act peacefully and unarmed. Tlhotlhalemaje, AJ confirmed the 
rule declaring the strike action by the respondent to be unprotected and unlawful.  
  
5.5 Conclusion  
The role of the courts and how they have interpreted the provisions of the LRA in the context 
of unprotected and violent strikes have been discussed in this chapter. In discussing their role, 
it has been established the Labour Court is vested with powers to adjudicate on any labour 
related matters brought before them including applications seeking to interdict violent strikes 
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by employees in the workplace. It has also been established that the courts in dealing with 
strikes characterised by violence, have adopted mostly the “functional approach” which they 
apply in order to determine whether a strike was functional and conducive to collective 
bargaining processes as provided by the LRA.  
The courts have applied this approach successfully and when a strike is found to have been 
unprotected such strikes have been interdicted by the courts. A worrying trend has been 
noted, however, in that in some circumstances, the employees belonging to certain registered 
and recognised trade unions within the workplace have adopted a tendency of disobeying 
court interdicts thus, the interdicts do not seem to discourage them from pursuing with the 
violent strike action. Some of these strikes have resulted in chaos and malicious damage to 
property, including property of the employer. This chapter has also discussed the liability of 
trade union leadership whose members have been found to be responsible for the damage 
caused during the strike. It has been established that in such circumstances the union may be 
ordered to compensate the employer based on the fact that the trade union leadership has a 
responsibility to ensure that its members conduct themselves diligently during a strike.  
It is evident that the courts with the powers they have as envisaged in the LRA have 
successfully played their role in interpreting and applying the law. It is however, unfortunate 
that the courts can only set an example for the would-be violent strikers which example(s)) 
have not necessarily proved to be effective in curbing the prevalent strikes characterised by 
violence in the mining and other sectors of employment. Reason being that the courts deal 
with the “after effect” part of the strike, which means they come to the party after a strike has 
taken place, whereas new effective provisions, as suggested by this research, could be 
introduced in the LRA to curb and/or prevent violent strikes from emerging at the onset as 
these would be provisions that the strikers would have to comply with before embarking on a 
strike. This research, therefore, suggests that the current provisions of the LRA405 dealing 
with strike actions need to be developed as the degree and propensity of these violent strikes 
clearly call for measures that seek to prevent the emergence of these strikes in the first place, 
rather than to cure the consequences that come with the violence they entail. In the next 
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chapter, International Law Organisation principles on the right to strike will be discussed. A 
comparison of limitations on the right to strike in respect of selected foreign countries will be 
made. Reference will be made to the statutory provisions of these countries dealing with 
limitations on their right to strike. This will be done in order to establish which of those 
provisions can be of assistance when incorporated into our labour legislation in order to better 
regulate the right to strike in our country.   
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CHAPTER 6: THE RIGHT TO STRIKE WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ORGANISATION PRINCIPLES AND FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS  
6.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, the right to strike under international labour law will be discussed. 
International Law Organisation (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ILO’) principles on the right to 
strike will be discussed. Furthermore, the research will discuss an assessment on the 
limitations within which this right may be exercised. This will be conducted through a 
comparative analysis of limitations on the right to strike among the selected foreign countries. 
This will be conducted in order to establish which provision(s) can be incorporated into our 
labour legislation so as to better regulate the right to strike 406 in the workplace, and in order 
to reduce the prevalent and violent strike action we have witnessed in the mining industry 
(and also in other employment sectors in our country). The right to strike is protected in 
international and domestic law. There are various ILO conventions and recommendations 
which are relevant to strike action, although they do not explicitly provide for the right to 
strike.407 Although they do not explicitly mention the right to strike, they establish the right of 
workers and employers organizations to ‘organise their administration and activities and to 
formulate their programmes,’408 and they identify the aims of such organizations as 
‘furthering and defending the interests of workers or of employers.’409 The ILO conventions 
relevant to strike action are ILO No. 87 of 1948 and ILO No. 98 of 1949. These will be 
discussed below. By establishing the right of workers’ and employers’ organizations to 
‘organise their administration and activities and to formulate their programmes’ they 
recognise that employees and employers may exercise their right of collective bargaining and 
through this process the right to strike is not excluded. The right to collective bargaining is 
derived from the Constitution.410 The right to strike, through exercising the right to collective 
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bargaining, is necessary because when there is deadlock at negotiation stage or the employer 
is unwilling to bargain at all, the available recourse for employees is for them to resort to 
strike action. Generally the ILO is devoted to promoting social justice and internationally 
recognized human and labour rights.411 Its main aim is to promote rights at work, encourage 
decent employment opportunities, enhance social protection and strengthen dialogue on 
work-related issues.412 Within the ILO there are two bodies set up to supervise the ILO 
standards.413 They are the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. The Committee on 
Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations414 have frequently stated that the right to strike is a fundamental right 
of workers and of their organizations, and they have defined the limits within which it may be 
exercised, laying down a body of principles regulating the right to strike.415 These principles 
and limitations will be discussed below in order to establish what they entail.   
6.2 The Meaning of the Right to Strike  
The principles of the ILO’s supervisory bodies contain no definition of strike action.416 
Despite the absence of a prescribed definition, certain types of strike action have been 
accepted by the Committee on Freedom of Association, provided they are conducted in a 
peaceful manner.417 These types of strike action include strike action such as “go-slows” or 
“work-to-rule strikes” and include acts of occupying the workplace. This has been classified 
as a strike action by the Committee on Freedom of Association on the basis that it is also a 
form of industrial action directed towards the employer and it shares same objective as 
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industrial action by employees in the form of a strike. The underlying factor here is that even 
though the principles of the ILO’s supervisory bodies contain no definition of strike, it is a 
requirement that the strike action must be peaceful in nature.418 When the right to strike is 
guaranteed by national legislation, a question that frequently arises is whether the action 
undertaken by workers constitutes a strike under law.419 In determining whether the action 
undertaken constitutes a strike under law, the action is considered to ascertain whether it 
complies with the legal requirements regulating it.. The Committee on Freedom of 
Association considers that restrictions on strike action and workplace occupations should be 
limited to cases where the action ceases to be peaceful.420 This means that for as long as the 
strike action is not characterised by intimidation and violence and is performed within the 
parameters of the law, then that strike action is not limited by the Committee on Freedom of 
Association.  
In summary, although there is no definition of strike in terms of the ILO, the ILO recognises 
and accepts strike action which is peaceful and in compliance with its principles.   
6.3 The ILO’s Principles on the Right to Strike  
In 1952 the Committee on Freedom of Association  declared  strike action to be a right and 
laid down the basic principles underlying this right, which recognises the right to strike to be 
one of the principal means by which employees and their trade unions may legitimately 
promote and defend their economic and social interests.421 This right was declared by the 
Committee on Freedom of Association as the most important right which employees could 
use as a tool in order to defend their socio-economic rights at the workplace.422 It is in no 
doubt that the right to strike is paramount in the workplace but the main concern is how this 
right is exercised and whether the legislation which regulates it minimises the violence and 
intimidation which may accompany it’s exercise..  The Committee of Freedom of 
                                                 
 
418  Article 8 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1996.  
419  B Gernigon, A Odero & H Guido (note 412 above) 444.  
420  ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, (1994) 173 - 174.  
421  Ibid (note 421) para 473-475.  
422  Ibid (note 421) para 473-475.  
115  
  
Association423 has expressed views in respect of the right to strike, views which coincide in 
substance with those of the Committee of Experts.  The views of the Committee of Freedom 
of Association424 are as follows:  
The Committee has made it clear that the right to strike is a right which workers and their 
organisations are entitled to enjoy;424 The Committee reduced the number of categories of 
workers who may be deprived of this right, and further reduced the legal restrictions on 
the exercise of the same right.425 One of the categories was declared as that of essential 
services. The sectors under essential were declared to be the hospital sector, electricity 
services, water supply services and the air traffic control.426 Essential services are defined 
as those ‘the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of 
the whole or part of the population.427 The Committee linked the exercise of the right to 
strike to the objective of promoting and defending the economic and social interests of 
workers (which criterion excludes strikes of a purely political nature from the scope of 
international protection provided by the ILO);428 Stated that the legitimate exercise of the 
right to strike should not entail prejudicial penalties of any sort, which would entail acts 
of anti-union discrimination.429  
 
What is of importance and as outlined above by the views of the Committee on Freedom of 
Association is that the right to strike is a fundamental right which must be exercised within its 
limitations. These limitations should however not be unreasonably restrictive. Based on the 
views by the Committee on Freedom of Association, member states of the United Nations 
must ensure that the right to strike is properly restricted by law in order to avoid abuse of the 
right and especially so where the exercise of the right may be dominated by violence and 
intimidation, as is the situation in South Africa.   
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6.4 The Right to Strike Under International Labour Law  
A provision on the right to strike can be found in the 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights430 (hereinafter referred to as the “ICESCR”), though it 
makes its exercise subject to conformity with national laws.431 Article 8 contains an internal 
limitation which provides that the right to strike should be exercised in conformity with 
national laws. National laws prohibit violence during strike action.432 Such national laws 
would, in the case of South Africa, be laws such as the LRA. Thus, exercising the right to 
strike outside the ambit of national laws is a violation of the provisions of article 8 of 
ICESCR. This covenant is relevant to the ones that are provided for above in that it also 
requires that the right to strike should be exercised within the ambit of national legislation, 
and further that strike action should not be characterised by violence. The absence of a 
specific reference to the right to strike in the ILO Conventions does not mean that there is no 
such right in ILO jurisprudence. Both the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations and its Committee on Freedom of Association have 
derived a right to strike from the provisions of the Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No.87), and the Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). 
The Committee of Freedom of Association has made it clear that “freedom of association 
implies not only the right of workers and employers to form freely organisations of their own 
choosing but also the right, for the organisations themselves, to pursue legal activities for the 
defence of their occupational interests”.433 The Committee has long recognised the right to 
strike by workers and their organisations as an appropriate means of defending their 
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economic and social interests”.434 Thus, it is now established that the right to strike is 
entrenched as part of freedom of association and the right of workers to organise.435 
6.4.1 ILO Convention 87 of 1948  
As highlighted above there are two legal sources of the right to strike or freedom to 
strike.436437 First, the right or freedom to strike is a positive treaty-based international labour 
standard implicit in Conventions No. 87 and 98, which deal with the freedom of association, 
the right to organise, and the application of the principles of the right to organise and to 
bargain collectively. Secondly, the right to strike is implicit in the ILO Constitution in which 
the concept of the freedom of association is entrenched.438 ILO Convention 87 guarantees all 
employers and workers, including supervisors, the right to freely establish and join 
organisations of their own choice subject only to the rules of the organisation.439 Under article 
3, workers’ and employers’ organisations are also entitled to “draw up their constitutions and 
rules; to elect their representatives in full freedom; to organise their administration and 
activities; and to formulate their programmes without any interference from public 
authorities.”440 This means that the public authorities must refrain from any interference that 
would restrict such organisations or impede the lawful exercise of their rights. According to 
this convention, employees are at liberty to constitute their own organisations and participate 
freely in the collective bargaining processes without any interference or manipulation. In 
essence this convention guarantees the right to freedom of association. Article 8 of this 
Convention further provides that in exercising rights provided for in the Convention, workers, 
employers and their respective organisations, must respect the law of the land. The law of the 
land, however, should not be such as to impair, and shall not be applied so as to impair, the 
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guarantees provided for in the Convention.441 This means that when employees exercise their 
right to strike  they must do so in a manner that will not undermine the restrictions put in 
place by the national legislation. However, the national legislation must also be in line with 
the constitution. For an example, national legislation must not provide for a restriction that 
would be in contravention of the constitution. Convention 87 of 1948 guarantees the right to 
freedom of association by the employees and employers in the workplace. Further they are 
entitled to establish their own terms and conditions within their associations or organisations 
which will govern how they conduct themselves and their activities. What is of importance 
and relevance to this research is that this convention demands that the parties in the 
workplace respect the law of the land and further requires them to exercise the right to strike 
in a manner that will not contravene the Constitution. This is contrary to the position in South 
Africa. In amplification this research has found above that workers in the mining sector have 
departed from exercising the right to strike within the dictates of the LRA. It has also found, 
in terms of the case law discussed, that workers have even disregarded court orders 
interdicting them from exercising this right violently and with intimidation.   
6.4.2 ILO Convention 98 of 1949  
ILO Convention 98 deals in particular with the right to organise and to bargain collectively.  
It also provides protection for workers, employers, trade unions, or workers’ organisations 
against acts of interference with the exercise of their rights by other parties.  
This Convention protects workers against acts of discrimination and victimisation by their 
employers on the basis of their trade union membership or activity.442 These include acts of 
dismissal, and any other act designed to detrimentally affect workers’ union membership, or 
because of their participation in union activities outside of working hours, or with the consent 
of the employer, within working hours.443  
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6.5 ILO Restrictions on Exercising the Right to Strike  
It has been discussed and established above that in terms of the ILO principles and other 
relevant international instruments the right to strike is protected even though there is no 
specific reference thereto. However, it is important to acknowledge that the ILO’s 
supervisory bodies do not regard the right to strike as absolute. The ILO has maintained that 
the right to strike is an essential element of the right to freedom of association, but recognises 
that strikes may be restricted by law, where appropriate, provided that adequate alternatives 
to dispute resolution such as mediation, conciliation, and arbitration offer a solution to 
workers who are affected.444 Exercising the right to strike in a way which violates other 
people’s rights is contrary to the principle of freedom of association. According to the 
Committee of Experts, engaging in an unlawful strike may be considered an unfair labour 
practice and entail civil liability and disciplinary sanctions for those who engage in it.445 The 
supervisory bodies have accepted that governments may legitimately impose certain 
preconditions on the right to strike. However, all preconditions must be reasonable, and must 
not substantially limit recourse to industrial action by employees and trade unions.446 The 
Committee on Freedom of Association also considers that restrictions on the right to strike 
should be limited to cases where the action ceases to be peaceful.447 According to Committee 
on Freedom of Association, the principle of freedom of association does not protect abuses 
consisting of criminal acts performed while exercising the right to strike. Thus, violent 
activities during strikes fall outside the ambit of the protection.448  In most cases, the law lays 
down a series of conditions or requirements that must be met in order to render a strike 
lawful. The Committee on Freedom of Association has specified that such conditions “should 
be reasonable and in any event not such as to place a substantial limitation on the means of 
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action open to trade union organisations.”449 The Committee of Freedom of Association has 
accepted the following prerequisites for protected industrial action:  
1. The obligation to give prior notice;450 The obligation to have recourse to conciliation, 
mediation and arbitration procedures in industrial disputes as a prior condition to 
declaring a strike, provided that the proceedings are adequate, impartial and speedy and 
that the parties concerned can take part at every stage;451  The obligation to observe a 
certain quorum and to obtain the agreement of a specified majority;452 The obligation to 
take strike decisions by secret ballot.453  
2.  Adoption of measures to comply with safety requirements and for the prevention of 
accidents;454  
3. The establishment of a minimum service in particular cases;455 and  
4. The guarantee of the freedom to work for non-strikers.456  
 
A brief discussion will be conducted on these prerequisites so as to understand what they 
entail and how they ought to be complied with. It is also important to make mention that the 
LRA does entail most of these prerequisites (which have been discussed above) except the 
secret ballot prerequisite. The secret ballot prerequisite was however contained in the 1956 
Act which preceded the LRA.  This research, amongst other assertions, suggests that the 
secret ballot prerequisite should be re-introduced in the LRA; however, it further argues that 
the mere reintroduction of this prerequisite cannot address the problem of violent strike 
actions if not accompanied by other prerequisites as will be suggested in Chapter 7 of this 
research. An analysis of the limitations on the right to strike by other foreign countries must 
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be conducted. This will assist in identifying which provisions in the statutes of these foreign 
countries, when introduced in the LRA, can successfully reduce the propensity for unlawful 
strike actions. This would ensure better regulation of collective bargaining in the mining 
industry and other sectors of employment in South Africa.  
 6.5.1 Prior notice  
The Committee on Freedom of Association is of the opinion that in the case of planned 
collective action, particularly strike action, notice periods help to cool down emotions and 
assist employees to make a careful, informed decision prior to taking the decision to go on 
strike.457 The committee is also of the opinion that the obligation to notify the employer of the 
planned collective action in advance cannot be considered a restriction on the right to strike, 
however, the length of the notice periods may be restrictive in unduly onerous.458 The 
committee is of the opinion that the requirement of notice should be perceived as a legitimate 
restriction but only to a certain extent. It suggests that the notice can only be acceptable if the 
required notice period is not too lengthy. This assessment or suggestion is reasonable in that a 
notice requirement preceding a strike action is a fair and reasonable requirement to enable the 
employer to be aware and prepared of any possible eventuality that may come with the strike 
action. However, a notice requirement can be said to be unreasonable if the required notice is 
so lengthy such that the intended strike action may lose its intended cause or the organisation 
may be open to manipulation by the management.  
6.5.2 Conciliation, mediation and arbitration  
The Committee on Freedom of Association accepts that ‘provision may be made for recourse 
to conciliation, mediation and arbitration procedures in industrial disputes before a strike may 
be called, provided that they are adequate, impartial and speedy and that the parties involved 
can take part at every stage.’459 The Committee on Freedom of Association has emphasised 
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that in a large number of countries legislation stipulates that conciliation and mediation 
procedures must be exhausted before a strike may be called. This is also the situation in 
South Africa in terms of the LRA.460 The spirit of these provisions is compatible with Article 
4 of Convention No. 98, which encourages the ‘full development and utilisation of machinery 
for the voluntary negotiation of collective agreements.’461 Such machinery in terms of the 
Committee on Freedom of Association must, however, have the sole purpose of facilitating 
bargaining.462 The Committee on Freedom of Association further suggests that it should not 
be so complex or slow that ‘a lawful strike becomes impossible in practice or loses its 
effectiveness.’463 The Committee on Freedom of Association’s suggestion here is correct 
because for a strike to be effective and for the employer to meet the needs and demands of 
employees the strike action does not need to be violent. 
The conciliation, mediation and arbitration process in terms of the ILO is governed by the 
Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Convention No. 92 of 1951. In line with this 
prerequisite, the Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Convention No. 92 of 1951 
advocates that if a dispute has been submitted to conciliation procedure or arbitration for final 
settlement with the consent of all parties concerned, the latter should be prevented from 
engaging in strikes and lockouts, while the conciliation procedure or arbitration is in progress 
and should ultimately accept the arbitration award. This is also the position in South Africa. 
No party is entitled to proceed with the strike action prior or during a conciliation or 
arbitration process, or if the issue is one that a party has a right to refer to arbitration.464  
6.5.3 Quorum and majority  
The Committee on Freedom of Association in relation to the quorum and requisite majority 
required for taking strike decisions, has adopted criteria for determining same in response to 
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the complaints submitted to it.465 A quorum and requisite majority are factors that must be 
considered before a decision to strike is taken. Among other issues, the complaints were that 
this prerequisite has made the exercise of strikes through a ballot method difficult and mostly 
impossible to exercise.466 It has indicated and confirmed, for example, that the observance of 
“a quorum of two-thirds of the members may be difficult to reach, in particular where trade 
unions have large numbers of members covering a large area”.467 With regard to the number 
of votes required for the calling of a strike, the Committee on Freedom of Association has 
pointed out that the prerequisites of two-thirds of the total number of members of the union or 
branch concerned constitutes an infringement of Article 3 of Convention No. 87 of 1948.468 In 
contrast, the Committee on Freedom of Association has considered this to be in conformity 
with the principles of freedom of association.469 A situation where the decision to call a strike 
in the local branch of a trade union organisation may be taken by the general assembly of the 
local branch, is when the reason for the strike is of a local nature and where, in the higher-
level of trade union organisations, the decision to call a strike may be taken by the executive 
committee of these organisations by an absolute majority of all the members of the 
committee.470 The Committee on Freedom of Association has also confirmed that in many 
countries legislation makes  the exercise of the right to strike subject to prior approval by a 
certain percentage of workers. In this regard the Committee on Freedom of Association has 
emphasised that the ballot method, quorum and the majority required should not be such that 
the exercise of the right to strike becomes very difficult or even impossible in practice.471  
What is important and relevant here is that the ballot method as a prerequisite for protected 
strike action should not be a tool to prevent workers from exercising the right to strike. It 
must be a flexible process that can be used to determine whether there is the democratic will 
to exercise the strike action in the workplace. It must not be tainted with extra limitations that 
may make it impossible to exercise. It is important to emphasise that even though this 
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research suggests amongst other things the re-introduction of secret ballots, it does not 
suggest that it should be used as a tool to prevent workers from exercising their right to strike.  
6.6 Illegal Exercise of the Right to Strike  
The right to strike, which is held by the ILO supervisory bodies to be fundamental, is not an 
absolute right472 and its exercise should be compatible with the other fundamental rights of 
citizens and employers.473 Consequently, the principles of the supervisory bodies cover only 
legal strikes, that is, strikes which are carried out in compliance with national legislation 
(where this does not undermine the basic guarantees of the right to strike as have been 
described above in relation to principles of freedom of association in connection with 
strikes).474 This means that the right to strike should be exercised in a manner that does not 
undermine the other rights of people which are equally important. The competing rights must 
be properly balanced against each other. Any act in the exercise of the right to strike which is 
contrary to how this right should be exercised cannot be recognised under the ILO. Abuses in 
the exercise of the right may take different forms, ranging from its exercise by groups of 
workers who may be excluded from this right, or failure to comply with reasonable 
requirements in declaring a strike, to damaging or destroying premises or property of the 
employer and/or physical violence against persons.475 In examining situations involving 
abuses in the exercise of the right to strike, the Committee on Freedom of Association 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘CFA’) has decided that the principle of freedom of association 
does not protect abuses consisting of violence and any other unlawful acts while exercising 
the right to strike.476 The CFA has also decided, in relation to the unlawful exercise of the 
right to strike, that penal sanctions should only be imposed in respect of strikes where there 
are violations of strike prohibitions in conformity with the principles of freedom of 
association.477 This means strike actions which are not in compliance with national legislation 
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prescribing how strikes should be exercised so as to be deemed legal and recognised, should 
be punished and/or penalised by enforcement of subsequent disciplinary action. Sanctions in 
respect of violent strike actions could assist in deterring other would be violent strikers, 
however, the level of deterrence would be largely dependent on the severity of the sanctions 
imposed. As much as the provision of sanctions and penalties can be seen as assisting, the 
problem with sanctions and penalty provisions as possible solutions, is that it is solution 
which is reactive to the problem. It takes place after the occurrence and its effectiveness 
depends on the kind of sanction or penalty that would follow. This research argues that the 
problem of strikes characterised by violence and intimidation in the mining sector warrants a 
solution which is proactive and which is capable of curbing and/or preventing such strikes 
from taking place. This therefore, means that provisions capable of curbing unlawful strikes 
before they even occur are necessary and more important than provisions that would suggest 
sanctions and penalties after the violent and unlawful strikes have occurred.  
6.7 Limitation on Right to Strike by Foreign Jurisdictions  
An analysis among foreign states in relation to limitations on the right to strike will be 
conducted. These foreign states are Australia, USA, UK, Canada, New Zealand and 
Botswana. A broader analysis was conducted including a various number of other states and 
these have been identified as states from some of which our country can identify suitable 
provision(s) that can help to better regulate the right to strike. Selected provisions from these 
countries will assist in better regulating the right to strike in South Africa by curbing the 
wave of unlawful strikes in the mining sector as well as other sectors in South Africa.  
Provisions will be identified in the following chapter at least from three of the  
aforementioned states and such provisions will be suggested as suitable for incorporation into 
the LRA. These will assist to better regulate the right to strike and curb the wave of unlawful 
strikes in the mining sector. These provisions have been identified because practically, they 
would be effective in curbing the violent and unlawful strikes in the mining sector and other 
relevant sectors. These provisions contain strict restrictions which are pro-active but which at 





For much of Australia's history there has been no right to strike and even currently the 
Australian Constitution478 does not recognise or create a specific right to strike.479 In 1993, 
however, the Australian Government passed legislation480 protecting the right to strike in 
terms of s 51 of the Australian Constitution.481 The legislation was passed in response to 
various findings by ILO committees, charged with monitoring compliance with ILO 
conventions.482 The committees had found that Australia breached its obligations under 
certain ILO conventions by failing to protect the right to strike.483 Prior to the Industrial 
Relations Reform Act of 1993, trade unions and trade union members who took industrial 
action were exposed to actions for damages in tort and contract.484 The Industrial Relations 
Reform Act 1993 amended Division 4 of the Industrial Relations Act of 1988, inserting a new 
Part VIB Division 4, which provided for immunity from civil liability for striking employees 
in limited circumstances.485 In 1996 the Workplace Relations Act repealed the Industrial 
Relations Act of 1993. It also protected the right to strike in the workplace. It has amongst 
other features, a ballot requirement; a good faith bargaining duty and the right to court 
intervention. These will be discussed below.   
Industrial action by employees or an organisation of employees is not protected under this 
Act unless certain requirements in section in s 435 (2) are met.486 These requirements are that 
the industrial action must take place during the bargaining period, which is the period allowed 
for collective bargaining and must be by an organisation of employees that is a negotiating 
party, or a member of the organisation who is employed by the employer.487 Further 
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employees, prior to their action, are required to issue a notice to the employer.488 The said 
notice must be in writing and must provide at least a  three working days written notice prior 
to the intended day of strike489. This means that if employees intend to go on strike they must 
issue a written notice three days’ prior the intended date so the employer can be aware of the 
intended strike in advance. Engaging in industrial action by members of an organisation of 
employees that is a negotiating party is not protected action unless, before the industrial 
action begins, the industrial action is duly authorised by a committee of management of the 
organisation or by someone authorised by such a committee to authorise the industrial 
action.490 A written notice of authorisation by the committee must also  be given to a 
Registrar.491 Further industrial action by employees is not protected action unless it has been 
authorised in advance by a secret ballot492. The rule that industrial action by employees is not 
protected action unless it has been authorised by a protected action ballot does however, not 
apply to action in response to an employer engaging in industrial action against the 
employees.493 Secret ballot as a requirement simply requires that before employees or the 
organisation of employees embarks on a strike, the employees’ action must have been 
decided through a secret ballot. The majority vote then determines whether the employees or 
their organisation intend to go on strike.  
The similarities that South Africa has with Australia are that both countries contain a written 
notice requirement prior to industrial action. They differ on the required period of notice.  
They also differ on the requirement of secret ballot. In Australia, employees are required to 
conduct a secret ballot to determine whether the intended strike action is the will of the 
majority of employees. This is also used as a determining factor among the employees.  
However, in South Africa this requirement is no longer applicable in the current LRA. 
Further and in contrast to South Africa, Australia requires parties to bargain in good faith and 
                                                 
 
488  Section 441 (2) (b) of the Act.  
489   Section 441 (3) (a) of the Act. 
490  Section 446 (1) (a) of the Act.  
491  Section 446 (1) (c) of the Act.  
492  Section 449 (2) of the Act.  
493  Section 449 (3) of the Act. 
128  
  
that strike action can only take place during the bargaining period. Beyond this period no 
strike action is allowed.  
What is remarkable here is that when parties bargain they are required to do so in good faith. 
If parties, during the bargaining process, would uphold this principle there would be fewer 
reasons for either of the parties to embark on an industrial action because all the expected 
obligations from parties would be implemented in good faith. It is however, not clear as to 
what the yard stick is in order to determine when a party has acted in good faith or not.   
  
6.7.2 United States of America  
The USA government has repeatedly claimed that international human rights norms, 
including the right to strike, are adequately protected by U.S. statutory and constitutional 
law.494 It is not clear where in the constitution this right is enshrined, however. In terms of the 
National Labour Relations Act495 employees are guaranteed ‘the right to self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labour organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining’.496 Section 7 of the Act states in part that ‘Employees shall have the right to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection.’ Section 13 also concerns the right to strike. It reads as follows:   
 ‘Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either 
 to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the  
 limitations or qualifications on that right’.  
It is clear from a reading of these two provisions that the law not only guarantees the right of 
employees to strike, but also places limitations and qualifications on the exercise of that right.   
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 Strikers who engage in serious misconduct in the course of a strike may be refused 
reinstatement to their former jobs. This applies to both economic strikers and unfair labour 
practice strikers. Serious misconduct has been held to include, among other things, violence 
and threats of violence. Examples of serious misconduct that could cause the employees 
involved to lose their right to reinstatement are: strikers physically restricting persons from 
entering or leaving the workplace; strikers threatening violence against non-striking workers; 
and strikers attacking managerial representatives.  
 Where employees strike over issues settled by collective bargaining, or during the life of a 
bargaining agreement, such strike is deemed illegal.497 Almost all bargaining agreements 
contain no-strike clauses prohibiting all work stoppages during the life of such contracts. 
Violations of such provisions constitute unprotected strike conduct, and may render 
supporting labour organizations liable for claims for breach of contract.498 Even where no 
express “no-strike” provision is included in the contract, if workers strike over issues subject 
to final resolution through contractual grievance and arbitration procedures, they would be in 
violation of the implied “no-strike” obligation in the adoption of those processes. 
Parties to an existing collective bargaining agreement cannot resort to a strike or lockout until 
they have endeavoured, in good faith, to achieve a new agreement without a work stoppage.499 
This is another requirement. In terms of this requirement the parties are required to bargain in 
good faith before resorting to a strike action. What is important here is that the parties must 
bargain honestly and without intentionally misleading the other party. 
The party wishing to negotiate a new agreement must provide the other party with notice 
indicating that they wish to modify the terms of employment. This may be a collective 
agreement between the parties governing their process of collective bargaining in the 
workplace. The notice must be issued at least sixty days prior to the termination date of the 
existing contract.500 They must then provide the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 
and the relevant state mediation service with such notice thirty days prior to the termination 
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date of the current contract to enable such agencies to offer the parties mediation assistance.501 
It is clear that the parties would be expected to comply with the agreement and are prevented 
from making demands or bargaining on issues that are not covered in the agreement. 
Neither side may resort to a strike or lockout for sixty days after such notice has been 
provided to the opposing party (or the termination date of the contract, whichever comes 
later), to give the employer and the labour organization the opportunity to resolve their 
differences through the bargaining process. In most cases, new agreements are reached 
through this process without resort to strikes or lockouts. Although many labour 
organizations conduct secret ballot strike votes prior to work stoppages, nothing in federal 
law requires them to do so.  
 The similarity between USA and South Africa is the provision for collective agreement 
between the parties in the workplace which restrict strike action. During the operation of this 
agreement no party is at liberty to embark on industrial action in respect of an issue which is 
in the agreement, until the agreement has come to an end. This is also the situation in South 
Africa as provided in the LRA.502  The USA Constitution however, is silent on the right to 
strike whereas in South Africa the right to strike is enshrined in the Constitution. 
6.7.3 United Kingdom   
There is no right to strike under English Law or their Constitution, and no such right has ever 
existed.503 As a result of this, any rights associated with strike and industrial action are not 
protected in any superior document but are rather regulated by statute and common law.504 
The law in the UK does grant immunity from liability for civil wrongs that are committed 
during a strike.505 These immunities are subject to restrictions and mandatory rules contained 
in the Trade Unions and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 ( hereinafter referred to 
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as “TULRCA”).506 The UK has experienced disastrous effects from strikes but they did 
manage to curb strikes under the Thatcher administration.507 The UK needed transformation 
in relation to issues pertaining to industrial action. Margaret Thatcher proved to be the leader 
that would change the industrial landscape of the country. She served as British Prime 
Minister from 1979 to 1990 and was the first female leader of the UK.508 The right to strike in 
the UK is defined as the ‘withdrawal of labour by a group of workers who are in dispute with 
their employer.’509 One method of inhibiting or ending a strike in the UK is firing union 
members who are striking, which can result in elimination of the union. Although this has 
happened, it is rare due to laws regarding ‘firing’ and ‘right to strike’ having a wide range of 
differences in the UK depending on whether union members are from the public or private 
sector. Employees who strike risk dismissal, unless it is an official strike (one called or 
endorsed by their union) in which case such employees are protected from unlawful 
dismissal.510 The underlying point to note here is that generally the right to strike is restricted.  
6.7.4 Canada   
The Canadian Constitution guarantees everyone the right to associate, organize, to bargain 
collectively, and the right to strike.511 In terms of the Public Service Labour Relations Act512 
‘strike’ includes a cessation of work or a refusal to work or to continue to work by persons 
employed in the public service, in combination, in concert or in accordance with a common 
understanding, and a slow-down of work or any other concerted activity on the part of such 
persons that is designed to restrict or limit output.513 The Canadian Code514 which regulates 
the right to strike in Canada imposes two separate duties on parties to collective bargaining to 
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conclude a collective agreement. The duties are as follows: A duty to bargain in good faith; 
and a duty to make every reasonable effort to enter into a collective agreement.515 
A party to collective bargaining may bring a complaint to the Canada Industrial Relations 
Board on the basis that the other party has failed in either or both of these duties.516  The Code 
states where notice to bargain collectively has been given , the  
‘bargaining agent and the employer, without delay, but in any case within 20 (twenty) days 
after the notice was given unless the parties otherwise agree, shall meet and commence, or 
cause authorized representatives on their behalf to meet and commence, to bargain 
collectively in good faith, and make every reasonable effort to enter into a collective 
agreement’.517  
Most importantly the Minister has the authority to order that an employer’s latest offer be put 
to the members of the bargaining unit for a vote if, in the Minister’s opinion, this would be in 
the public interest. The Minister may also direct the Board or another person or body to be in 
charge of conducting the vote.518 Upon the employees’ acceptance of the offer, all strike or 
lockout activity shall cease. The Minister may do this at his or her own discretion; no referral 
from a party to the dispute is needed.519  
This means that according to the Canadian Code the Minister has an option to put the 
employer’s last offer to the members of the bargaining unit to decide on it through a vote. 
When an offer has been made by the employer after a certain demand was brought by the 
employees through a recognised bargaining process, the Minister is then entitled to chip in 
and put that offer to the members of the bargaining unit to decide over it through a secret 
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ballot. The outcome of the vote will then determine whether the employer’s last offer is 
accepted.  
The similarity that South Africa shares with Canada is the notice requirement. However, the 
reason for which the notice is issued in Canada is different to the South African position. In 
Canada the notice is issued for parties to commence the bargaining process in the form of 
negotiations between the employer and employees. It is further required that the parties must 
meet at least within twenty days after issuing of the notice.520 This however, is not the 
position in South Africa. In South Africa a written notice of intention to strike is issued prior 
to embarking on a strike action.  
Canada has as a requirement to bargain in good faith which is not a requirement in South 
Africa. The requirement of bargaining in good faith also exists in Australian law. Another 
requirement in Canada is that a strike action is required to be preceded by secret ballot. This 
determines whether the intended strike action is required by the majority of workers or not. 
The secret ballot requirement in South Africa was only applicable during the 1956 Act. In 
terms of the LRA this is no longer a requirement in South Africa.  
6.7.5 New Zealand   
In terms of the New Zealand Constitution everyone is guaranteed the right to freedom of 
association.521  
Any act done by a trade union to induce a person to take part, or continue to take part, in 
industrial action is not protected unless the industrial action has the support of a ballot.522 
Industrial action is also regarded as having the support of the union only if the union has held 
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a ballot in respect of the action in relation to which the requirements of holding of the ballot 
were satisfied.523  
In terms of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, a notice for industrial action is a 
notice in writing which states whether industrial action is intended to be continuous or 
discontinuous and specifies where it is to be continuous, the intended date for any of the 
affected employees to begin to take part in the action.524 The notice is further required to 
contain the following:  
 
• a list of the categories of employee to which the affected employees belong;525  
• list of the workplaces at which the affected employees work;526  
• the total number of the affected employees;527  
• the number of the affected employees in each of the categories in the list mentioned;528  
• the number of the affected employees who work at each workplace in the list mentioned 
in subsection;529   
• the total number of the affected employees;530  
• the categories of employee to which the affected employees belong and the number of 
the affected employees in each of those categories;531 and  
• the workplaces at which the affected employees work and the number of them who work 
at each of those workplaces.532  
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A union is required to agree with the employer before industrial action ceases to be 
authorized or endorsed, that it will cease to be authorized or endorsed with effect from a date 
specified in the agreement (“the suspension date") and that it may again be authorized or 
endorsed with effect from a date not earlier than a date specified in the agreement.533 The 
union is not entitled to conduct strike action where they will continue until their demands are 
met. A specific date on which their action will cease to be authorised has to be specified on 
their notice regardless of whether their demand would have been met by such date.  
The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act further provides that an employee has no right to 
complain of unfair dismissal if at the time of dismissal he was taking part in an unofficial 
strike or other unofficial industrial action.534 The Act also provides when an industrial action 
can be said to be unofficial. A strike or other industrial action is unofficial in relation to an 
employee unless he is a member of a trade union and the action is authorized or endorsed by 
that union, or he is not a member of a trade union but there are among those taking part in the 
industrial action members of a trade union by which the action has been authorized or 
endorsed.535  
The similarities here are a written notice preceding the action. However, what is different 
with New Zealand is that the notice has to contain certain specifics as outlined above 
including an indication of whether or not the intended strike action will be continuous or 
discontinuous and specifies where it is to be continuous, the intended date for any of the 
affected employees to begin to take part in the action.536 In New Zealand another requirement 
is the secret ballot.  
What is clear from New Zealand is that the notice requirement has to contain a number of 
specifics which the striking employees or a union has to ensure that they are contained in the 
notice before they can embark on a strike. The requirement of these specifics in a notice 
prevent the strike action from being influenced by employees who were not included in the 
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notice. This further puts a responsibility on the striking employees or their leaders to ensure 
that their strike is not influenced or joined by those who were not listed in the notice and who 
may have an ulterior motive.  
What the notice requirement is required to entail in New Zealand is in fact what is lacking in 
our notice requirement in South Africa. The notice requirement in terms of the LRA for 
example, does not require the total number of employees which will be affected or partaking 
in the strike to be specified. This opens the strike action to manipulation by members of the 
public or others employees who are not affected by the cause of the strike action.  
6.7.6 Botswana   
Section 13 of the Bill of Rights guarantees freedom of assembly and association with other 
persons. Section 13(1) proves that:  
“Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his 
freedom of assembly and association, that is to say, his right to assemble freely and 
associate with other persons and in particular to form or belong to trade unions or 
other associations for the protection of his interests.”  
In terms of the Trade Disputes Act537 ‘industrial action’ means a lock out, strike or action 
short of a strike in furtherance of a trade dispute. Botswana presents a unique situation arising 
not from its definition of a strike, but from the fact that it deems all strikes lawful unless they 
are declared unlawful by a court of law. This means that a strike in Botswana would be 
unlawful when a Minister of Labour or a court of law has made a finding that a particular 
strike action was unlawful. However, immunity from civil liability under the common law is 
only granted to trade unions and their members.538  
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All countries in Southern Africa, except Botswana, insist on a strike being the last resort after 
other statutory methods of dispute resolution have been exhausted. Botswana is different in 
that (other than essential services), resorting to a strike is not expressly subject to any 
particular preconditions, such as conciliation and prior notice.539 This is solely because there 
is no law that regulates the conduct of industrial action. It must indeed be noted that the 
Minister of Labour can declare a strike unlawful where he or she is satisfied that statutory 
procedures have not been exhausted.540 This effectively compels the parties to a dispute to 
exhaust those procedures.541  
Professor T Cohen in relation to section 13 of the Botswana Bill of Rights argues that while 
this constitutional provision makes no specific mention of the right or freedom to strike, a 
purposive interpretation of freedom of association necessitates its inclusion.542 The professor 
is arguing this point because from the point of view of the workplace, there can be no 
enjoyment of freedom of assembly and association without the necessary enjoyment of the 
right to freedom to strike. If workers are entitled to assemble and associate to discuss 
whatever issues or grievances they have in the workplace, it goes without saying that a right 
to freedom to strike automatically follows provided they have complied with the necessary 
requirements. This should be the position, because you cannot separate the right to freedom 
of association from the right to strike. 
In Botswana most employees are denied the right to strike by being declared and/or 
categorised as essential services employees regardless of the duties they perform. Further the 
absence of a constitutional right to strike makes it impossible for workers in Botswana to 
legally challenge the exclusion of the whole public service from enjoyment of the right to 
strike. What is however, confusing in Botswana, is that despite the workers being denied the 
right to strike, they do enjoy the right to freedom of association. The right to strike cannot be 
separated from the right to freedom of association. These rights should go together because 
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when workers associate with each other or in groups to discuss their grievances, subsequently 
the purpose thereof may be to display to the employer that they have certain grievances.   
6.8 Conclusion 
  
It has been established in this chapter that the right to strike is protected by national 
constitutions, laws, international labour rights instruments, and regional human rights 
instruments. These may be conventions, treaties, foreign statute or law on the right to strike.  
The right to strike, however, is not set out explicitly in ILO Conventions and 
Recommendations. Though they do not explicitly mention the right to strike, the Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention No. 87 of 1948, establishes 
the right of workers and employers’ organizations to ‘organise their administration and 
activities and to formulate their programmes, and the aims of such organizations as 
“furthering and defending the interests of workers or of employers”.543 
  
It has also been established that there are the two bodies set up to supervise the application of 
ILO standards, which is the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. These bodies have made 
it clear that the right to strike in the workplace is a fundamental right. The research has also 
established that the same bodies have set limitation standards which all Members States 
exercising the right ought to comply with.544  
The limitations on the right to strike from different foreign states have also been discussed to 
determine what limitations these foreign states prescribe with the aim of identifying which 
limitations, when incorporated into our own labour legislation, can curb the violent strike 
action that we have witnessed in the mining industry and other relevant sectors.   
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 Having regard to the limitations from the above foreign states, it is the submission of the 
author that the limitations imposed by New Zealand and Canadian law when carefully 
considered, can assist in curbing and better regulating our right to strike in the workplace. 
Specific identification and substantiation of these provisions on how and why they can 
improve the regulation of right to strike in the workplace in our country will be discussed and 
detailed in the following chapter where this research will be dealing with the conclusion and 
recommendations. All these countries have different provisions that deal with strikes. Some 
of these countries' provisions are similar to South Africa's provisions but in each country 





CHAPTER 7: CURBING THE PREVALENT VIOLENT STRIKE ACTION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
7.1 Introduction  
This research has examined the dispensations in respect of the right to strike by workers 
during the application of the LRA  28 of 1956 and the current LRA. 66 of 1995. This research 
has also examined the current strike action by workers, particularly in the mining industry, in 
relation to what is required by the LRA pertaining to industrial action. Having done so, it has 
been established that under the current LRA, that the right to strike has been redefined by 
workers successfully. For example, workers in the mining industry have achieved wage 
increases despite having conducted unlawful strikes. In discussing this issue, reference was 
made to case law wherein rulings had been made to interdict and deem such strike actions as 
unlawful, but despite such rulings the workers have continued with their unlawful strikes 
resulting in the employer being forced to comply.  
In assessing the current position in South Africa regarding how industrial action is exercised, 
particularly in the mining industry, reference was also made to the ILO principles on the right 
to strike.545 A comparison was conducted in respect of certain foreign states546 on their 
recognition of the employees’ right to strike and what limitations, if any, they contain in their 
legislation which protect against the abuse of the right. Throughout this research the aim, 
therefore, has been to show that workers have largely departed from the prescribed process 
towards collective bargaining and subsequent industrial action. It was also established that 
despite this departure some of the limitation provisions that talk to industrial action in the 
LRA are not effective in curbing the prevalent and violent strike actions that we have 
witnessed. 
In this concluding chapter, therefore, the focus of this research will be to suggest and 
recommend which specific provisions can be introduced to the LRA in order to effectively 
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curb the occurrence of violent strikes and to help better regulate the right to strike in the 
workplace. These provisions will be sourced from Canadian and New Zealand legislation, as 
mentioned in Chapter 6 above. The government has, however, recently made endeavours to 
try and deal with this problem and a few suggestions were made by NEDLAC.547 These 
suggestions will be highlighted below with aim of assessing them to see if they will be 
effective in dealing with the identified problem in this research.   
7.2 The Need to Prevent Unprotected Strike Action  
In South Africa, the right to strike is a constitutional right and it is generally regulated by s 23 
of the Constitution and other labour legislation that govern employment relationships.548 
Section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa confers on every worker the 
right to strike. It further provides that every trade union, employers organization and 
employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining and goes on to provide that national 
legislation may be enacted to regulate the process. The national legislation giving effect to 
this right is the LRA.  
This research has established that in South Africa, all sectors of the economy are 
experiencing strike action that is normally embarked upon by the labour unions.549 While 
some of the strike actions are legal and protected within the ambit of the law, others have 
been found to be illegal and frivolous.550 It has also been established that these types of illegal 
strikes are prominent in the mining industry.551  
It has been discussed in this research that unprotected striking is not a criminal offence 
punishable by law as was the case under the 1956 Act. Under the application of this Act, if 
workers were found to have taken part in an unprotected strike, they risked a chance of being 
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criminally charged and exposed to criminal sanctions.  However, under the LRA, an 
unprotected strike action is classified as an act of misconduct.552 If the strike does not comply 
with the statutory requirements the strike action will not enjoy protection.   
This research has undertaken to discuss the nature of unprotected strikes which have unfolded 
recently in our country, with specific emphasis on the mining sector. This was conducted 
with the aim of depicting that the strikes do not comply with the statutory restrictions. It has 
also been established that some of the statutory restrictions are not effective in dealing with 
the non-compliance of strike law, the result of which is that the strikes are violent in nature. 
This research acknowledges that the peaceful exercise of the right to strike is important in 
labour relations and empowers workers to collectively bargain effectively against exploitive 
mining companies.553  
It has been established that this right has not been exercised peacefully by the workers as 
required in terms of the LRA. Furthermore, it has been indicated above that the data collected 
and analysed in 2013 by the Department of Labour554 indicates a continuous rise in the 
number of strikes as from 2002. It has been established that the Labour Department recorded 
114 industrial incidents in 2013 up from 99 recorded in 2012.555 The Department had reported 
out of that 99 strike actions embarked upon by workers in 2012, about 45 were unprotected 
and all these strikes were characterised by violence with a total of 241 391 workers 
participating in that strike.556 The mining industry in 2013 continued to experience working 
days lost, amounting to 515 971 during that year- more than any other sector.557 In other 
reports, however, it is indicated that 52% of the strikes in 2013 were unprotected as compared 
to 48% protected strikes.558  
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In the mining sector particularly, strikes characterised by violence and intimidation have been 
witnessed. These strikes have been identified in this research mainly as, the Marikana strike, 
the Anglo-Ashanti Gold strike, Anglo Platinum strike and the Coal Mining strike. What all 
these strikes had in common was violence, intimidation of non-strikers and malicious damage 
to property. The Marikana strike has had a significant impact on the labour relations 
landscape in South Africa.559 The strikes which followed the Marikana strike, especially those 
in the mining sector, were influenced by the latter as most of these strikes took more or less a 
similar route in demanding wage increases.  
It has been established that the Marikana strike was generally characterised by “illegality, 
violence, intimidation, lawlessness and climaxed with casualties.”560 Regardless of these 
irregularities in collective bargaining procedure and practice, the workers succeeded in their 
demand for a wage increase, through redefining the collective bargaining and dispute 
resolution mechanisms in the LRA.561 The Anglo-Ashanti Gold strike took more or less the 
same route as the Marikana strike. The distinguishing factor herein is that management, after 
establishing that the strike was unprotected and in contravention of the provisions of the 
LRA, subsequently involved workers in dismissal proceedings and they were subsequently 
dismissed. This was however, not the case in the Marikana strike as striking miners retained 
their jobs even after having engaged themselves in an unprotected strike which lasted for 
more than five months.  
Having established the departure from the prescribed collective bargaining process as 
provided by the LRA and the subsequent nature of violence undertaken in the name of 
industrial action, this research suggests that new mechanisms or provisions have to be 
introduced within the statutory restrictions of the LRA and that amendments need to be made 
in order to prevent another wave of violent and unprotected strikes. 
                                                 
 
559 C Twala, “The Marikana Massacre: A Historical Overview of the Labour Unrest in the Mining Sector 
in South Africa” Vol 1(SAPSS) 66. 
560  Ibid.  
561               J van der Merwe & L. van der Walt “Mineworkers’ unprocedural strike: Setting the path for redefining 
collective bargaining practice in South Africa” (2013) (Vol 10), J of Contemporary Management 251.  
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7.3 Ineffective Statutory Restrictions  
This research has discussed and established that protected strikes are those which comply 
with the provisions of sections 64, 65 and 67 at Chapter IV of the LRA, which impose 
procedural requirements and substantive limitations on the use of strikes. The procedural 
requirements are a prelude to a protected strike, and this includes conciliation, notice of 
commencement of a strike or lock-out, adherence to time periods, and advisory arbitration 
where applicable, prior to strike action.  
In terms of s 64 (1) (a), the issue in dispute is referred either to a bargaining council or to the 
CCMA562 for conciliation. Failing settlement, a certificate of outcome is issued, or a period of 
30 days from the date of referral of the dispute must elapse.  
It is required that at least 48 hours written notice of commencement of the strike must be 
given to the other party in terms of s 64 (1) (b).563  Striking is permissible only after notice is 
given and notice of proposed strike should be given to the employer.564 Discharge of the said 
conciliation and notice requirements by either party entitles the other party to take industrial 
action over the dispute. The notice to the employer must specify the precise time of the 
commencement of the strike.565 It is insufficient merely to state that the strike will commence 
at some later time.566   
This research has, in addition to establishing the need to incorporate more restrictive 
provisions in the LRA, also established the ineffectiveness of the statutory restrictions on the 
right to strike in the LRA with specific reference to the “notice requirement.” The 
                                                 
 
562 Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration as established by the LRA.  
563 Where the state is the employer the required notice period in terms of s 64 (1)(d) of the LRA is seven 
days.  
564 If the employer is a member of an employer’s organisation that is a party to the dispute, s 64 (b)(ii) of 
the LRA requires that notice be given to that employer’s organisation. If the issue in dispute relates to a 
collective agreement to be concluded in a bargaining council, s 64 (1)(b)(i) stipulates that such notice 
must be given to that council.   
565 J Grogan, Collective Labour Law 2ed (2007) 384.  
566 Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitaryware v National Construction Building & Allied Workers 
Union & others (2) (1997) 18 ILJ 671 (LAC); Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Professional 
Transport Workers Union (1998) 20 ILJ 260 (LAC).  
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ineffectiveness of the notice requirement in curbing unlawful strikes was also proved in the 
case of SATAWU.567 This case ended up at the Constitutional Court. It is the view of this 
research that the ineffectiveness hereof is caused by the vagueness of s 64 (1) (b) of the LRA, 
which prescribes the notice requirement. In this case the employer had dismissed employees 
who had participated in a strike by SATAWU, which was preceded by a notice issued by 
SATAWU on behalf of its members. These employees were not members of SATAWU and 
they belonged to a minority union that had not issued a notice to strike as it had resolved that 
it will not go on strike.  
The employer argued that it was an implied requirement of s 64 (1) (b) that the strike notice 
would only be valid in respect of those employees who had referred the dispute and on whose 
behalf the notice had been given. The Labour Court ruled that the section did not place any 
limitation as to who should give notice, nor on whose behalf it could be given.568 
The Labour Appeal Court was divided on the question of whether the notice of intention to 
strike issued by the union also entitled the non-union members to strike. The majority held 
that the non-union members were permitted to join the strike in respect of the same notice 
issued by SATAWU. However, the minority judgement in this case by Zondo JP found that 
the use of the pronoun ‘we’ in the strike notice implied that it would only be SATAWU 
members who would participate in the strike action.569  
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, it was found that the strike was unprotected and 
the dismissal of the employees was not automatically unfair. The matter was then referred to 
the Constitutional Court where the fundamental question to be decided was whether the 
dismissed employees met the provisions of s 64 (1) (b) by engaging in a strike when only 
SATAWU issued a strike notice on behalf of its members. Of importance is that the 
Constitutional Court further stated that where the language was clear, the court could not 
speculate about issues which the legislature saw fit not to detail in the section. The Court 
further stated that the procedural pre-conditions and substantive limitations of the right to 
                                                 
 
567  SATAWU and others v Moloto NO and another 2012 (6) SA 249; (2012) 12 BLLR 1193 (CC).  
568  Ibid para 24.  
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strike in the LRA contain no express requirement that every employee who intends to 
participate in a protected strike must personally or through a representative give notice of the 
commencement of the intended strike, nor who will not take part in the strike.570 
It has therefore, been established in this research and through the Constitutional Court 
judgement that the notice requirement in terms of s 64 (1) (b) of the LRA is not effective. 
This research further argues that the interpretation by the Constitutional Court should be 
blamed to the section itself as it fails to express the important specifics that the notice should 
entail which the Constitutional Court found to have not been specified. Had these been 
specified it would be clear who is entitled to participate in a strike preceded by the “notice 
requirement.” The notice requirement, as it stands, cannot be said to be the best means of 
curbing the prevalent violent strikes in the workplace. To be more specific, what should be 
considered is that if s 64 (1) (b) is not improved, strike action will always be open to abuse by 
non-union members and those members of the public who have an ulterior motive.  
7.4 Proposed Solutions by Government  
It has been established in this research that the government, after having witnessed the wild 
cat strikes in the mining industry, made some efforts to curb the wave of unprotected strikes.  
Amongst these efforts was the tabling of the Labour Relations Amendment Bill before 
parliament, by the Minister of Labour in March 2012 .571 The unions would, in terms of the 
amendments introduced in the Bill, conduct ballots to ensure that the majority of members 
agreed to the need of the strike before a strike would be embarked on.572 This view was 
however, strongly rejected by COSATU and as a result the Bill was never promulgated.  
7.4.1 Proposed Code of Good Practice  
The National Economic, Development and Labour Council (hereinafter referred to as 
“NEDLAC”), comprising of government, business, labour and civil society has put together 
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the Code of Good Practice and deliberated extensively thereon, with the hope of finding 
solutions to promote lasting peace for South Africa’s labour relations. This Code will cover 
all phases of industrial disputes including pre-negotiation, negotiation, post-negotiation, 
dispute, strike and lockout, post-strike and lockout. This code is intended to curb the violence 
associated with strike action in the workplace. There are a few critical provisions in the 
proposed Code of Good Practice. The Code amongst other provisions, provides for picketing 
rules. This addresses the conduct and the nature of the picket. In detail the provisions 
summarily provide that:  
(1) The registered trade union and employer should seek to agree to picketing rules before 
the commencement of the strike or picket.573  
(2) A collective agreement may contain picketing rules. When they negotiate an agreement 
the following factors should be considered-574  
(a) the nature of the authorisation and its service upon the employer;575  
(b) the notice of the commencement of the picket including the place, time and the extent 
of the picket;576  
(c) the nature of the conduct in the picket;577  
(d) the number of picketers and their location;577  
(e) the modes of communication between marshals and employers and any other relevant 
parties;579  
(f) access to the employer’s premises for purposes other than picketing e.g. access to 
toilets, the use of telephones,580 etcetera;  
                                                 
 
573  Section 4 of the Proposed Code of Good Practice on Collective Bargaining.  
574  Ibid Section 4 (2).  
575  Ibid Section 4 (2) (a).  
576  Ibid Section 4 (2) (b).  
577  Ibid Section 4 (2) (d).  
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(g) the conduct of the pickets on the employer’s premises;578 and  
(h) this code of good practice.579  
 
What is important from this code and relevant for purposes of this research is that the code 
has slightly dealt with the issue of the notice commencing the strike action. From the code it 
is clear that the notice will be required to stipulate the number of picketers. This is one issue 
amongst a few that this research established to be lacking from the notice requirement in the 
LRA. However, the Code does not seem to deal with other issues within the notice 
requirement which this research believes are crucial. These issues will be dealt with by way 
of taking guidance from a foreign statute below.  
This code however, cannot be seen as a binding document in that even if either of the parties 
has been found to be in breach thereof, there are no serious legal consequences. This is so 
because the code provides that it does not impose any legal obligations and the failure to 
observe it does not by itself render anyone liable in any proceedings.580 In addressing the 
issue of prevalent violent strike actions, this research argues that the state cannot afford to 
introduce laws that have no effect of binding the relevant parties, as such an exercise would 
be fruitless.  
These attempts by government clearly show that the government considers that the existing 
provisions in the LRA pertaining to the right to strike have had limited effect in dealing with 
the wave of unprotected strikes that have recently unfolded, especially in the mining sector. 
This research argues that more still needs to be done in order to curb the prevalent wave of 
unprotected strikes. Even the proposed code does not necessarily address the issues raised by 
this research.  
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7.5 Suggestions and Recommendations  
It is evident from this research that collective bargaining in South Africa is, for the most part, 
not exercised as per the LRA. Employees in the workplace have departed from the collective 
bargaining process stipulated in the LRA. It has also been established that despite the total 
departure from the prescribed bargaining process, the restrictive provisions on the right to 
strike in the LRA, such as the notice requirement, has not been effective in curbing the 
violent strikes that we have noticed in the mining industry. It has further been established that 
further provisions dealing with this issue need to be introduced into the LRA in order to 
ensure that the prevalent wave of unprotected strikes is curbed.  
This research acknowledges that amongst other driving factors in the mining industry which 
lead employees to undertake unprotected strike action, socio-economic predicaments are a 
prevalent cause. However, this research understands that as much as this is a matter of serious 
consideration, it cannot be used as an excuse or a justification to breach the collective 
processes in the LRA.  
The Government, including COSATU and other relevant stakeholders have not been strict on 
the mining industry. The mining industry has shown no interest whatsoever, in addressing the 
socio-economic needs of its employees. This research has established that the Mining Charter 
which was introduced in 2002 for purposes of addressing the socio-economic issues in the 
mines, had never been enforced by the employers. It has further been established in this 
research that a second attempt to implement the Mining Charter in 2010 was undertaken. This 
new charter aimed at addressing various shortcomings in the implementation of the Mining 
Charter of 2002. The government therefore, should pay attention to these issues and monitor 
the implementation of the Mining Charter closely, in order to address the needs of the 
mineworkers. Failure to facilitate these issues may undermine whatever constructive 




Brassey581 provides that deeper structural changes are required in the labour law market to 
address all the problems faced. He suggests fundamental changes in the laws that govern the 
labour market including repealing labour legislation that unreasonably extends statutory 
bargaining agreements to non-parties.582 According to Brassey, South Africa has the highest 
strike rate in the world. He provides that in an environment where wage settlements are 
realistically pitched, workers will have significantly reduced motive to strike due to 
understanding and reasoning. This view by Brassey confirms what this research has 
suggested above in that the Mining Charter, which seeks to address socio-economic issues, 
must be enforced and closely monitored so as to stabilise the situation in the mining industry.  
John Brand has also made several suggestions583 most of which when carefully considered can 
partly assist in curbing the prevalent wave of unprotected strikes in the mining industry.  
He suggested as follows during his presentation:  
The establishment of an independent institute to:587  
 
 Educate the social partners about their rights and obligations in terms of the Bill of 
Rights and ILO Conventions;  
 The notice period for a strike to be increased to 14 days;  
 The introduction of a right to a secret strike ballot within the 14 days’ notice period  
 Such secret ballot shall entitle affected workers and unions to strike protection:584 
 If the ballot is conducted by the CCMA or a suitably accredited independent body, 
and  
 If the quorum for the ballot is 50% plus one of those workers who wish to participate 
in the strike, and  
                                                 
 
581 M Brassey “Fixing the Laws that Govern the Labour Market” (2012) ILJ 1 17.  
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 If 50% plus one of those workers who vote, vote in favour of the strike, and  
 A further ballot may be called after 30 days from the date of a previous ballot, and  
 A specialised Industrial Action Protection Unit be established within the South 
African Police Service to protect people from criminal conduct during industrial 
action;585  
 Employers, other than those in essential services, be prohibited from hiring 
replacement workers during protected industrial action;586  
 The Labour Court be given the power to grant appropriate and proportional relief for 
any breach of the law to any party whose rights are violated during industrial action. 
This may include suspending the protection of industrial action for limited periods of 
time in extreme cases;587  
 Public servants exercising authority in the name of the State should be included in the 
definition of essential services workers.588  
 
This research concurs with John Brand’s suggestions and particularly one pertaining to the re-
introduction of secret ballot. This research has established the need for such reintroduction. 
John Brand concludes his views by suggesting that there will only be lasting industrial peace 
when the primary causes of industrial unrest, such as the social wage deficit and the structure 
and process of collective bargaining are addressed.  
This research has also established in Chapter 6, a few restrictive provisions from certain 
foreign states which can be helpful when incorporated in the LRA as part of statutory 
restrictions on the right to strike. It has also been established that the notice requirement in 
terms section 64 of the LRA is vague and that causes the notice to be ineffective. The notice 
therefore, needs to be amended and be aligned with that of New Zealand. In terms of the 
                                                 
 
585 Ibid.  
586 Ibid.  
587 Ibid.  
588  Ibid. 
152  
  
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1992 of New Zealand, a relevant notice is a notice in 
writing which states whether industrial action is intended to be continuous or discontinuous 
and specifies where it is to be continuous, the intended date for any of the affected employees 
to begin to take part in the action.589  
The notice is further required to entail the following:  
 
 a list of the categories of employee to which the affected employees belong;590  
 list of the workplaces at which the affected employees work;591  
 the total number of the affected employees;592  
 the number of the affected employees in each of the categories in the list 
mentioned;593  
 the number of the affected employees who work at each workplace in the list 
mentioned;594   
 the total number of the affected employees;595  
 the categories of employee to which the affected employees belong and the number of 
the affected employees in each of those categories;596 and  
 the workplaces at which the affected employees work and the number of them who 
work at each of those workplaces.597  
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A union is required to agree with the employer before industrial action ceases to be 
authorized or endorsed,598 that it will cease to be authorized or endorsed with effect from a 
date specified in the agreement (“the suspension date") and that it may again be authorized or 
endorsed with effect from a date not earlier than a date specified in the agreement.599 The 
union is not entitled to conduct a strike action that continues until their demands are met. A 
specific date on which their action will cease to be authorised has to be specified on their 
notice regardless of whether their demand would have been met by such date.  
The required notice in terms thereof is very clear and specific. It assists the employer in 
knowing which employees will be taking part in the intended strike. Furthermore, this limits 
the chances of having unknown members partaking in the strike as the employer will be 
aware of the estimated number of employees that ought to take part in the strike. The moment 
the number of strikers does not seem to be congruent with the number which the employer 
was notified of, then such strike would risk the possibility of being unprotected. This will 
also require the organisers of the strike to ensure that no other members or individuals other 
than those listed, will partake in the strike. This provision will assist in curbing prevalent 
strike action because the end date of the strike stipulated in the notice will mean that the 
strike will cease from that date. There will be no strike action that persists indefinitely as is 
normally the case in South Africa.  
A second restrictive provision that can be introduced is found in Canada. In Canada the right 
to strike is regulated by a Code of Good Practice.600 The Code states that where notice to 
bargain collectively has been given under this code, the bargaining agent and the employer, 
without delay, but in any case within twenty days after the notice was given unless the parties 
otherwise agree, shall meet and commence, or cause authorized representatives on their 
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behalf to meet and commence, to bargain collectively in good faith, and make every 
reasonable effort to enter into a collective agreement.601 
Most importantly, in terms of this Code, the Minister has the authority to order that an 
employer’s latest offer be put to the members of the bargaining unit for a vote if, in the 
Minister’s opinion, this would be in the public interest.602 Upon the employees’ acceptance of 
the offer, all strike or lockout activity shall cease. The Minister may do this at his or her own 
discretion; no referral from a party to the dispute is needed.603  
This means that according to the Canadian Code, the Minister has an option to put the 
employer’s last offer to the members of the bargaining unit to decide on it through a vote. 
When an offer has been made by the employer after a certain demand was brought by the 
employees through a recognised bargaining process, the Minister is then entitled to intervene 
and put that offer to the members of the bargaining unit to decide over it by means of a secret 
ballot. The outcome of the vote will then determine whether the employer’s last offer is 
accepted. This option can help prevent a number of strike actions from taking place. It 
suggests the government’s involvement in the process. Even if this process can be facilitated 
by an independent body and not by government, it can still curb the possibility of continuous 
and violent strikes.  
7.6 Conclusion  
This research has established that the restrictive provisions on the right to strike in the LRA 
are not effective, and more particularly the notice requirement which is perceived as the most 
important and symbolic requirement is also not effective. It has also been established that 
other than working around the notice requirement to give it more effect, more restrictive 
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602 Section 108.1 (1) of Collective Bargaining Code under Canada Labour Code-Remedies when parties 
fail to resolve disputes, Legal and Legislative Affairs Division, 26 January 2009.  
603  Ibid. 
155  
  
provisions need to be introduced which can curb the prevalent violent strike actions in the 
mining sector.  
These provisions, taken from the foreign legislation of New Zealand and Canada have been 
introduced, coupled with the re-introduction of a secret ballot provision. These provisions 
therefore, hold the potential to curb the prevalent unprotected strike action associated with 
violence in our country.  
This research therefore, recommends that that these provisions be incorporated into the LRA 
so as to add more restrictive provisions in the LRA preceding the right to strike. These will 
not amount to the unjustifiable limitation of the right to strike.  
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